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Abstract
(Dis)unity in the UN Security Council: Voting Patterns in the UN’s Peace and Security Organ
by
Paul Romita

Advisor: Thomas G. Weiss

The conventional wisdom is that the international system in the Cold War was defined by the
struggle between East and West. While this was certainly the case, voting patterns in the UN
Security Council present a more nuanced picture. Counterintuitively, France, the United
Kingdom and the United States—three of the five permanent members of the Security Council
(the Permanent 3 or P3) and members of the NATO alliance—voted apart on Council resolutions
far more frequently in the Cold War, when they faced the common threat of the Soviet Union,
than in the post-Cold War era. This dissertation observes that they were frequently divided on
issues related to colonialism and Israel/Palestine, among other matters. It argues that the voting
differences among them largely had to do with the way the Council functioned, as negotiating
processes were underdeveloped and assertive Council members from the Non-aligned Movement
(NAM) often proposed draft resolutions which made bold political statements but had little
chance of being adopted. As the Cold War ended, however, the permanent members—the P3, as
well as Russia and China—gained a newfound appreciation for the potential of a Security
Council unhindered by significant East-West tensions. They sought to consolidate their control
of the Council’s work. In part because of the perception expressed by permanent and elected
members alike that a unified Council is a more effective one, voting unanimity has been
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achieved on nearly 92 percent of adopted resolutions since 1992. The dissertation further
maintains that the NAM has lost its unity and political clout in the post-Cold War, with its
members (or for that matter, any other group of members in the Council) less likely to propose
draft resolutions destined to be vetoed. At the same time, it posits that the elected members (the
Elected 10 or E10), in spite of the differing views among them, at times play a constructive role
in the Council’s work, including by building bridges among the permanent members when they
are divided.
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Introduction
The popular conception of the Cold War period is that the world was divided into two
ideological camps, with the foreign policies of states closely aligned with either superpower.
Some scholars also argued that with the end of the Cold War, the Western alliance would fall
apart, as the Soviet threat no longer bound them together. 1 However, voting patterns in the UN
Security Council, the international organ entrusted with the primary responsibility for
maintaining international peace and security, demonstrate that the opposite has occurred. France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States—the three most powerful members of the NATO
alliance—have voted together with greater frequency in the post-Cold War era than during the
Cold War era. One might have expected that the former Soviet Union (Russia) and the United
States would vote together a higher percentage of the time after the end of the Cold War. But the
fact that these three countries (known as the “Permanent 3” or the “P3” in the Council) have
voted together a high percentage of time in the post-Cold War years, without the threat of the
Soviet Union to bind them together, would seem counter-intuitive.
The evidence of P3 voting divergence in the Security Council in the Cold War, followed
by P3 voting convergence in the post-Cold War era, is striking. Through the end of 1991, they
did not vote together as a bloc on approximately one of every six resolutions (slightly under 17
percent of the time), whereas they have voted apart on only one of roughly every fifty resolutions
(approximately 2 percent of the time) between 1992 and 2016.2

See, for example, John J. Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic 266, no. 2 (1990):
35-50; and Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics,” International Security 18, no. 2
(1993): 75-76.
2
These figures relate to resolutions that were adopted or vetoed. They do not include the handful of resolutions that
failed to be adopted because of insufficient votes, which are difficult to track. Furthermore, while there were 725
resolutions adopted in the Cold War, 11 of these were omitted from the analysis because the voting record was
1

1

Determining why this change in P3 voting patterns has occurred raises several interesting
questions. Some of these are relevant to the evolution of P3 policy positions, but there is also
much to be said about changes in how the Council has functioned as an institution, how the
perceptions of this organ among its members (permanent and elected alike) has changed, and
how its working methods have evolved during the history of the United Nations. Why did the P3
often vote apart in the Cold War? To what extent is unity among the P3 in voting in the postCold War era a reflection of their shared values and policy positions, and to what extent is it a
reflection of a broader trend toward consensus within the Council as a whole? Why has this trend
toward unanimous voting occurred in recent decades? Council members value unity in decisionmaking, but precisely why is this so? Given the trend toward unanimous voting in the Council,
why does this organ seem so divided on so many issues? Does unanimity in voting reflect
widespread commitment to the outcomes produced? Has the movement toward unanimity
improved the quality of the Council’s decision-making or not? In other words has increased
voting consensus been a positive or negative development, or a bit of both? And when does
unanimity break down?

The Argument
This thesis will attempt to answer the questions posed above. In doing so, it will make five main
arguments. First, in the Cold War, the Council members in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
coalesced around a strong anti-colonial, anti-Zionist agenda and frequently proposed draft
resolutions that exposed the different views among the permanent members and led to voting
differences and resulted in frequent vetoes. In the post-Cold war period, there is no similar bloc

unclear. Voting in the Council includes positive votes, negative votes (which, in the case of permanent members is
a veto on all but procedural matters) and abstentions.
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of elected members that will consistently table controversial drafts that undermine the pursuit of
consensus. To the contrary, the elected members frequently come together in an effort to build
bridges among the permanent members, even though the E10 (as the 10 elected members are
called) often have divergent policy positions.
Second, Council members place significant value in this organ’s stature as a decisionmaking body, an arbiter of difficult matters related to international peace and security. This has
especially been the case in the post-Cold War era when perceptions of the Council’s problemsolving capacity have by and large been more favorable among permanent and elected members
alike than in the Cold War. The effort to achieve unanimity is a reflection of the importance that
members attribute to the organ’s work. In particular, as I outline in Chapter IV, there are four key
reasons why unanimity is so desired by Council members: the legitimacy it accords to decisions;3
the notion that a consensus document is the product of the good stewardship of the negotiation
process by those leading it; the perceived impact of unanimous resolutions on the party or parties
who are the object of the resolution; and the fear of isolation of those members considering
breaking the consensus.
Third, institutions and processes have been developed by the permanent members to
manage the Council’s workload that have reinforced the trend toward greater consensus since the
late Cold War era. Interactions among the permanent members have increased as a result,

This part of the argument is consistent with the work of several scholars who have written about the Council’s
legitimating role. These include, for example, Mats Berdal, “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but
Indispensable,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 9; Inis L. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of
the United Nations,” International Organization 20, no. 3 (1996): 367-379; Bruce Cronin, “International consensus
and the changing legal authority of the UN Security Council,” in The UN Security Council and the Politics of
International Authority, ed. Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 57-79; and Ian Hurd,
After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press
2007).
3
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creating more opportunities to strike agreements or at least achieve acquiescence than had been
the case in the Cold War.4
Fourth, unanimous decisions do not necessarily have the desired effect of exerting more
leverage on the subject parties. The voting landscape is littered with unanimously adopted
resolutions, which have done little to support international peace and security. Compromises
struck to achieve the agreement of all 15 Council members often lead to weak resolutions or
resolutions that are difficult to implement because they are not backed by sufficient political will.
Fifth, while elected members can play an important role in the Council’s work, this organ
is managed by and for the permanent members, whose veto privilege gives them an enormous
advantage over the E10 in determining how and whether decisions are made. If the “Permanent
5” or the “P5” (which consists of the P3 and Russia and China) have fundamental disagreements
on issues of importance to them, the unity of the Council will be sacrificed.

Cold War Divisions
The general view is that East-West tensions in the Cold War severely hampered the Council’s
ability to carry out its responsibilities. The Soviet-US confrontation was the key fault line in
international relations, one that played out in Council deliberations. But as some scholars have
noted, tensions within the Western camp also hindered the Council’s work.5 Among the P3, the
United States viewed itself as an anti-colonial power that supported self-determination, while

4

Council outcomes refer to resolutions and presidential statements. Press statements and press elements are also
products produced by Council members, but they are not considered formal Council outcomes.
Unlike resolutions, presidential statements, press statements, and press elements require agreement among all 15
members of the Council.
5
See, for example, Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council (New York:
Stein and Day, 1971); and David Bosco, Five to Rule Them All: The UN Security Council and the Making of the
Modern World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
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France and the United Kingdom were reluctant to give up their empires and supported the
colonial policies of other European states as well.6 Wilsonian idealism may have informed the
US perspective on self-determination to a certain extent; however, the United States had
important strategic reasons for supporting this ideal as well. It was concerned that if it did not
espouse self-determination, the former colonial states that entered the UN General Assembly as
independent states in the 1950s and 1960s would fall into the hands of the Soviet Union, leading
to the “possibility of an adverse balance of power in the General Assembly.” 7 It is not by mistake
then that the P3 frequently diverged in their Council voting in cases in which the colonial
interests of the United Kingdom and France—or other colonial powers to which they were
sympathetic—were at stake, including with regard to Suez, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Southern Rhodesia, and the Comoros.
The United States may not have had a colonial empire, but it did behave imperiously with
regard to many states in Central and South America during the Cold War. In the tradition of the
Monroe Doctrine, it was particularly sensitive to what it perceived as communist or otherwise
threatening behavior by states in its neighborhood, a perception that was reflected in how the
United States voted in the Council and one which at times separated it from France and the
United Kingdom. Thus, the United States voted apart from the other two Western permanent
members on a number of country-specific resolutions in the Cold War pertaining to the
Americas, including, for example, Grenada and Nicaragua.

On the difference in worldviews between the United States and NATO’s colonial powers over the reluctance of
these colonials states to relinquish their possessions, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO Divided, NATO United: The
Evolution of an Alliance (Westport, Calif.: Praeger Publishers, 2004), 12-13, 21, 24; William Roger Louis,
“American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire,” International Affairs 61, no. 3 (1985); and
C.M. Woodhouse, “Attitudes of NATO Countries Towards the United States,” World Politics 10, no. 2 (1953): 209.
7
Woodhouse, “Attitudes of NATO Countries,” 209.
6
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Another consistent area of disagreement among the P3 during the Cold War (and since),
reflected in Security Council voting patterns, has been the US’s unique relationship with Israel.
The United States stands largely apart from the overwhelming majority of UN member states on
this issue. Over the years, the United States has made a habit of either vetoing or abstaining
resolutions condemning Israel. Infrequently the United Kingdom has joined the United States in
abstaining on such resolutions, but it has never cast a joint veto with the United States on such
votes. While US support of Israel in the Council has spanned the Cold War and post-Cold War
periods, the United States nonetheless resorted to the veto more frequently to protect Israeli
interests in the Cold War era than it has during the post-Cold War era. During the 23 year period
from 1967 (the year of the Six Day War) through 1989, the US vetoed 27 resolutions critical of
Israel; however, in the 26-year period from 1990 through 2016, it vetoed only 14 resolutions
opposed to Israel in a Council that was more active in terms of volume of resolutions adopted
than it was during the Cold War.8
The voting divergences among the P3 in the Cold War reflected tangible policy
disagreements on discrete issues. But, at times, these differences also reflected an uncertainty
about the merits of the Security Council as a foreign policy instrument. In particular, France’s
ambivalence toward the UN during Charles de Gaulle’s years as president (1959-1969) impacted
on the way it voted in the Council. De Gaulle viewed the UN as a tool for the United States to
exercise its dominance in world affairs. 9 As Andrew Boyd has written, “the French councilman’s
basic instructions during these years seemed to run something like this: Do not take initiatives. If
somebody else does, say that the action contemplated is illegal or at least improper. But do not

8

List of Security Council vetoes compiled by the Dag Hammarskjöld Library, available at
http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/veto.
9
Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, 29.
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vote against it. As a rule, abstain.”10 True to Boyd’s claim, France did not veto any texts in the de
Gaulle years, but it did issue a rash of abstentions (18) on adopted resolutions in this time period.
However, it did veto draft resolutions at other periods of the Cold War, while it has yet to
exercise its veto privilege in the post-Cold War era.
A key factor that generated voting disunity in the Council was the assertiveness of the
developing world. By the 1960’s, the NAM had become a significant force in international
affairs, advocating for the interests of developing countries. Sheer numbers ensured that the
NAM would wield considerable power in the UN General Assembly. Although the P5 veto
diminished the NAM’s influence in the UN Security Council, non-aligned states were
nonetheless able to push their anti-colonial, anti-Zionist agenda as a unified bloc. At times, the
NAM got its way in the Council, as Council action on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa
demonstrated in some instances. Usually, however, on these and other issues, NAM positions led
to frequent vetoes on draft resolutions. Since the end of the Cold War, the NAM’s influence in
global affairs has receded. Whereas several NAM members would coalesce around common
positions in the Council in the last two and one half decades of the Cold War, the elected
membership in the post-Cold War era has been less unified, detracting from the E10’s impact on
the deliberations of the UN’s peace and security organ.

A more active Council and efforts to build consensus: late Cold War to the
present
As the Cold War waned, there was a newfound appreciation of the possibilities of
multilateralism and a sense of excitement at what the UN could accomplish without superpower
tensions. The ending of the Cold War led the permanent members to reevaluate their foreign
10

Ibid, 29-30.
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policies. In a September 1987 article published in Pravda and Izvestiia, Soviet Chairman Mikhail
Gorbachev argued in favor of a “comprehensive system of international security” with the UN at
its core.11 US President George H.W. Bush proclaimed a New World Order “where diverse
nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind—
peace and security, freedom and the rule of law.”12 The handling of the First Gulf War seemed to
confirm this optimism, with the Council authorizing a broad military coalition to expel Saddam
Hussein’s forces from Kuwait in 1991, the first such Chapter VII action since the disputed Korea
decision in 1950.13
As this seismic shift in the international system began to unfold and the permanent
members of the Security Council began to envision a United Nations that might be able to live
up to the promise of its founders, the potential for a revitalized multilateral system meant that
these states had a vested interest in ensuring that the Security Council achieved the sometimes
incompatible and sometimes compatible goals of operating effectively and serving their foreign
policy interests. Of course, the permanent members had always wanted the Council to serve
these dual purposes, but this suddenly appeared more possible than in the past.
The enthusiasm about the Security Council in the aftermath of the First Gulf War soon
waned amidst numerous peacekeeping failures of the 1990s, including in Somalia, Rwanda, and
Srebrenica. The record of the ensuing years has also been rocky, occasioned with some successes
(e.g., East Timor and Sierra Leone) but also littered by many failures (e.g., Darfur and Syria).
But the Council has continued to survive and, in spite of its shortcomings, it has maintained a

11

Mikhail Gorbachev, Realities and Guarantees for a Secure World (Moscow, Russia: Novosti Press Agency
Publishing House, 1987).
12
George H.W. Bush, “Address to the US Congress,” (11 September 1990).
13
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, A Secretary-General’s Memoir: Pilgrimage for Peace (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997), 248.
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heightened status in the foreign policies of the permanent members. This is why they invest so
much energy in making it work for them.
Since the late Cold War years, all the permanent members have viewed unanimity in
decision-making as a means to promote a better functioning Security Council. As Kendall W.
Stiles has written, albeit in reference to the entire UN system and not just the Council, “the norm
of consensus” had taken hold by the end of the Cold War.14 For the permanent members, it has
made no sense for the Council to be hindered by the frequent use of the veto, as this only
weakens the institution that they need to achieve their goals. Resort to the veto is to be done
sparingly, only in exceptional circumstances, when core national interests are perceived to be at
stake. While the veto continues to be employed and at times can cripple Council action with
devastating consequences for people on the ground, the general trend in the post-Cold War era
has been toward its less frequent use. (China is the sole exception on this count among the
permanent members.) Abstentions on resolutions have also been used more sparingly in the postCold War era than during the Cold War era.
There will always be disagreements among the permanent members, even the P3, which
have generally formed a highly cohesive voting bloc in the past 25 years. At times, the
differences among the permanent members will be irreconcilable, forcing divergent votes among
them, as we have seen in recent years with issues such as Israel/Palestine, Syria, and Ukraine. In
some instances, when it becomes clear in negotiations that unanimity cannot be achieved and a
permanent member threatens to use the veto, the member(s) proposing a resolution will withdraw
the draft. At other times, drafts may not even be proposed for discussion out of fear that they will

Kendall W. Stiles, “The Power of Procedure and the Procedures of the Powerful: Anti-Terror Law in the United
Nations,” Journal of Peace Research 43, no. 1 (2006): 41-42.
14
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be vetoed. This so-called “hidden” or “pocket” veto looms large in deliberations and has a
deleterious effect on decision-making. However, notwithstanding Russia’s recent assertiveness,
painstaking efforts have been taken in the post-Cold War era to promote consensus, although the
quality of the outcomes is often questionable. The Council’s level of engagement in peace and
security issues and the volume of its outcomes (resolutions and presidential statements) have
soared in the last 25 years. In fact, the Council of today would be almost unrecognizable to
diplomats of the Cold War era. In 1971, Boyd observed: while “organized…to function
continuously,” according to article 28 of the Charter, “the Security Council is not sitting
anywhere, most of time. It averages one formal meeting a week.”15 By way of comparison, the
Council held 256 formal meetings and 169 informal meetings in 2016.16 The Council’s
production in terms of written outcomes has also proliferated. From January 1946 to December
1991 (the month the Soviet Union officially collapsed), the Council adopted a mere 725
resolutions, in comparison to more than 1,600 since January 1992.
The permanent members also have taken a strong interest in developing mechanisms and
processes to help them to run this very active Council. Whether through ad-hoc closed meetings,
serving as penholders (i.e., drafting resolutions), or appointing chairs of sanctions committees
among the elected members, they have tried to steward the Council’s work through what I call
“managed multilateralism.”17 They collaborate to exert as much leverage and control over
Council decision-making as they can, an approach that has become increasingly pronounced in
recent years. These enhanced interactions among them have reinforced the general tendency
15

Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg, 8.
Security Council Report, “The Security Council in 2016,” February 2017 Monthly Forecast,
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2017-02/the_security_council_in_2016.php.
17
These mechanisms and processes are synonymous with “international regimes.” Lisa L. Martin notes that regimes
can be “defined as sets of principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures,” referring to Stephen Krasner’s
early work on the subject. Lisa Martin, “Neoliberalism,” in International Relations Theories: Discipline and
Diversity, ed. Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 111.
16

10

toward unanimous decision-making, as they have provided forums in which they can uphold
common policy positions, hammer out differences, and if necessary, make deals with one
another.
Managed multilateralism has taken various forms in the context of the Security Council’s
work. Most informally, the P5 from time to time meet to discuss critical issues of common
concern. This phenomenon began in earnest soon after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the
Soviet Union, and there was an easing of East-West friction. In late 1986, seeking a way to end
the Iran/Iraq War, the permanent members began meeting informally at the residence of UK
Ambassador John Thompson to discuss strategies for ending the Iraq-Iran War.18 While there
have been some periods of the post-Cold War era when meetings among the permanent members
occurred more infrequently than others, 19 the P3 in particular have consistently played a
significant role in drafting outcomes and leading negotiations, thus having an important impact
on decision-making in the Council.
At times, the elected members have not passively accepted their subordinate role. They
have been known at times to take the initiative to make their mark on the Council’s work. In the
instances when they take the lead in drafting outcomes, they frequently work hard to promote
agreement among all members, at times spending months leading negotiation processes in an
effort to break impasses among the permanent members and to unite the Council.
However, in spite of the frequent efforts by permanent and elected members to achieve
unity, unity in and of itself is not necessarily a good thing. Concessions made to achieve
David M. Malone, “Introduction,” in The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, ed. David
M. Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 4.
19
For example, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, UK Ambassador from 1997-2003, has said the P3 rarely met as a group
during his tenure in New York. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, interviewed by phone by the author, New York, 3 March
2017.
18
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agreement on a resolution may lead to that resolution being so weak as to be useless or even
counter-productive. Permanent members that acquiesce to a particular resolution to avoid a veto
may be reluctant to implement its measures. For example, as several reports of the Sudan
Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts have demonstrated in recent years, weapons produced
after 2005 (when the arms embargo was expanded through resolution 1591 of 29 March 2005 to
include the government of Sudan and other signatories of the N’Djamena Agreement) manage to
find their way into Darfur, in violation of the arms embargo.20 And yet, resolutions reauthorizing
the Panel of Experts of the Darfur Sanctions Committee annually have been unanimously
adopted nearly every year since 2008; the one exception was resolution 1945 of 14 October
2010, which was adopted with 14 affirmative votes and one abstention by China. 21 In 2010, the
final report of the Panel of Experts maintained that Chinese bullets had been used in Darfur, 22 a
likely explanation for the abstention.

The P3 versus China and Russia
In spite of the trend toward unanimous voting among the permanent members in the post-Cold
War era, there are nonetheless key differences between the P3, on the on hand, and China and
Russia, on the other hand: how they have voted since the end of the Cold War, what issues
matter to them in negotiations on Council outcomes, and what this reflects about their
worldviews. As demonstrated by their voting patterns, one of the key differences is that China
and Russia generally hold a more restrictive view of what constitutes a threat to international
peace and security than the P3, sometimes resulting in irreconcilable differences during
20

See, for example: Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005)
(S/2013/79), 12 February 2013; Ibid, (S/2014/87), 7 February 2014; and Ibid, (S/2015/31), 16 January 2015.
21
UN Security Council resolution 1945, 14 October 2010.
22
Clifford Coonan, “Chinese Bullets Killed Our Staff in Darfur, Says UN,” Independent, 21 October 2010,
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/chinese-bullets-killed-our-staff-in-darfur-says-un-2113351.html.
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negotiations. This has become a more noticeable factor since 2007,23 with China and especially
Russia increasingly asserting their great power status in words and deeds and clashing with the
P3 in the process.
One manifestation of China’s and Russia’s more restrictive view of international peace
and security is that they adhere more closely to traditional sovereignty norms than the P3. They
are generally uncomfortable with efforts to focus the Council’s work on human rights issues,
especially when they believe that doing so constitutes interference in the domestic affairs of
sovereign states. Between 2007 and 2016, there were seven joint China-Russia vetoes: five on
Syria, one on Myanmar, and one on Zimbabwe—in all of these cases, significant human rights
violations were committed by the regimes in power.24 In these cases, China and Russia
frequently employed arguments emphasizing the importance of upholding the territorial integrity
and domestic jurisdiction of the states in question, reluctant to criticize these states in any
meaningful way. Of course, the P3 are often averse to exerting strong leverage on close allies
that commit human rights violations in order to improve their behavior (for example, the limited
pressure they have placed on the Saudi-led coalition for the cynical way it has prosecuted its war
in Yemen). However, they are more willing to discuss human rights issues in the Council than
China and Russia, and in general, they do not hold the same level of commitment to norms of
sovereignty and non-interference as China and Russia in cases where human rights violations are
being committed.

23

2007 was the year of the first joint China-Russia veto, which focused on Myanmar. See UN Security Council
document S/2007/14, 12 January 2007.
24
Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, “Evolution of the Security Council’s Engagement on Human Rights,” in
The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights, ed. Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 26. Genser and Stagno Ugarte noted that “…the Russian Federation
and China have, to date, always acted in tandem in using the veto to defeat draft resolutions that contained humanrights elements. These were on the situations in Myanmar…, Syria…, and Zimbabwe…, all of which contained
contextual references to ‘human rights.’”

13

Disagreements on policy aside, there is also a difference in how the P3 engage in the
Council’s work compared with Russia and China. The P3 tend to be more assertive in managing
the Council’s workload. Russia actively engages in negotiations, makes frequent proposals to
draft Council outcomes, and on matters of strong strategic interest, will sometimes present its
own draft products for consideration. However, the P3 currently holds the pen (i.e. drafts and
leads the negotiations) on the overwhelming majority of issues on the Council’s agenda, with
Russia drafting less frequently. China takes the most low-key approach to the Council’s work of
any permanent member. It is not the penholder on any issue, it rarely makes its own proposals on
draft texts, and it does not engage as actively in negotiations as the other permanent members.

Methodology and Sources
The first part of my analysis extends to the late Cold War period, while the second part explores
the late Cold War period to the present. In studying the first period, one challenge is that there is
a dearth of information on how Council resolutions and other outcomes were negotiated and
more broadly, on how the Council functioned. I have relied heavily on the formal records of
Council debates to fill this gap. Also helpful are memoirs of key UN Secretariat officials, US
State Department documents, and the Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 25 which
provides descriptions of Council proceedings on all agenda items. Secondary sources covering
the early history of the Council are useful as well in capturing the positions of different members
on key issues on the agenda and providing historical background on these issues.
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Much of the same source material is used to cover the late Cold War to the present in my
analysis.26 However, I have benefited as well from a significant number of interviews with UN
Secretariat officials and diplomats who have served in the Council during the past 25 years.
Interviews with diplomats, Council debate records, and public statements by diplomats have
been especially useful in demonstrating the value that members place on Council unity. Another
key source of information on Council deliberations in recent years has been the not-for-profit
organization Security Council Report, which has provided analysis of the Council’s work since
2005.27
While much of my analysis investigates the sources of unity in the Council since the late
Cold War era, it is impossible to ignore the growing divide in policy positions between the P3,
on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other hand, especially since China and Russia cast
their first joint veto on Myanmar in January 2007. Through an analysis of public statements by
China and Russia—in addition to their voting records—I demonstrate that principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention are often the reasons for their divergent positions from the P3,
and indeed, several other Council members.
I further describe the different processes and mechanisms which are relevant to how
Council members conceptualize, produce and vote on resolutions, and how they have promoted
greater cohesion in Council voting. I rely on interviews from Council members involved in the
negotiations on resolutions and seek their views about how processes have affected negotiations.
The Security Council Report’s What’s In Blue site, which has been in service since 2011, has
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been particularly useful in shedding light on the processes by which resolutions have been
negotiated over the past seven years, providing real time analysis of the Council’s work. 28

Alternative explanations
The crux of my puzzle relates to why P3 voting convergence has grown in the post-Cold War
era, without the threat of the Soviet Union to bind these countries together. I argue that there are
three reasons why this is so: there is no group of members willing to table controversial drafts
that might be vetoed like the NAM did in the Cold War; members value consensus because a
unified Council is perceived as a more effective one in a multi-polar world in which this organ
plays a key foreign policy role for its members; and working methods have evolved to enable
more considered negotiations on drafts, in particular among Council members (usually the
permanent members) with a key stake in the issue under discussion. Taken together, these
reasons help to explain why voting convergence has increased in the post-Cold War era not just
among the P3, but in the Council as whole.
However, there are plausible alternative explanations regarding why there has been such
strong voting convergence among the P3 in the Council in the post-Cold War era. But these
explanations ultimately fall short.
An obvious alternative explanation is that the policy positions of the P3 have simply been
more closely aligned over the past 25 years than they were in the Cold War. This argument has
strong merits and at least partially explains the decrease in voting divisions among the P3. After
all, many of the issues on which the P3 had voting differences in the Cold War—e.g., Suez,
Southern Rhodesia, or Nicaragua—are no longer on the agenda. Nonetheless, the argument tells
28
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only part of the story, as it fails to account for the changes in the working methods of the
Council. As I attempt to demonstrate in this dissertation, the evidence suggests that on divisive
issues (i.e., those on which there was a strong chance of a veto) draft resolutions were put to a
vote more frequently in the Cold War than has been the case since the end of the Cold War, as a
result of the assertiveness of the non-aligned members from the 1960s to the 1980s. In current
times, Council members still force a veto from time to time—as was done, for example, with the
December 2017 Egyptian draft on Jerusalem 29—but this occurs with less regularity than in the
Cold War.
Another alternative argument that could be made is that the P3 have converged in their
voting in the post-Cold War era around burgeoning human security norms that have increasingly
been a focus of the Council’s work. Most UN peacekeeping missions now have protection of
civilians’ mandates. “Women, Peace and Security,” “Children and Armed Conflict,” and
“Protection of Civilians” are thematic issues on the Council’s agenda, and language related to
protecting civilians in general or more specifically related to protecting women and children has
become common in Council resolutions and other outcomes.
The P3 consistently profess support for human security norms in the Security Council,
although one could question their level of commitment in cases in which core strategic interests
are at stake. However, it is important to note that these issues only entered the mainstream of the
Council’s work in earnest in the late 1990s, while voting convergence among the P3—and
several other Council members—began roughly a decade earlier. For example, the P3, along
with China and Russia, were united in blocking constructive action by the Council in the midst of
the 1994 Rwandan genocide, although one could argue that the French-led, controversial
29
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Opération Turquoise during the later stages of the genocide was motivated by protection
concerns.
A final alternative explanation for P3 voting convergence in the Council during the postCold War era is that the global power of France and the United Kingdom has diminished to the
point where they are uncomfortable in taking public positions that vary from their more powerful
western ally, the United States. 30 This would seem plausible on the surface, but it does not stand
up to closer analysis. First, France and the United Kingdom were already waning powers in the
Cold War, and yet they frequently voted apart from the United States, in spite of the fact that the
Soviet Union was a common threat to them. Second, even though voting discrepancies among
the P3 have been rare in the post-Cold War Council, they have not been non-existent, and there
have been significant arguments among them on issues such as Bosnia and Iraq, which will be
discussed in Chapter IV.

About this project
This project attempts to fill several unexplored or under-explored areas in the literature on the
Security Council. The dissertation discusses the impact of the NAM on the Council’s
deliberations during the Cold War. In particular, it describes how the NAM members shaped the
voting agenda of this organ. While it is a truism that decolonization had a significant impact on
deliberations in the UN General Assembly, this project analyzes the underexplored role of the
NAM in Council deliberations. It further provides a case study on the evolution of the Council’s
working methods. Efforts to analyze working methods have only provided snapshots of
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particular periods.31 This project, in contrast, aims to explore the significant changes in this
organ’s working methods spanning the Cold War period to the present. The durability of the
Council and its adaptability to the changing demands of the international security environment
are visible.32 Another contribution is additional evidence for the political science literature about
how processes can have an impact on outcomes. The permanent members have assiduously
worked together to shape Council working methods to serve their interests. Their impact is clear
on how Council decisions are made, including how resolutions and presidential statements are
conceived, drafted and negotiated. Furthermore, the dissertation explores why the Council is
important to elected members and how they can play a constructive role in its work, issues that
are not adequately explored in the literature.
Six chapters follow this introduction. Chapter I provides a survey and assessment of the
literature on the Security Council and its role in world affairs. It describes how both normative
and rational choice factors are relevant to an analysis of Security Council voting patterns over
time.
Chapter II offers a brief statistical overview of voting patterns in the Security Council
from 1946 to 2016. It provides some raw data to substantiate greater voting convergence on
31
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resolutions among the P3, and indeed within the Council as a whole, since the late Cold War
period. The chapter also briefly summarizes the significance of these statistics, arguing that
voting unity does not necessarily translate into quality outcomes. It seemed appropriate to end
the broad statistical overview of voting patterns in the post-Cold War era with the last calendar
year of the Obama administration and to be cautious throughout the dissertation about making
definitive statements about the dynamics among the P3—and between the United States and the
rest of the Council—beyond Obama’s tenure, given the lack of clarity of the Trump White
House’s long-term foreign policy vision only one year into the president’s term. Nonetheless,
references to events in 2017 and early 2018 in the empirical chapters of the dissertation largely
serve to highlight continuities in Council practice. Furthermore, some preliminary analysis
(including statistical analysis) is provided on the Trump administration’s early engagement with
the Council in the conclusion (Chapter VI), although it would be premature to guess the course
that this relationship will have taken by the time the current president leaves office.
Chapter III explores some of the issues that divided the permanent members, including
the P3, during the Cold War. A key focus of this chapter is the impact of the NAM on Council
deliberations, as non-aligned Council members frequently joined together to propose
controversial resolutions that often resulted in vetoes or non-unanimous adoptions.
Chapter IV describes how the permanent members have consolidated their control over
Council decision-making since the late Cold War period. It describes the factors that have led to
increased voting unity. Finally, the chapter compares the different perspectives of the Council’s
role in world affairs among the permanent members, focusing on the divisions between the P3
and Russia and China.
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Chapter V analyzes the role that elected members have played in recent years in the
Council’s work; it explores why Council membership is important to them, and how they have
made efforts to promote unanimity. Three cases studies are presented to demonstrate the efforts
of elected members to shape the Council’s work: one on humanitarian issues in Syria, a second
on the protection of health care workers and facilities in armed conflict, and a third on sanctions.
Chapter VI summarizes the findings of the dissertation and offers some suggestions for
future research. It poses questions that researchers should consider in order to determine the
price for achieving consensus, specifically in terms of the quality of resolutions and the
Council’s mixed record in spite of voting unanimity on so many issues. Among the issues
explored are the impact of unanimously adopted resolutions, the dominance of the P3 in drafting
outcomes, and China’s role in the Council, in addition to the above mentioned discussion of the
Trump administration’s early engagement with the Council.
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I: An evolving institution
Hampered by superpower conflict, the Council was not particularly active in its early decades of
existence. As I argue in Chapter III, from the 1960s through the late 1980s, Council deliberations
were often driven by the interests of developing countries, even though the veto always ensured
that the permanent members could protect their interests. The first part of this chapter focuses on
the evolution of the Council’s work since the end of the Cold War and explores the literature on
this organ. It makes two key observations regarding the evolving role of the Council since the
end of the Cold War: first, the organ has experienced (and continues to experience) a high-level
of activity in comparison with earlier years; second, it has addressed an expanding range of
issues as part of its international peace and security responsibilities. The literature on the
Security Council is wide in scope and touches on many different aspects of this organ’s work. In
surveying the literature, I explore issues such as how the Council has been characterized; how it
has been assessed as a tool for legitimation; how its voting procedures have been described and
analyzed; and what role its members play. The second part of this chapter assesses the literature,
notes some the existing gaps, and describes ways in which the dissertation strives to addresses
these gaps. It argues that the dissertation is helpful in assessing why greater consensus has been
achieved in the post-Cold War era as compared to the Cold War; in exploring the relations
among all Council members; and in describing how resolutions are drafted and negotiated. A
final section provides an analytical framework for my argument. It maintains that both normative
and instrumental factors can be used to explain the behavior of Council members, while positing
that the pull of strategic interests ultimately dictates how decisions are made.
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Literature on the Security Council
From Cold War to Today
The Council of the post-Cold War era bears little likeness to the Council of the Cold War. 33
First, it has been much more active in recent years than it was during the Cold War. 34
Unhindered by the gridlock of superpower competition, adopting resolutions and statements is
less difficult today than it was 30 years ago. Edward Luck’s observation that “the Council moved
in slow motion for four decades of Cold War and has been hyperactive since its end” is just as
relevant today as it was when he wrote those words in 2006. 35 From January 1946 to December
1991, the Council adopted 725 resolutions; since then, it has adopted over 1,600 resolutions.
Second, the Council’s perception of international peace and security has evolved
significantly over the past 25 years. Prior to 1990, the Council rarely made decisions on internal
conflicts.36 Since the 1990s, internal disputes that would likely have been considered off limits
during the Cold War because of more restrictive sovereignty norms have filled the Council’s
agenda. Thus, the Council has addressed several human rights violations and humanitarian crises
in domestic situations since the 1990s,37 even though implementation of its decisions on these
matters has been lacking. Human security issues such as the Protection of Civilians in Armed
Conflict, Children and Armed Conflict, and Women, Peace and Security have also become
fixtures on the agenda in recent years.
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considered threats to international peace and security by many Council members, and have been
the focus of Council debates and outcomes. Third, the Council resorts much more frequently to
coercive measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in the post-Cold War era than during the
Cold War.39 In the entire Cold War period, there were only two sanctions regimes, one on South
Africa and one on Southern Rhodesia; today, there are 14. While most UN peace operations
during the Cold War were designed to separate warring parties and monitor a ceasefire to create
time and space for political dialogue, nine of the 15 peace operations today have been mandated
by the Council under Chapter VII. According to the non-governmental organization Security
Council Report, “Whereas only 10 of the 37 resolutions adopted in 1990 were under Chapter VII
(27.0 percent), 32 of the 53 resolutions adopted in 2012 made reference to Chapter VII
(60.4%).”40
In recent years, several scholars have also argued that the Council is assuming a
legislative role. 41 In the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Council
adopted resolution 1373, which placed broad obligations on all states to take steps to prevent
financing to terrorists (2001) that are not time-bound. On April 28, 2004, it adopted resolution
1540, imposing wide-ranging, temporally open-ended obligations on all states to prevent the
spread of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors. These resolutions have been widely
interpreted as legislation. As Stefan Talmon states, the “hallmark of any international legislation
Routledge, 2008), 57-79. Cronin has noted that the increased range of the Council’s work to include human
protection issues in internal conflicts reflects the evolution of international law that has upheld these issues and has
been embraced by states.
39
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is the general and abstract character of the obligation imposed.”42 Talmon argues that in cases
in which the Council considers making legislation—as it did with the adoption of resolutions
1373 and 1540—it must include non-Council members in its deliberations. Otherwise, the
“legitimacy and acceptance of its legislative acts” will be problematic, and “they may remain
dead letters.”43 Indeed, laws promulgated by the Council that do not reflect “the general will of
the world community” of states will be difficult to enforce. 44
While few would dispute that the Council has held an important place in international
affairs since 1946 and that its norms and practices have evolved greatly, there are differing
perspectives on how well it has discharged its duties over the years. Realists are generally the
harshest critics, as they believe that international institutions like the Council merely serve the
interests of the great powers.45 However, many scholars of the Council have a less critical
assessment. David Bosco believes that the Council is good at defusing crises among the big
powers but ineffective in managing many other tasks 46, while Erik Voeten maintains that its
value lies in its ability to constrain US power and maintain equilibrium in the international
system.47 Vaughan Lowe et al. write that while the Council has handled a number of issues
“deplorably”—including the Arab-Israeli situation since 1947, the 1994 Rwanda crisis, the 1980
Iraq invasion of Iran, and the situation in Darfur from 2003 onward—it is nonetheless a “partial
success” because it has “contributed to a modest degree of stability and progress in international
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relations.”48 In particular, among other achievements, they believe that the Council has played a
role in reducing inter-state conflict since 1945, in stabilizing inter- and intra-state conflicts
through its authorization of UN peacekeeping operations, and in promoting cooperation among
the major powers.49
Characterizations of the Council
The UN is generally considered a collective security organization. In theory, this is true. Article
1.1 of the UN Charter states that among the purposes of the organization is “to maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or
other breaches of the peace.” 50 In practice, however, this is far from the truth. Several scholars
have recognized this discrepancy in their attempts to characterize the work of the Security
Council. Among other things, the Council has been likened to a “concert system,” 51 “an elite
pact,”52 “a Roman model,”53 and a “selective security”54 institution.
David Bosco has suggested that the permanent members of the Security Council have
collaborated with a sense of comity to solve major crises since the end of World War II. Bosco
has likened the Council to the 19th century Concert of Europe, the informal grouping of major
powers that kept the peace for nearly half a century. 55 Throughout its history, according to
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Bosco, the Council has been effective at providing a mechanism for the big powers (i.e., the
permanent five members) to manage tensions among themselves and to preserve order during
major crises.56 Bosco suggests that it is in part because of their deliberations at the UN that major
war has been avoided among the permanent members since the organization’s founding. 57
However, he argues that the Council has not been particularly good at “defusing local conflicts,
stabilizing unstable states, preventing the proliferation of dangerous weapons, punishing war
criminals, and enforcing international sanctions.” 58
Eric Voeten has written that, since the first Gulf War, the Council has functioned like an
“elite pact” in regard to decisions by states, especially the United States, to use force. 59 If the
Council authorizes the use of force, then member states are likely to view the use of force by the
United States (or another power) as legitimate and not oppose military action; however, force
employed without the approval of the Council is viewed as illegitimate by member states, which
will retaliate with foreign policy decisions detrimental to the state(s) carrying out the military
operation.60 In this way, the Council helps to maintain equilibrium in the international system
and to restrain the United States.61
In his 2004 edited volume, David Malone writes that when he and his coauthors
considered how to characterize the post-Cold War Council, they thought that a “Roman model”
might be appropriate, whereby “the Council serves as a senate constraining the emperor”62 (i.e.,
the US). However, Malone (and his coauthors) ultimately backs away from this assessment,
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writing that history moves far too quickly to make such a theoretical approach for analyzing the
Council fruitful.63 In a subsequent edited volume on the Council published in 2016, Malone and
his co-editors recognized the changes in greater power politics that had occurred since the 2004
volume, describing the relationship between the United States and Russia and China as a major
factor in determining Council’s influence rather than the importance of constraining US power. 64
The “selective security” characterization of Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum is based
on the fact that the Council is selective in how it addresses peace and security issues. According
to the authors, the P5 veto and “the limited willingness of all states—whether or not members of
the Council—to provide resources and trained personnel to resolve conflicts that they may
perceive as distant, complex and resistant to outside involvement” are among the elements
contributing to this selectivity. 65
Tool for Legitimation
Several academics have argued that the Council is an instrument that can be used to legitimate
the policies and actions of states. 66 These scholars challenge realists who believe that decisions
and actions of international institutions merely reflect the distribution of power in the
international system. 67 As far back as 1966, Inis Claude wrote that “collective legitimization is

63

Malone, ed., From the Cold War to the 21st Century, 3.
David M. Malone, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, and Sebastian von Einsiedel, “Conclusion,” in The UN Security Council
in the 21st Century, ed. David M. Malone, Bruno Stagno Ugarte, and Sebastian von Einsiedel (Boulder, Colo., Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2016), 828.
65
Roberts and Zaum, Selective Security, 7-8.
66
Mats Berdal, “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but Indispensable,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 9; Inis L.
Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of the United Nations,” International Organization 20,
no. 3 (1996): 367-379; Bruce Cronin, “International consensus and the changing legal authority of the UN Security
Council,” in The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority, ed. Bruce Cronin and Ian Hurd
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2008), 57-79; and Ian Hurd, After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United
Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2007).
67
See, for example, Michael J. Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (2003); and
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 82, no. 3 (1994-95):
5-49.
64

28

one of the most significant elements in the pattern of political activity that the United Nations has
evolved in response to the set of limitations and possibilities posed by the political realities of
our time.”68 States accrue political capital based on the approval of the General Assembly and
the Security Council for their actions. 69 He argued that member states had themselves accorded
the organization this role, which reflects not “what the United Nations can do but…how it can be
used.”70 Writing in 2003, soon after the US’s failed attempt to gain Council approval for military
action in Iraq, Mats Berdal likewise argued that a “vital political function of the Council has
been to serve as an instrument for collective legitimation of state action.” 71
Ian Hurd’s analysis of the Council masterfully weaves together rationalist and
constructivist perspectives: regardless of their own positive or negative perceptions of the
Council, individual states make a calculated effort to employ the legitimacy provided by its
approval precisely because the wider international community of states has accorded it with that
normative power. 72 Hurd defines legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or
institution ought to be obeyed.” 73 He argues that rules and institutions have power because they
exert leverage on the decision-making of states, which make an effort to appropriate the
symbols 74 of the institutions to their benefit. 75 Thus, Russia sought and obtained the Council’s
support for its deployment of peacekeepers in Georgia and Tajikistan in the 1990s because of the
symbolic value attached to this approval, even though Russian troops generally did not adhere to
the core principles of UN peacekeeping (i.e.: impartiality, host-country consent and use of force
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as a last resort).76 Whereas realists emphasize anarchy in the international system, Hurd uses the
term “after anarchy” to describe the system, because of the leverage that international institutions
such as the Council have over states’ decision-making, meaning that “sovereignty exists in
international organization.”77
Voting in the Security Council
A number of scholars have studied voting in the Security Council. Early work on this issue often
focused on interpretations of article 27 (3) of the UN Charter, which outlines the organ’s voting
procedures.78 More recently, scholars have used game theory to interpret voting in the Council as
it is currently constituted, as well as under different scenarios for a structurally reformed
Council.79 The definitive work on Council procedure in general—including voting procedures
and processes—from the time of the UN’s founding to the present remains The Procedure of the
UN Security Council, now in its fourth edition. 80
Security Council voting procedures are outlined in article 27 of the UN Charter, which states:
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
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2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirmative
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members;
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party
to a dispute shall abstain from voting. 81
The meaning of article 27 (3) was a source of debate in the UN’s early years. One issue
that was often raised was the meaning of “concurring votes.” In particular, if the “concurring
votes” of the permanent members were required for the adoption of a resolution, did this mean
that an abstention by a permanent member should prevent the adoption of a resolution? Through
analysis of voting patterns, scholars demonstrated that the regular practice has been to consider a
P5 abstention a “concurring vote,” signifying that an abstention cannot block the adoption of a
resolution so long as the draft receives the requisite majority of votes and is not vetoed. 82 The
first case of this occurring was the adoption of resolution 4 on 29 April 1946, when the Council
adopted a resolution on “the Spanish question,” 83 which received affirmative votes of ten of the
11 Council members, with the Soviet Union abstaining. 84
Today, this discussion is outdated, as even a casual UN observer would not question the
validity of a resolution adopted with a P5 abstention. However, as late as April 1966—more than
20 years after the founding of the UN and following the adoption of numerous Council
resolutions with one or more P5 abstentions—Portugal and Spain questioned whether resolution
81
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221, which called on Portugal to prevent the transport of oil from Beira in Mozambique (a
Portuguese colony) to Southern Rhodesia, was legally binding because France and the Soviet
Union had abstained on the vote. 85
Another interpretive matter regarding article 27 (3) is the question of mandatory
abstentions by parties to a dispute, in cases pertaining to Chapter VI and paragraph 3 of article
52. In 1974, Sydney Bailey wrote that this provision of the Charter has not generally been
honored: “There have…been a few cases where parties have abstained on peaceful settlement
proposals, or not taken part in the vote—but only when it was pretty certain that this would not
affect the outcome. The idea that a state should not be a judge in its own cause has been largely
forgotten.”86
Subsequent history has confirmed Bailey’s observation. On 5 February 1976, France
vetoed a draft resolution that would have “consider[ed] the holding of…a referendum by the
French Government in Mayotte…interference in the internal affairs of the Comoros.” 87 More
recently, prior to annexing the Crimea in March 2014, Russia vetoed a draft resolution that
would have reaffirmed the Council’s “commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and
territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders” and declared that the
planned referendum in the Crimea “can have no validity.” 88 In both cases, France (with regard to
the Comoros) and Russia (with regard to the Ukraine) were parties to a dispute and should have
abstained from voting in adherence to article 27 (3).
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Game theorists have sometimes operated in the context of the debates on structural
reform of the Council, which highlight the unfairness of the veto and the perception that the
permanent membership does not accurately represent the geopolitical realities of the modern
world. Barry O’Neill explores the relationship between “power” (“the probability that changing
[a member’s] vote would change the outcome” 89) and “satisfaction” (“the probability that the
Council would pass a resolution the member wants passed or reject a resolution the member
wants rejected”90) under different reform scenarios. 91 He concludes that several of the reform
proposals on voting would not have much effect on voting influence. 92 Increasing the number of
veto-wielding members could hinder the organ’s ability to act, although “this effect is small if
the new members stand near positions already occupied by current veto members.” 93 He also
writes that increasing the number of non-veto holding members on the Council could “diminish
their total power,” although “their absolute power is so small before and after that change makes
little real difference.”94 Jonathan R. Strand and David P. Rapkin analyze the potential impact of
weighted voting, accounting for factors such as population size and contributions to the UN,
under different reform scenarios. 95 The authors conclude that “the selection of a majority
decision rule is a critical factor for both individual voting power and the probability that the
organ will be able to pass a resolution.” 96
Other scholars using game theory have analyzed voting in the Council under its current
configuration. Steve Chan measures voting “satisfaction” of veto-holding members, defined as
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“the probability of finding oneself on the winning side,” 97 in relationship to their “popularity,”
defined as the level of “general support” 98 from their peers on the 15-member organ.99 He
concludes that “satisfaction and popularity can be inversely related in the politics of the Security
Council.”100 Analyzing the Council’s decision-making in the 1990s, Voeten argues that while the
United States preferred to operate through the UN, it had other options for action, either
unilaterally or bilaterally with allies. 101 As such, other veto-wielding members of the Council,
like China and Russia, recognizing the range of options available to the United States and that
their use of the veto could not prevent it from exercising those options, would abstain in
exchange for concessions from the United States and some influence over actions made within a
UN framework.102 Voeten suggests that this is why there were infrequent vetoes but a high
number of abstentions among permanent members in the 1990s.103
Loraine Sievers and Sam Daws provide an overview of the Council’s voting rules,
procedures, and processes through examples demonstrating the evolution of practice over
time.104 Among other things, the authors address issues such as the use of vetoes and abstentions,
the difference between substantive and procedural votes, interpretations of article 27 (3) of the
UN Charter, and the different types of Council decisions. 105 Voting is only one aspect of
procedure covered in this volume, a detailed reference book that also explores different types of
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meeting formats, the relationship of the Council to its subsidiary bodies and other organs of the
UN, and the roles of permanent and elected members.106
Roles of Different Members
There have been some efforts to analyze the role of specific states or groups of states in
the context of their work on the Security Council. Bosco’s book is the authoritative work on the
P5. Ilya Gaiduk writes about the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union in
the UN from 1945-1965.107 Similar to Bosco, Gaiduk highlights to the role of the UN as a forum
for negotiation and compromise that helped to diffuse many crises. He notes, for example, that:
“The Suez and Cuban missile crises stand out as the most dangerous upheavals that could have
resulted in direct encounters between the two superpowers. The UN helped to prevent these
outcomes.”108
Book chapters have been written on the role of the United States,109 the United Kingdom
and France,110 Russia,111 and China112 in the Security Council, as well as on the relationship
between the permanent and the elected members. 113 Stephen John Stedman argues that the
United States has faced a key challenge in the Council in the post-Cold War era. It values
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Council approval of its actions, but this approval comes at a price in the form of concessions and
constraints on action. 114 The standing of the United States also suffers when it acts without this
organ’s blessing. 115 During the Cold War, when the Council was gridlocked, bypassing it may
have been more permissible, but since it has been less obstructed over the past 25 years, such
action sparks greater examination.116
Thierry Tardy and Dominik Zaum underscore that the Security Council plays an
important part in the foreign policies of France and United Kingdom today, “helping them to
maintain a privileged position in international society that exceeds their military and economic
clout.”117 In the early Cold War years, unlike in current times, they maintain that “an active
Council…was at times seen as threatening core colonial interests of both France and the UK.”118
Today, according to Tardy and Zaum, the Council promotes liberal values espoused by both
countries 119 and, given that the two countries are no longer significant military powers, “an
active Security Council does not pose a major constraint on their foreign and security
policies.”120
Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu note that there has been a transformation in China’s
approach to the Council since 1990s, when it often deferred to “the Western-driven
transformation of the Council into an interventionist organ mandating a wide range of highly
intrusive measures in a significant number of civil wars.”121 They maintain that in more recent
years “China has become increasingly active and assertive in the Security Council, both in
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defending its own interests as well as in displaying a greater readiness to challenge Western
agendas.” 122
Dmitri Trenin argues that “Russian officials reject criticism that Moscow’s frequent use
of the veto destroys consensus among the permanent members and renders the Security Council
dysfunctional.”123 Rather, he maintains, Russia envisions itself as “the guardian of international
law and thus a pillar of global stability”124 in a world in which “such actions as the 2003 invasion
of Iraq, undertaken without a Council mandate…undermine the international system and global
security.”125
In discussing the relationship between the P5 and the E10, Kishore Mahbubani argues:
“the P-5 have been given power without responsibility; the E10 have been given responsibility
without power.”126 He notes, for example, the irresponsibility of the P5 with regard to the
Rwanda and Srebrenica crises in the mid-1990s, adding that the Council could have learned by
conducting its own assessment of its handling of these situations, but that such an assessment
was likely not conducted because it would have heavily implicated the permanent members. 127
While Mahbubani’s chapter was written over 10 years ago, many of his observations about the
disparities between the permanent and elected members still ring true today, such as the hidden
veto (i.e., the threat of veto, which stymies engagement on certain issues before they are even
voted on) and the limited institutional memory of the elected members. 128
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Assessment of Literature
Several key conclusions can be drawn from assessing the literature on the Council. First, there is
a dearth of analysis of why there has been an increase in voting unanimity since the end of the
Cold War. Second, efforts to characterize the Council often focus on limited aspects of its work,
rather than viewing its activities holistically. Third, the literature provides little description of
how the Council’s outcomes (i.e. its resolutions and statements) are conceived, negotiated and
drafted.
Consensus, but Why?
As I argue in Chapter III, much of the division among Council members in the Cold War—
including among the P3, who have been closely aligned in the post-Cold War era—had to do
with developing countries tabling draft resolutions on divisive issues. While a number of
scholars have observed the trend toward more consensual decision-making in the Council in the
post-Cold War era,129 little effort has been made to explore why this is so.
Voeten provides the one exception in his article on the Council in the 1990s. He correctly
notes that the United States struck deals with other permanent members to avoid vetoes from
being cast, arguing that decisions are often the result of bargaining rather than “harmonious
interests.”130
Concessions and bargaining are an important element of decision-making in the Council.
But they are not the only reasons why greater unanimity has been achieved. Permanent members
value the Council as a foreign policy instrument, so they are generally reluctant to veto
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resolutions, and will often work with other P5 colleagues to avoid vetoes where possible. A more
united Council legitimizes policies more effectively, a point Claude made in his famous article
on the legitimating role of the UN. 131 He stated that a resolution that has the support of all the
permanent members “is taken more seriously than one on which three of them abstain.” 132 He
likewise wrote that members valued the “significance of resolutions [in the UN’s political
organs] according to the size and composition of the majorities supporting them and the
forcefulness of the language in which they are couched.” 133 What Claude did not adequately
capture was the fact that clarity and precision in language is sometimes the price to be paid for
securing large majorities, which can lead to implementation challenges. The “forcefulness of the
language”134 that he alluded to is often sacrificed to achieve unanimity.
Claude is correct in that permanent members value unanimous voting because they
believe it gives greater political weight to the organ’s outcomes. However, at the time of
Claude’s article, unanimous decision-making was not as prevalent as it has been in the Council
since the end of the Cold War, and its pursuit was frequently not possible in the same way.
Difficult geopolitical conditions, under-developed processes for negotiation and dialogue, and
ambivalence among some permanent members about the role of the UN in their foreign policies
hampered efforts to achieve unanimity.
Characterizations of the Council
Given the Council’s broad peace and security mandate, it is very difficult to characterize the
scope and complexity of its activities. This is why so much of the scholarship on the Council
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focuses on discrete aspects of its work, such as its engagement in particular country cases, its
handling of particularly thematic issues, or its legislative role (which is limited to specific
counter-terrorism resolutions.) Bosco persuasively argues that the Council is more effective if
assessed as a “concert”—i.e., a bargaining mechanism to diffuse tensions among the permanent
members—than as a tool for “governance” to maintain international peace and security. 135 He
correctly maintains that the Councils’ governance functions include “suppress[ing] the insecurity
that besets much of the globe by resisting aggression, defusing local conflicts, stabilizing
unstable states, preventing the proliferation of dangerous weapons, punishing war criminals, and
enforcing international sanctions.” 136 At same time, it should be noted that such “governance”
efforts constitute a significant portion of the Council’s work. Furthermore, many of the
“governance” functions that Bosco describes have implications for great power relations if they
are not addressed at an early point, so that the “governance” work of the Council can potentially
overlap with its “concert” role.
Describing the Council as an “elite pact” 137 or as a “Roman model”138 is a way of using
the power of the United States as a starting point for characterizing the Council. This view tends
to give short shrift to the power and influence of the other veto-wielding members, particularly
China and Russia, in a multipolar international system. It may be that the “elite pact” and
“Roman model” characterizations, made in the mid-2000s, were influenced by the still-raw
memories of the Iraq intervention of 2003, and in retrospective, Malone and his coauthors were
wise to ultimately retract the assessment of the Council as a “Roman model,” correctly noting
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that the rapid pace of historical events made theorizing about such models unproductive. 139
Russia’s actions in Syria and the Ukraine—and its blockage of an effective Council response—
are a grim reminder that the United States is not the only great power with influence in the
United Nations. By the time Malone and his colleagues published a successor volume in 2016,
they acknowledged that the primary concern in the Council is no longer harnessing US power:
“the shift in power and policies of the five permanent members, as well as the complex relations
among them, have significantly altered the dynamics of the body, giving rise to a new set of
concerns.”140 They conclude that at present “the greatest threat to the relevance of the Security
Council is the possibility of a standoff between the newly assertive Russia and China and a
United States…that is seen as increasingly unwilling to shoulder more international burdens than
absolutely necessary.”141
In this dissertation, I take a holistic view of the work of the Security Council. I look at a
broad range of Council decisions, and while the focus is primarily on the P3, there is also
discussion of the interactions among all five permanent members, as well as the interactions
between and among permanent and elected members.
Drafting and Negotiating
Another area that I address is how resolutions and statements are drafted and negotiated. This
issue is important because it provides a sense of how decisions are made; what kinds of leverage
states exert over decision-making processes; and how members view their role on the Council.
While some authors address different aspects of drafting and negotiating, they do not do so in
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great detail. This dissertation provides a more thorough analysis of the different ways in which
resolutions are conceived, drafted and negotiated than other works on the Council.

Analytical Framework
The framework for my argument has both normative and rational-choice elements. These two are
often treated as distinct categories in political science, but as Hurd has noted, that need not be the
case.142 The “collective legitimation” function of the Council has long been recognized by
scholars.143 Having endowed the Council with a privileged place in their foreign policies, the
permanent members have accepted the value of achieving consensus as a means of validating
their decisions. Elected members have accepted this norm as well.
Constructivist scholars have emphasized the importance of persuasion in the promotion
of norms.144 In this sense, it seems logical that if powerful states in the international system,
represented by the permanent members, emphasized the need to create greater harmony in the
international system as the Cold War ended, and voting together in the Security Council was a
reflection of this, then the permanent members would be able to influence other Council
members to follow suit. As a norm gets more firmly entrenched, there are reputational costs that
come into play with violating the norm, while peer pressure also helps the norm to gain
acceptance.145 And the norm is not just accepted by elected members; permanent members as
well become tied to the norm that they helped to create. The impact of peer pressure and the
effects on their reputations of violating consensus helps to explain the voting behavior of both
142
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permanent and elected members in recent decades, as nearly 92 percent of all resolutions since
1992 have been unanimously adopted. At the same time, more often than not, unanimity is a goal
to be achieved not merely for its normative value but because it is viewed as a means to an end.
As I argue in Chapter IV, Council members believe that unanimous decisions are more likely to
be adhered to by the subject parties and implemented by the broader UN membership.
Neo-liberalism demonstrates how international institutions can help to enhance
cooperation.146 Through iterative interactions, actors “learn about the preferences and constraints
facing other governments;” 147 make promises to others in exchange for their support 148 and
exercise prudence in their decision-making because of concerns about reciprocal measures. 149
These factors come into play in the Council, which is a forum for working through difficult
issues in order to achieve mutually acceptable agreements. During the multiple rounds of
negotiations on resolutions, red-lines are established by the veto-wielding members that can
undermine the outcome if crossed, proposals are made representing members’ preferences, and
compromises are struck on language that sometimes result in tortured prose. Permanent members
make deals from time to time—or threaten consequences for non-compliance—to secure votes
on issues of importance to them: for example, as Voeten has written, to ensure that China and
Russia would not block the Council’s endorsement of the use of force to expel Iraq from Kuwait
in 1990, the United States “incurred the cost of compromise, in terms of both the resolution text
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and debt concessions, support for World Bank loans, and financial aid.” 150 As Voeten correctly
noted in 2001: “Agreement among the five permanent veto powers on multilateral action does
not imply that these states have harmonious interests now that the Cold War has ended.” 151 His
observation still holds true today. It is consistent with Axelrod’s and Keohane’s observation that:
“Cooperation is not equivalent to harmony.”152 On some issues, there is widespread agreement in
the Council. But on others, consensus is achieved at a price.
While the Council often serves as a useful forum for negotiation and reaching agreement
and there is a normative value to achieving unity, it is important to note that core strategic and
domestic interests ultimately guide the behavior of states. In some cases, members may not be
strongly wedded to a resolution, but they will vote in favor of it because they do not have a major
interest at stake in opposing it and because they value the importance of a unified Council in
having a positive impact in promoting peace and security. However, in cases in which the pull of
their strategic interests or domestic politics is strong and contradicts the substance of a draft
resolution—or in cases where little effort is made to compromise and there are fundamental
disagreements on the content of a text—states will break the norm. In spite of the fact that
Council members have unanimously adopted the overwhelming number of draft resolutions
voted upon in the post-Cold War era, this explains why the United States frequently vetoes draft
resolutions critical of Israel or why Russia continues to veto resolutions on Syria. Furthermore,
the support of the Council is desirable to legitimize major peace and security decisions or to
convince the international community of states of the need to implement those decisions, but the
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permanent members do not perceive it as a necessity. 153 As Richard Haas has written, “…no
country, much less a major power, is prepared to forgo the opportunity to act on behalf of what it
perceives as its national interest simply because it lacks a blessing from the United Nations.”154

Conclusion
This chapter analyzed a range of literature on the Security Council. It found that there were gaps
in the literature in terms of explaining the rise in post-Cold war unanimity in Council voting. It
further explained that future chapters will explore interactions among the permanent and elected
members alike, as well as the processes by which resolutions are conceived, negotiated and
drafted, an area not adequately explored in scholarship on the Council. The chapter concluded by
noting that while the Council has been an effective mechanism for bargaining, resolving
differences, and deal-making, efforts to achieve unanimity are as a general rule usurped by the
core national interests of member states.
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II: Statistics on Security Council resolutions and vetoes
In October 2014, during a Security Council working methods debate, Wang Min, the Deputy
Permanent Representative of China to the UN, stated the following:
[The Security Council] should continue to pursue democratic consultations and political
collective decision-making. Council members share the same responsibilities for
maintaining international peace and security. The more complex and urgent the crises and
challenges are, the greater the need for Council members to work together to be united in
purpose and efforts and to cooperate fully in ways that reflect the principles of justice and
democracy. All Council members should have ample time for studying the draft
resolutions and presidential statements presented and, through patient consultations and
negotiations, reach broad consensus and preserve the solidarity of the Council, rather than
forcing texts through on which there are still major differences.155
While elected members would correctly dispute the notion that the Council’s deliberations are
democratic, Ambassador Min accurately captures the efforts made to achieve widespread
consensus that have typified Council decision-making in the post-Cold War era. As the data in
this chapter demonstrates, there has been a noticeable trend toward unanimous outcomes over the
past 25 years. A higher percentage of resolutions are adopted unanimously and a lower
percentage of draft resolutions are vetoed as compared with the Cold War. This chapter traces
the evolution of Council voting on resolutions and draft resolutions between 1946 and 2016; in
the process, it charts the trajectory toward greater consensus from a statistical standpoint.
At the same time, the chapter observes that the unanimity forged to adopt a resolution is
not necessarily synonymous with agreement. A resolution receiving 15 affirmative votes is often
a compromise document that may be poorly suited to the situation at hand or may conceal
fundamental differences among members, at times resulting in implementation difficulties.
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Adopted resolutions
The statistical data on Security Council resolutions demonstrates a clear trend toward consensual
decisions in the post-Cold War era.156 In the Cold War era, which officially ended with the
implosion of the Soviet Union in December 1991, 725 resolutions were adopted, although the
analysis here only includes 714 resolutions because the vote tally is unclear on 11 resolutions. 157
The Council achieved unanimity on 62.88 percent of the Cold War resolutions (449 of 714) in
this analysis. In the post-Cold War era, from January 1992 through the end of 2016, the Council
adopted 1611 resolutions; 91.93 percent of the resolutions were adopted (1481 of 1611)
unanimously. Thus, there is a more than 29 percent increase in the percentage of resolutions
adopted unanimously in the post-Cold War era as compared to the Cold War period.
In my analysis, I have chosen to include as unanimous votes those in which the members
present and voting have voted affirmatively. In some cases, the reason why a member does not
participate in a vote is to reflect its displeasure with the Council’s work or with its handling of a
matter. (Non-participation is different from an abstention, as it means that the member does not
even cast a vote, whereas an abstention is a type of vote.) Assuming that non-participation
undermines the spirit of consensus—even in cases where all those present and voting support a
draft resolution—the Cold War is even more striking in terms of the level of divisiveness, as
there were prolonged periods when the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union did not
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participate in Council meetings and votes. During the post-Cold War period, it has been rare for
a member not to participate in a vote. 158
From early January through the end of July 1950, the Soviet Union did not participate in
Council meetings in protest of the continued presence of Nationalist China on the Council as a
permanent member, even though mainland China had fallen to the People’s Republic of China
(i.e. the Communist forces of Mao Zedong) in December 1949.159 During this period, the Soviet
Union was absent for seven votes, including “a series of resolutions setting up a military
command to support the South Koreans” in the Korean War.160
The People’s Republic of China (i.e. mainland or Communist China), like the Soviet
Union, missed a significant number of votes; this occurred from late 1971, when it took over the
seat previously belonging to the Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan or nationalist China) through
1981.161 As Sievers and Daws write, the People’s Republic of China “began to refrain from
participating in the vote on matters arising from decisions taken when Nationalist China
occupied the Chinese seat on the Council, and this continued for almost a decade.” 162 The
Council adopted 52 resolutions in this period without China voting. It is worth noting that this
change of seat, which had been opposed by the United States, was the result of a General
Assembly vote that reflected the changing composition of the world body, with the rising
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number of developing countries sympathetic to the People’s Republic of China in the General
Assembly, helping Beijing to garner the requisite votes to unseat the Republic of China. 163
The move toward consensus-driven decisions in the Council in the post-Cold War era is
often assumed to have resulted from the thaw in East-West relations. While this is a major part of
the story, less well known is that the trend toward unity among the P3 in the Council is more
pronounced in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War. In the Cold War, the P3 voted
together 88.80 percent of the time on adopted resolutions (634 of 714) in this analysis; they have
voted as a bloc on adopted resolutions 99.01 percent (1595 of 1611) of the time from 1992 to
2016.
That the P3 profess shared values with regard to human rights, democracy and the rule of
law is a truism and can explain in part why they have converged so often in their voting,
especially since 1992. At the same time, however, their voting convergence is also part of the
broader effort among the P5 to cultivate consensus in decisions since the end of the Cold War.
While the P3 have voted together as a bloc approximately 99 percent of the time on adopted
resolutions from 1992 to 2016, the P5 (i.e., the P3 and China and Russia) have voted as a bloc on
adopted resolutions in the same period 93.97 percent of the time (1514 of 1611 resolutions), a
striking statistic that demonstrates the frequency with which voting unity is struck among
permanent members with divergent interests and ideological views.
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Vetoes
One might argue that analyzing the frequency of the veto’s use provides the best gage of how
united or divided the Security Council is in its decisions. After all, an abstention by a permanent
member cannot block the adoption of a resolution, while a veto on all but procedural matters
does. Although the veto has been used frequently in the post-Cold War era in ways that
undermine the Council’s effectiveness, it has been employed with much less frequency than
during the Cold War. Unfortunately, there are no statistics on threatened vetoes, which have the
same impact as a formal veto; information on threatened vetoes would help to increase our
ability to gauge the level of divisiveness in the Council. Over all, the veto was used 239 times on
195 draft resolutions from the founding of the UN through the end of 2016.164 Between 1946
and 1991, the veto was used 201 times on 164 draft resolutions. Between 1992 and 2016, the
veto was used 38 times on 31 resolutions. In other words, during the Cold War, the veto was
employed an average of 4.47 times per year (201 times in 45 years), whereas since then it has
been used an average of 1.58 times per year (38 times in 24 years).
The P3 have not voted as a bloc on 81 of the 195 draft resolutions vetoed through 2016.
During the Cold War, they did not vote together on 67 of 163 vetoed draft resolutions. 165 In the
post-Cold War era, they did not vote together on 14 of the 31 vetoed draft resolutions through
2016. On the surface, this would indicate considerable division among the P3 on resolutions that
have been vetoed in the post-Cold War era. However, it should be noted that 13 of 14 of these
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vetoes were on a single issue, Israel/Palestine, thus demonstrating the level of unity on the wide
variety of other matters.
Parsing further the data with regard to how the permanent members have used the veto
reveals several interesting patterns since 1946:
China
The Republic of China (i.e., Nationalist China), which held a permanent seat on the Council until
late 1971, never used the veto. The People’s Republic of China (i.e., Communist China) has only
used the veto 10 times through 2016. In the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China used the
veto only once, in order to block Bangladesh’s membership to the UN (1972). In the post-Cold
War era, prior to China’s joint vetoes with Russia beginning in 2007, it employed the veto on
two occasions to register its disapproval with countries hosting UN peace operations that
recognized Taiwan. 166 These included one draft resolution that would have enhanced the staffing
capacity of the UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the
Comprehensive Agreement of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA) (1997) and another
draft resolution that would have reauthorized the UN Preventive Deployment Force in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP) for an additional six months (1999).
A general reluctance to employ the veto through the mid-2000s has given way to a
greater willingness to exercise this prerogative in conjunction with Russia to defend states whose
sovereignty it believes is being threatened. China has employed the veto seven times jointly with
Russia between 2007 and 2016 on Myanmar (2007), on Zimbabwe (2008), and on Syria on five
occasions (once in 2011, twice in 2012, once in 2014, and once in 2016).
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France
France has employed the veto on 16 occasions, but not since December 1989, when it vetoed a
draft resolution in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United States that would have
condemned the US intervention in Panama. It first exercised its veto during the Suez crisis of
October 1956, when it jointly voted against two draft resolutions with the United Kingdom,
putting it in direct political confrontation with the United States. Between 1974 and 1981,
France, in conjunction with the United Kingdom and the United States, vetoed 10 draft
resolutions that, if adopted, would have been detrimental to the interests of apartheid South
Africa. It also joined with United States and the United Kingdom to veto draft resolutions in
April 1986 and January 1989 that would have condemned the US bombing of Libya and the
shooting down by the United States of Libyan reconnaissance planes, respectively. France cast
its only sole veto in February 1976 on a draft resolution that would have considered France’s
intention to organize a referendum in Mayotte, an island of the Comoros (a recently independent
French colony), interference in the affairs of the Comoros. 167
Soviet Union/Russia
The Soviet Union dominated the use of the veto in the early years of the UN. It was the only
permanent member to take advantage of its veto prerogative during the first ten years of the
UN’s existence; from February 16, 1946, the date of the first veto, to 15 December 1955, the
Soviet Union cast the sole veto on 57 draft resolutions. The Soviet Union cast about 90 percent
of vetoes (82 of the first 91) by all permanent members through 1971; thereafter, other
permanent members increasingly use the veto. A common Soviet tactic through 1961 was to veto
167
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membership applications for countries trying to enter the UN that were not favorably disposed to
Soviet policies.168 Russia has employed the veto 15 times between 1992 and 2016; in recent
years, it has resorted to the veto more frequently, as 12 of these 15 have been cast in the last
decade of this period (i.e., 2007-2016). As noted above, Russia cast seven joint vetoes with
China between 2007 and 2016.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom has used the veto 29 times, all during the Cold War era. Like France, it
first employed the veto during the Suez crisis of October 1956. Also like France, the United
Kingdom has not cast a veto since the December 1989 draft resolution on the US intervention in
Panama. While it frequently cast vetoes in conjunction with France and the United States to
defend the interests of apartheid South Africa, the United Kingdom often acted alone in casting
negative votes on draft resolutions pertaining to Southern Rhodesia, a British colony that gained
independence as Zimbabwe in 1980. Between 1963 and 1973, it vetoed seven draft resolutions
on Southern Rhodesia, five of which were cast alone and two jointly with the United States.
Another notable UK veto was on a draft resolution calling for a ceasefire during its military
campaign in the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, cast in conjunction with the United States in June
1982.
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United States
The United States cast its first veto in 1970 and has cast significantly more vetoes than any other
permanent member since then, a total of 79 from 1970 to 2016, with the Soviet Union/Russia
running a distant second with 25 vetoes in the same time period. The US cast 65 of its 79 vetoes
from 1970 to 1991. In the post-Cold War era, it cast 14 vetoes through the end of 2016.
Most frequently, the US has employed its veto to defeat draft resolutions that it has
perceived as being detrimental to the interests of Israel. Use of the veto to protect Israel has been
a consistent trend of US policy since 1972. Between 1972 and 1991, it cast 66.12 percent (28 of
43) of its sole vetoes on Israel/Palestine, or related issues (e.g., Israeli involvement in Lebanon).
The 14 US vetoes cast in the post-Cold war era (1992-2016) have been sole vetoes, virtually all
of which (13) have been on matters related to Israel/Palestine. The other veto was on a draft
resolution in June 2002 on the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which the US voted
against because it did not want US peacekeepers subject to the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court.169
The following chart shows the propensity of the permanent members to use the veto
during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras.
Table 1. Use of the Veto
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Combining Abstentions and Vetoes170
When combining the votes on draft resolutions that were either adopted or vetoed, Council
members made unanimous decisions 76.59 percent of the time between 1946 and 2016 (1930 of
2520 draft resolutions) in this analysis. As expected, there was considerable division during the
Cold War, and there has been frequent unity in the overall voting patterns in the post-Cold War
era. During the Cold War (1946-1991), Council members voted unanimously in favor of draft
resolutions 51.42 percent of the time (452 of 879 draft resolutions), taking into account adopted
and vetoed draft resolutions. However, in the post-Cold War era (1992-2016), Council members
have unanimously adopted 90.19 percent of draft resolutions (1481 of 1642) that were put to a
vote and either adopted or vetoed.
Combining vetoes and abstentions, the P3 voted together 92.98 percent (2345 of 2522
draft resolutions) of the time between 1946 and 2016. However, there is a considerable
discrepancy in their voting solidarity between the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. In the
Cold War (1946-1991), they voted as a bloc 83.30 percent (733 of 880 draft resolutions) of the
time on adopted and vetoed draft resolutions; in the post-Cold War era (1992-2016), they have
voted in unison 98.17 percent (1612 of 1642 draft resolutions) of the time on adopted and vetoed
draft resolutions.
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So What? What Statistics Don’t Tell
Statistically the trend toward unanimous voting is an indisputable element of Council decisionmaking during the post-Cold War era. The caveat, of course, is that states still break this norm.
The veto causes gridlock in the Council on situations in which one or more of the permanent
members have a key stake, frequently having a devastating impact on the lives of people on the
ground. For example, the trend toward greater voting unanimity matters little to populations
suffering from vetoes pertaining to Syria and Ukraine.
Another issue worth reiterating is that unanimous decisions are not necessarily good
decisions. Sometimes the best compromise that can be made among all 15 Council members is a
bad one for populations in need. Very weak resolutions are occasionally the price that is paid to
avoid a veto.
Council action during the early weeks of the Rwandan genocide makes this point.
Resolution 912, which decreased the size of the force of UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda
(UNAMIR) at the outset of the Rwandan genocide, was adopted unanimously on 21 April 1994;
while it might have been better than no resolution at all, it was nonetheless a bad resolution for
the people of Rwanda. Since much of the Council (including, most importantly, the permanent
members) was not willing to take meaningful action to stop the genocide, it may have been the
only way forward for the “small group of countries seeking to preserve the mandate, to keep the
force in place, and to reinforce it as soon as possible…,” according to Colin Keating, the thenPermanent Representative of New Zealand and the Council president in April 1994. 171
Nonetheless, it was not commensurate with the need for a more robust force willing to take
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action to stop the genocide. Resolution 918, adopted on 17 May 1994, was another weak
resolution, authorizing minimal reinforcements for UNAMIR. The resolution was voted on in
two separate parts: the only negative vote cast on the first part of the resolution was by Rwanda,
which was perpetrating the genocide and was a member of the Council at the time; the second
part of the resolution was adopted unanimously. 172 At that point, most of the Council was
supportive of a stronger resolution than what resulted, but the veto-holding United States blocked
more substantive action. 173 The records will thus show that near consensus had been achieved on
these resolutions, but this masked strong divisions on the Council, and ultimately helped to seal
the fate of the victims of the genocide.
There are also cases when resolutions are unanimously adopted, but the members will not
make a concerted effort to implement the measures outlined, and may even undermine the
resolutions that had their support. Since 2011, the Council has voted unanimously every year to
renew the panel of experts of the Sudan Sanctions Committee. 174 Yet some panel of experts
reports in recent years have referred to violations of the arms embargo, with Sudan shipping
weapons into Darfur produced by permanent members China and Russia after the embargo was
imposed on all parties to the Darfur conflict in 2005.175 Admittedly the arms embargo is on the
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Darfur region of Sudan, not the country as whole, but even a casual follower of events would
realize that weapons shipped to Khartoum have been used in Darfur in violation of the embargo.
A final point to be made is that the lack of data on the threatened veto is a further
indication that it is difficult to tell how divided the Council is by looking at voting patterns alone.
Kishore Mahbubani, who headed Singapore’s Council team in 2001-2002, has gone as far as to
allege that “…while the formal veto is rarely used, the informal veto is used almost every day,
especially in the frequent and more important informal consultations among Council
members.”176 Although it is unclear just how often this hidden veto is used, it does appear that its
use is not infrequent. It can cause the member or members that have proposed a draft to
withdraw it. Likewise, members that are contemplating whether to produce a draft on a particular
issue may not even proceed with their idea, if they suspect that their draft could be doomed by a
veto. The hidden veto (like the formal veto) is part of what makes the Council a “selective
security” institution, as Adam Roberts and Dominik Zaum have called it. 177 For example, The
New York Times reported in October 2015 that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had
not been held accountable by the Council for its human rights violations because of the threat of
a veto by China.178

Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that there has been a movement toward unanimity in Security
Council voting during the post-Cold War era. This represents a departure from the Cold War,
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when there was considerable more division in voting. Even states like the P3, which have
generally been aligned on foreign policy since the end of World War II and faced a common
Soviet threat in the Cold War, have been more aligned in their voting patterns in the post-Cold
War era. At the same time, it is important to recognize that voting unity is different from
agreement; sometimes the unanimity achieved on a resolution masks internal divisions among
members that can lead to resolutions which are not suited to the needs required or which key
states on and off the Council do not have the will to implement. Additionally, weak commitment
to resolutions unanimously adopted can lead to implementation problems.
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III: A rising developing world in the Council
In the Cold War, some of the most contentious issues the Council addressed—the Suez crisis, the
Congo, and Southern Rhodesia, among others—focused on crises in recently independent states
or in states about to gain their independence. The greatest rupture among the P3 was the Suez
crisis. During this crisis, France and the United Kingdom were directly opposed to the United
States, which was on the same side as the Soviet Union for the first and only time in a major
Cold War crisis. Differences in approach among the P3 were reflected in the UN’s engagement
in the Congo in the early 1960s, 179 although these were less pronounced than during the Suez
crisis. US efforts to defend Israeli interests were another source of tension among the P3 that
played out in Council deliberations in the 1970s and the 1980s and continue to this day. In a
small number of instances, there were policy differences on agenda items in the Americas,
largely resulting from heavy-handed US policies justified by fears about Communist interference
in its backyard.
By the early to mid-1960s, the rising membership in the world body of developing
countries was shaping the work of the Council, forcing consideration and votes on issues like
Southern Rhodesia, Angola, and South Africa. The conventional view of the Cold War is of an
East-West confrontation, and in the Council, this tension was clear in a number of dramatic
confrontations between the Soviet Union and the Western states over issues like the Korean
conflict, Hungary, Berlin, and Cuba that put the Soviet Union and the US in direct confrontation
with each other.

179

On these differences, see Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the UN: A Peculiar Relationship (Columbia:
University of Missouri Press, 2010), 49-70.

60

Nonetheless, especially from the 1960s onward, much of this East-West tension played
out in the context of the developing world’s struggle to break free from the shackles of colonial
rule and its anti-Zionist approach to world affairs, with the Third World serving as a battlefield
for superpower influence.180 Where there were disagreements among the P3, even subtle ones,
these were often exposed by developing countries tabling draft resolutions, thus forcing the
permanent members to show their hand through Council votes.
The process by which resolutions were often negotiated in the Cold War would be
unfamiliar to the modern day observer of the Council. On matters of great importance to the
permanent members, there would be significant deliberations on texts. However, quite frequently
resolutions would be voted upon with little, and on occasion, no substantive negotiation, leading
to abstentions and vetoes that might have been avoided. Carefully managed negotiations are
more typical of today’s Council than that of the Cold War.
This chapter explores the Council’s deliberations and voting patterns of the P3 during the
Cold War; historical background is provided as required to contextualize the analysis. The
chapter starts with a discussion of the most significant rupture among the P3 in the Cold War, the
Suez crisis of 1956, followed by a discussion of the Congo crisis of the early 1960s. After these
two cases ensues an analysis of the developing world’s impact on the Council deliberations from
the 1960s onwards. A final section focuses on the processes by which the Council negotiated
resolutions until the waning years of the Cold War.
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Two post-colonial crises: the Suez and the Congo
Crises in the Suez and the Congo predated the surge of activism in the Council by developing
countries. This is largely because much of the developing world had yet to join the organization,
and hence could not serve in the Council. The UN membership expansion was only beginning to
rise in earnest at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956 and was still in the midst of rising by the time
of the Congo crisis in 1960. Both Egypt and the Congo were recent post-colonial states, where
France and the UK had considerable economic and political interests. These two issues are a
useful place to start because they demonstrate how member states in the developing world would
come to occupy much of the UN’s attention and cause friction among the permanent members,
including the P3. The difficulties in the Suez and the Congo were a harbinger of the deep
engagement the Council would have in the post-colonial world in the decades to come, and in
fact, still has today. 181
The Suez Crisis
The Suez crisis represents the most significant rupture in relations among the P3 in the postWorld War II era, one that had the potential for perilous geopolitical consequences, given the
military engagement of France and the United Kingdom and the political interests of the Soviet
Union and the United States in the region. It also presaged one of the themes that would become
an important characteristic of international affairs from the 1960s to the 1980s—the assertiveness
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of the post-colonial states. In this instance, that assertiveness was embodied in Gamal Abdel
Nasser, president of Egypt.
The crisis was precipitated by Nasser’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal in July
1956, threatening the political and economic interests of France and the United Kingdom, who
were the Suez Canal Company’s key shareholders. 182 Diplomatic efforts to come up with an
acceptable formula for managing the canal, notably through the London Conference in August
1956, were unsuccessful, as “proposals…for the continued international control of the Canal
with the participation of Egypt were rejected by Nasser.”183 What France and the United
Kingdom viewed as Egyptian intransigence prompted them to issue a joint letter to the Security
Council on 12 September. 184
In the letter, the waning colonial powers maintained that Egypt had failed to negotiate on
the basis of proposals that “offer[ed] a means for a just and equitable solution,” proposals that
had been presented by 18 of the 22 states attending the conference, who “represent[ed] between
them over ninety per cent of the user interest in the Canal.”185 Consequently, they argued that the
rejection of these proposals was “an aggravation of the situation, which, if allowed to continue,
would constitute a manifest danger to peace and security.” 186
In fact, both powers had already been planning with Israel, which continued to endure a
series of small scale cross-border terrorist attacks from Egyptian fedayeen, a military operation to
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take control of the Canal Zone. 187 This ill-fated operation was concocted by Britain and France
without the knowledge of their close ally, the United States, which had made it clear that military
force was not an option to resolve the impasse. 188 Operation Musketeer called for Israeli forces
to attack Egypt, ostensibly in response to the fedayeen raids, followed by an Anglo-French
ultimatum to both Egypt and Israel to cease hostilities within 48 hours, to disengage at least 10
miles from the Canal Zone, and to permit British and French forces to take positions in Ismailia,
Port Said, and Suez, in order to serve as a buffer between the parties and to protect shipping in
the Canal Zone.189 If the parties did not stop fighting in the 48-hour period and withdraw their
forces as dictated, then the United Kingdom and France would launch a military operation. The
assumption, correct as it turned out, was that Egypt would resist a demand to stop defending its
sovereign territory from invasion, which would enable the French and British governments to
argue that their ultimatum had been violated and allow them to proceed with their military
plan.190
On 28 October, Operation Musketeer was put into motion when Israeli forces attacked
Egypt through the Sinai Peninsula, and the Anglo-French ultimatum was issued on 30 October.
Suspicious of Anglo-French collusion with Israel, the US government was alarmed at the
potential political, economic and geostrategic consequences of such a plan. In a 29 October 1956
telegram to the US embassy in Paris, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles posited that if
France and the United Kingdom become involved in a conflict in the Middle East, “they will
have started something they cannot finish and the end result may very well be an intensive antiWestern sentiment throughout the Middle East and Africa and intimacy with [the] Soviet Union
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which will impair…indispensable relations of Europe with [the] Middle East and Africa.”191 In
addition to having grave economic consequences in France, the United Kingdom, and Western
Europe, Dulles further expressed the view that the United States would be “unlikely” to help its
allies, as it had in the two world wars, when “they were clearly victim[s] of armed
aggression.”192
Upon receiving news of the Israeli attack on Egypt, the United States quickly requested a
Council meeting, wanting to gain the upper-hand in the arena of public opinion by going to the
Council before the Soviet Union. 193 During the public session of October 30, Soviet Ambassador
Arkady Sobolev accurately described the Anglo-French-Israeli deception: “It is plain from
everything that is happening that Israel could not have made this attack without encouragement
and help from…aggressive circles which…are trying to find some pretext for moving their
troops into this area.”194 He proceeded to read from an Associated Press article describing the
Anglo-French ultimatum giving Egypt and Israel 12 hours to withdraw from the Canal Zone, and
accurately concluded that the article “makes it quite clear that the intention is to intervene in the
events taking place in the Middle East without waiting for United Nations action.” 195
While not unusual for a Soviet representative to chastise a NATO member, the divisions
among members of the Western alliance in the subsequent public session later in the day were
unusual. The United Kingdom and France clashed openly with the United States. UK
Ambassador Pierson John Dixon dutifully defended the ultimatum that had been presented to
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Egypt and Israel, maintaining the need to pressure the parties to end their hostilities and to ensure
that the Canal Zone would remain open. 196 Supported by French Ambassador Bernard CornutGentille,197 he urged action not to be taken on the draft resolution that had been proposed by the
United States,198 which called on Israel to immediately “withdraw its armed forces behind the
established armistice lines” and called on member states “to refrain from giving any military,
economic or financial assistance to Israel” as long as it failed to comply with the resolution. 199
US Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge refused to withdraw the draft from consideration, arguing:
“If this draft resolution is adopted and complied with by Israel, then the basis for the ultimatum
will have disappeared.”200 Just before the vote, Lodge posited that the vote would “have
considerable moral effect” and represented “something we all should do.” 201
In the ensuing vote, France and the United Kingdom cast their first ever vetoes; in fact,
their joint vetoes represented the first time any of the permanent members, other than the Soviet
Union, had used their veto privilege. Australia, a Commonwealth nation, abstained, as did close
French ally Belgium. All other members voted in favor of the draft.
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Later the same day, France and the United Kingdom vetoed a second draft resolution, 203
which had been put forth by the Soviet Union with amendments from the Republic of China and
Iran.204 According to Urquhart, the main difference in the second vetoed draft as compared to the
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first one was that it “omitted the clause calling on all UN member states to refrain from the use
or threat of force.”205
The irony of this unseemly display of P3 disunity was that neither UK Ambassador
Dixon nor French Ambassador Cornut-Gentille was informed of Operation Musketeer by their
respective governments. 206 Defending their countries’ interests at the UN took a heavy personal
toll on them. Urquhart writes that: “On 31 October, Cornut-Gentille collapsed from heart trouble
brought on by nervous exhaustion.” 207 Adekeye Adebajo writes that Dixon “considered resigning
over the issue” and quotes him as saying that defending the UK position in the UN General
Assembly brought on “‘the severest moral and physical strain I have ever experienced.’” 208
Given the impasse in the Council, the matter was referred to the General Assembly
through the Uniting for Peace procedure. Uniting for Peace, conceived during the Korean War by
the United States to bypass a Soviet veto, was based on General Assembly resolution 377 (V) of
3 November 1950, which stated that: “If the Security Council because of lack of unanimity of the
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security….the General Assembly shall consider the matter
immediately…”.209 While France and the United Kingdom voted against resolution 119, which
referred the Suez crisis to the General Assembly, they could not block the resolution because this
was a procedural matter not subject to a veto. 210
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The General Assembly almost immediately played a constructive role. On 2 November,
with British and French troops in Egypt, it adopted a resolution urging an immediate ceasefire. 211
It then authorized the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to “secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities”212 on November 4. The creation of a UN force facilitated UK and French cooperation
in withdrawing their troops from Egypt. 213
While the crisis was over, its repercussions on France and the United Kingdom, on the
Western alliance and on the functioning of the Council were considerable. With both the Soviet
Union and the United States aligned against them, France and the United Kingdom had no choice
but to retreat. The political fall-out in the United Kingdom resulted in Prime Minster Anthony
Eden’s resignation. 214 The United States vowed to block International Monetary Fund (IMF)
funds to the United Kingdom, until French and UK soldiers had withdrawn from Egypt, 215 and
“British and French embassies all over the world were…attacked by infuriated mobs…”. 216
The Suez crisis occurred concurrently with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Hungary,
impacting the Council’s treatment of the later issue. US ire at its French and UK allies with
regard to Suez made it unwilling to co-sponsor with them a resolution condemning the Soviet
attack on Hungary and calling for an emergency special session of the General Assembly. 217 Ilya
Gaiduk notes that US President Dwight Eisenhower and US Secretary State John Foster Dulles
“suspected that this proposal by the Western allies was intended to deflect attention from events
in the Middle East and claimed that they lacked adequate information about what was happening
211
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in Hungary.”218 He even suggests that this “noncommittal attitude” by the United States resulted
in the Hungarian issue being given short shrift both in the Security Council and in the
Secretariat.219
The Congo Crisis
The Congo came onto the Council’s agenda within days of the Council’s adoption of resolution
142 on 7 July 1960, admitting it as a UN member state. By this date, Congolese troops had
already begun mutinying against Belgian officers (who had been kept in place to help train the
new Congolese army) and committing violence against Belgian citizens.220 In response, the
Belgian government deployed troops “to restore order and protect Europeans...”.221 To
compound the challenges facing the newly independent country, Moise Tshombe, the head of the
Congo’s mineral rich Katanga province, proclaimed Katanga’s secession on 11 July 1960. 222
Amidst ongoing violence in the new state and the attempted secession of Katanga
province, Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu and Congolese Prime Minister Patrice
Lumumba wrote to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld requesting UN military
intervention “to protect the national territory of the Congo against the present external
aggression,” asserting that its “request [was] justified by the dispatch to the Congo of
metropolitan Belgian troops in violation of the treaty of friendship signed between Belgium and
the Republic of the Congo on 29 June” which indicated that “Belgian troops may only intervene

218

Gaiduk, Divided Together, 220.
Ibid, 220.
220
Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 392.
221
Brian Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1987), 146.
222
Urquhart, Hammarskjöld, 395.
219

69

on the express request of the Congolese Government.” 223 After receiving this request,
Hammarskjold called an urgent meeting of the Council, invoking article 99 for the first time in
the UN’s history. 224
The great powers had different understandings of the Congo crisis and how to address it.
The United States believed that that the UN could play a useful role in keeping Cold War politics
out of the new state, 225 an aspiration which ultimately failed. A US State Department briefing
paper produced for a 19 January 1961 meeting between President Eisenhower D. Eisenhower
and President-elect John F. Kennedy noted: “We believe a UN solution is still the best answer
for the Congo and that the advantage of adherence to our policy of support for the UN outweighs
possible advantages inherent in a program of unilateral action in the Congo.” 226 Allowing the UN
to take the lead in the Congo would further allow the United States to distance itself from
charges of supporting colonialism;227 it would back the UN engagement in the Congo, while
being less critical of the calls for the departure of Belgian troops than its British and French
colleagues.228 The US desire to distance itself from pro-colonial sentiments was especially
critical given the changing composition of the UN General Assembly; 229 as Odd Arne Westad
has written, “…the advent of new, independent Third World states began already in 1960 to
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change the role of the United Nations into a more diverse forum, less susceptible to American
influence than before.”230
France and the United Kingdom were sympathetic to the initial Belgian intervention.
They viewed it as a necessary measure to protect the lives of foreign nationals. 231 Their views
may have further reflected a sense of kinship with another colonial power and concerns with
their economic interests in the Katanga region.232 However, the United Kingdom was ultimately
more supportive of the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) than France,233 which “was opposed
to U.N. intervention in principle,” according to Ernest W. Lefever. 234 France registered its
disagreement with the UN’s involvement in the Congo crisis by abstaining on five of six
resolutions adopted on the issue in the early 1960s. 235 In some cases, Paris maintained that the
texts were too critical of what it perceived as Belgium’s efforts to protect its nationals and
provide stability, a concern it shared with London. For example, France and the United Kingdom
(along with the Republic of China) abstained on resolution 143 (14 July 1960) because the text
called on Belgium “to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of the Congo”236
when UN forces were not yet in place. Both France and the United Kingdom believed that this
condemned their NATO ally (Belgium), which they maintained was providing a humanitarian
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service in the Congo, protecting foreigners from violence. 237 Furthermore, resolution 143
authorized the UN to provide military assistance to the Congo government, but for France and
the United Kingdom, it was not sufficiently clear that this meant that Belgian troops should leave
only once this military assistance came, an interpretation of the resolution held by the United
States but not by the Soviet Union. 238
The French abstentions on the Congo, on drafts always supported by the United States
and often supported by the United Kingdom, can also be explained by Charles de Gaulle’s
negative view of ONUC and of the UN more broadly. 239 De Gaulle believed that the UN’s
involvement exacerbated the political and security problems of the Congo. Given that France had
not voted in favor of the mission’s deployment, it decided to withhold financial support for
ONUC.240 This dereliction of financial responsibility, along with that of the Soviet Union, helped
to precipitate a financial crisis in the Organization. 241 According to Lawrence Kaplan, the
French unwillingness to financially support ONUC differentiated it from the United Kingdom:
“…Britain’s weight ultimately fell on the UN side. Unlike France, it never withheld financial
support for ONUC.”242
De Gaulle believed that the great Western powers (France, the United Kingdom and the
United States) could have done a better job of handling the Congo crisis than the United
Nations.243 By September 1960, only two months into ONUC’s deployment, he argued that had
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France, the United Kingdom, and the United States collaborated in a unified way, they could
have resolved the Congo crisis in a manner that “‘would have been preferable to the bloody
anarchy that…exists in the new state’” and one that would have ensured “‘the prestige and
cohesion of the West’” better than “‘playing second fiddle to the so-called ‘United’ Nations.’”244
According to Lefever, in de Gaulle’s view this would entail the three powers overseeing an
orderly process by which “a significant cadre of Belgian administrators, technicians, and
probably military officers would remain in the Congo to carry on the functions of the state until a
sufficient number of Congolese had been trained to take over.” 245
Above and beyond the Congo crisis, de Gaulle resented what he thought was the world
body’s meddling in the management of colonial matters, a particularly sensitive issue to him
given the post-World War II decline of the French and the other European empires. According de
Gaulle, “…the United Nations has no right according to its own Charter to intervene in an affair
which is under the internal jurisdiction of France.” 246 This attitude underscored France’s
bitterness toward General Assembly engagement with Algeria and Hammarskjöld’s handling of
the quarrel between France and Tunisia. 247 In his biography of Hammarskjöld, Urquhart writes
of the former secretary-general: “his admiration for de Gaulle seems to have made
Hammarskjöld reluctant to recognize de Gaulle’s view of him as an international interloper
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attempting under false pretenses to gain admission to the hollowed fraternity of leaders of
powerful sovereign states.”248
De Gaulle was appalled by the views of the newest members of the UN General
Assembly, whom he maintained were more interested in airing their grievances and making
demands than achieving results. 249 He further lamented what he perceived as the encroachment
of the General Assembly on Security Council responsibilities: “…the General Assembly…[has]
assumed all powers. It can deliberate on everything, without and even against the advice of the
Security Council which is thus disposed of its essential prerogative.”250 Meetings at the United
Nations, according to de Gaulle, were no more than “riotous and scandalous sessions…filled
with invectives and insults…especially by the Communists and those who are allied with them
against the Western nations.”251
The Soviet Union was also disillusioned with ONUC, but for different reasons than
France. It would support UN engagement so long as it would hasten the departure of Belgian
troops,252 as it maintained that the Belgian intervention was a colonial exercise supported by
other Western powers designed to strip the Congo of its newfound independence. 253 It quickly
soured on the UN operation. It was troubled by delays in the departure of Belgian troops,254 the
continued support of the Katanga rebellion by foreign mercenaries, 255 and the view that the
United Nations was pro-Western in its approach to the Congo. 256
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The Soviet Union vented its anger in Council meetings. At the 13 December 1960
meeting, it complained that most of the UN military and administrative staff working in the
Congo was from NATO and pro-Western states. 257 The Soviet Union was also upset at the UN’s
closure of the Congolese airports and the Leopoldville radio station in early September 1960.258
The United Nations took these measures to inhibit the mobility of Congolese Armed Forces and
to prevent the airwaves from being used to incite violence; 259 however, they disadvantaged the
pro-Soviet Lumumba in his power struggle against Kasavubu, who had access to a strong radio
transmitter in Congo (Brazzaville) due to his alliance with its leader, Abbé Youlé. 260
Ambassador Valerian Zorin of the Soviet Union implied that a double standard was at play,
because the mission closed down the radio station and airfields, but did nothing to stop the forces
of General Joseph Mobutu,261 a US ally.262
Soviet anger at the UN’s handling of the Congo crisis culminated following the
assassination of its client, Patrice Lumumba, on 12 February 1961. At the Council meeting on 15
February 1961, it went so far as to introduce a draft resolution calling for an end to the Congo
mission within a month and the dismissal of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld; this draft was
voted down by the Council in a meeting on 20/21 February, 1961, with the Soviet Union casting
the sole vote in favor of its own resolution.263
Amidst contentious discussions in the Council, it was the elected members that filled the
void by proposing draft resolutions that would garner enough support to be adopted. In the six
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resolutions adopted on the Congo between 14 July 1960 and 24 November 1961 on the Congo,
five were proposed by elected members from the developing world. 264 The other resolution,
proposed by the United States, was adopted on 17 September 1960; its sole purpose was to call
an emergency special session of the General Assembly, given that “the lack of unanimity” of the
permanent members at a recent Council meeting had “prevented it from exercising its primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.” 265

The rise of the developing world
The Congo crisis took place in the midst of a rapid expansion in the membership of the United
Nations between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s. In 1955, the organization consisted of 76
member states.266 Over the next decade, its size nearly doubled, so that by 1965, the UN
comprised of 117 member states. 267 This expansion was largely the result of a rapid wave of
decolonization that swept across Africa, Asia and the Middle East.
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Coming from the developing world, many of the new members shared a deep sense of
injustice at the wrongs suffered at the hands of colonial overseers. They coalesced around an
agenda that emphasized economic and social justice, racial equality, and decolonization as a
means to promote international peace and security. In essence, their wide-ranging agenda
suggested that the three pillars of the UN Charter—human rights, development and peace and
security—had been systematically violated by the developed world and that global political,
economic and social inequities needed to be quickly redressed. This view had a strong impact on
the politics of the UN from the 1960s through the end of the Cold War.
By the early 1960s, a number of resolutions began to be adopted in the UN General
Assembly criticizing the inequities of the international order. UN General Assembly resolution
1514, which was adopted on 14 December 1960 and called for the independence of colonial
countries and their people, provided an early exposition of the new members’ outlook. This
resolution—entitled a “Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and
peoples”—urged a rapid and “unconditional end [to] colonialism,” declaring that it “constitutes a
denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an
impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.”268 Late the following year, the
Assembly adopted Resolution 1698 on the “Racial discrimination in Non-Self Governing
Territories,” condemning “the policy and practice of racial discrimination and segregation in
Non-Self-Governing Territories.”269 In the ensuing years, the General Assembly increasingly
demanded self-determination for subjugated populations in specific cases, including South
Africa, South West Africa, and Southern Rhodesia, among other examples.
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The policy aspirations of the developing world were largely represented by the NonAligned Movement (NAM). The NAM provided an organizing platform for the developing
world, enabling it to articulate unified policy positions on issues of common concern with the
weight of a membership that continued to grow from the 1960s to the 1980s. Although the NAM
alleged impartiality in the East-West Cold War confrontation, its demands for an end of
colonialism and imperialism and for social and economic justice were consistent with Soviet
ideology and propaganda. In UN fora, the NAM found useful allies in the Soviet Union and other
eastern bloc countries, which frequently supported the NAM’s positions.
The increasing percentage of developing countries in the General Assembly meant that
the elected composition of the Security Council also changed. This impacted the work of the
Council. The Soviet Union recognized that the UN membership was becoming more favorably
inclined toward Soviet positions. 270 This meant it was no longer compelled to use the veto in the
Security Council to block membership applications to the world body, which was a common
practice in the early years. Reflecting on this practice, long-time Soviet Ambassador to the UN
Yakov Malik noted, “it was sad that the USSR veto was repeated many times, but this was a
situation I could not help.” 271
The chart below demonstrates the growth in membership of the UN between 1945 and
1985, the year Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union. Concurrently, it
demonstrates the increased participation of the NAM in the UN over this time period by
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indicating which member states would become members of the Movement prior to 1990, the
year before the Soviet Union collapsed. I do not chart the growth in UN membership through
1990 because only a negligible number of states (i.e., only two) joined the organization between
1985 and 1990; Liechtenstein and Namibia became UN member states in 1990. As indicated in
chart, the number of UN member states that joined the NAM during the Cold War was
significant; by 1985, 82 of the UN’s 159 member states (more than half) were part of the NAM.
Table 2. Growth in UN Membership and NAM Representation in the UN 1945-1985272
Founding member states of the United Nations in 1945 (51 founding UN member states): 19 of the founding 51
members of the UN had become NAM members prior to 1990
Argentina (NAM), Australia, Belgium, Bolivia (NAM), Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Chile
(NAM)273, Republic of China, Colombia (NAM), Costa Rica, Cuba (NAM), Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador (NAM), Egypt (NAM), El Salvador, Ethiopia (NAM), France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
India (NAM), Iran (NAM), Iraq (NAM), Lebanon (NAM), Liberia (NAM), Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua (NAM), Norway, Panama (NAM), Paraguay, Peru (NAM), Philippine Republic, Poland, Saudi
Arabia (NAM), Syria (NAM), Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela (NAM), and Yugoslavia (NAM)
Member states joining the UN between 1946 and 1955 (76 UN member states by 1955): 30 of the 76 members of
the UN in 1955 had become NAM members prior to 1990
Afghanistan (1946) (NAM), Albania (1955), Austria (1955), Bulgaria (1955), Burma (1948) (NAM), Cambodia (1955)
(NAM), Ceylon (Sri Lanka) (1955) (NAM), Finland (1955), Hungary (1955), Iceland (1946), Indonesia (1950) (NAM),
Ireland (1955), Israel (1949), Italy (1955), Jordan (1955) (NAM), Laos (1955) (NAM), Libya (1955) (NAM), Nepal
(1955) (NAM), Pakistan (1947) (NAM), Portugal (1955), Romania (1955), Siam (Thailand) (1946), Spain (1955),
Sweden (1946), and Yemen (1947) (NAM)
Member states joining the UN between 1956 and 1965 (117 UN member states by 1965): 52 of 117 members of
the UN in 1965 had become NAM members prior to 1990
Cameroun (1960) (NAM), Central African Republic (1960) (NAM), Chad (1960) (NAM), Congo (Brazzaville) (NAM)
(1960), Congo (Leopoldville) (1960) (DRC) (NAM), Cyprus (1960) (NAM), Dahomey (1960) (Benin) (NAM), Gabon
(1960) (NAM), Ghana (1957) (NAM), Guinea (1958) (NAM), Ivory Coast (1960) (NAM), Japan (1956), Malagasy
Republic (1960) (Madagascar) (NAM), Federation of Malaya (Malaysia) (1957) (NAM), Mali (1960) (NAM), Morocco
(1956) (NAM), Niger (1960) (NAM), Nigeria (1960) (NAM), Senegal (1960) (NAM), Somalia (1960) (Somalia), Sudan
(1956) (NAM), Togo (1960) (NAM), Tunisia (1956) (NAM), and Upper Volta (1960) (Burkina Faso) (NAM)
Member states joining the UN between 1966 and 1975 (144 UN member states by 1975): 74 of 144 members of
the UN in 1975 had become NAM members prior to 1990
Bahamas (1973) (NAM), Bangladesh (1974) (NAM), Bahrain (1971) (NAM), Bhutan (1971) (NAM), Barbados (1966)
(NAM), Botswana (1966) (NAM), Cape Verde (1975) (NAM), Comoros (1975) (NAM), Equatorial Guinea (1968)
(NAM), Fiji (1970), German Democratic Republic (1973), Federal Republic of Germany (1973), Grenada (1974)
(NAM), Guinea-Bissau (1974) (NAM), Guyana (1966) (NAM), Lesotho (1966) (NAM), Mauritius (1968) (NAM),
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membership, 1945-present,” available at http://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nationsmembership-1945-present/index.html, and Nagaoka University of Technology, “Non-Aligned Movement
Participants, Observers, and Guests,” available at http://kjs.nagaokaut.ac.jp/mikami/NAM/member_list.htm
273
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Mozambique (1975) (NAM), Oman (1971) (NAM), Papua New Guinea (1975), Qatar (1971) (NAM), Sao Tome and
Principe (1975) (NAM), Suriname (1975) (NAM), Swaziland (1968) (NAM), United Arab Emirates (1971) (NAM) and
Yemen (1967)(NAM)
Member states joining the UN between 1976 and 1985 (159 UN member states by 1985): 82 of 159 members of
the UN in 1985 had become NAM members prior to 1990
Angola (1976) (NAM), Antigua and Barbuda (1981), Belize (1981) (NAM), Brunei Darussalam (1984), Dominica
(1978), Djibouti (1977) (NAM), Saint Lucia (1979) (NAM), Saint Christopher and Nevis (1983), Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines (1980), Samoa (1976), Seychelles (1976) (NAM), Solomon Islands (1978), Vanuatu (1981) (NAM),
Vietnam (1977) (NAM) and Zimbabwe (1980) (NAM)

The information in the above chart is consolidated in the one below.
Table 2.1. Growth in UN Membership and NAM Representation in the UN 1945-1985
(consolidated)
Year
1945

Number of UN member states that
would join the NAM by 1990
19

Number of total UN member
states
51

1955

30

76

1965

52

117

1975

74

144

1985

82

159

The Council was expanded in 1966 from 11 to 15 members with the addition of four
more elected seats, as a result of P5 acquiescence and “proposed revisions to the charter [that]
secured the needed ratifications” in the General Assembly in 1965. 274 By 1967, four Council
members were part of the NAM. From 1967 to 1990, the number of NAM members on the
Council never went below four, and in some calendar years, was as a high as eight. 275
The chart below shows the number of Security Council members which were part of the
NAM during their tenures from 1965 to 1990.
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Bosco, Five to Rule Them All, 102.
In 1983 and 1984, eight of the 15 Council members were part of the NAM.
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Table 3. Security Council Members which were part of NAM (1965-1990)
Year

Number of NAM countries on the Security Council

1965

1

1966

1

1967

4

1968

4

1969

4

1970

5

1971

4

1972

5

1973

7

1974

6

1975

5

1976

5

1977

5

1978

5

1979

7

1980

5

1981

4

1982

6

1983

8

1984

8

1985

6

1986

5

1987

5

1988

6

1989

7
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1990

7

As a result of the influx of developing countries in the UN with their activist approach,
the “issues taken up by the Organization as a whole, and the approach to those issues...”
changed.276 The permanent members, particularly France, the United Kingdom and the United
States, were forced to react to anti-colonial initiatives spearheaded by the developing world. This
significantly changed the pattern of vetoes in the Council, with the Soviet Union using the veto
less and the Western states using the veto more. As Sievers and Daws have demonstrated,
between 1 January 1966 and 1 May 2014, the United States and the United Kingdom cast more
vetoes than the Soviet Union/Russia. 277 Many of the more contentious issues on the Council’s
agenda in the second half of the Cold War came onto the agenda of the Council during the
1960s, such as Angola (1961), the Congo (1960), South Africa (1960), Southern Rhodesia
(1963), and South West Africa (1968).
The initial treatment of many agenda items resulted largely from the initiative of
developing countries, rather than the permanent members, who were supposed to be the primary
guardians of international peace and security. Likewise, many of the vetoed resolutions from this
time period, and indeed, through the end of the Cold War, were based on texts proposed by
developing countries; often times, the P3 would not vote together on these texts. The level of
activity from elected members and their allies in the General Assembly calling for Council action
and tabling controversial drafts is a far cry from the Council of the post-Cold War era, which has
by and large been tightly managed by the permanent members.

276
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In the 1960s, several developing countries would frequently ban together to alert the
Council to potential threats to international peace and security. This was the case, for example,
with agenda items related to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, disarmament,
Namibia/Southwest Africa, Portuguese territories in Africa, South Africa, and Southern
Rhodesia. These became controversial issues leading to several vetoes or non-unanimous
resolutions. They came onto the agenda as follows:
•

On 25 March 1960, 30 developing states wrote to the Council requesting that it “consider
the situation arising out of the large-scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators
against racial discrimination and segregation in the Union of South Africa.” 278 This
became the agenda item “Complaint Concerning South Africa” on 30 March 1960.279

•

Following the collapse of the May 1960 Paris Summit, Argentina, Ceylon, Ecuador and
Tunisia circulated to the Council a draft resolution urging the great powers (France, the
Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom) to recommence negotiations as
quickly as possible. 280 The draft, focusing on disarmament, was adopted on 27 May 1960
as resolution 135, with nine votes in favor and two abstentions (Poland and the Soviet
Union.)281

278
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•

On 11 July 1963, 32 developing states wrote to the Council saying that apartheid
constituted a threat to peace and security, and the matter was placed on the agenda of the
Council on 22 July 1963 as “The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa.” 282

•

On 22 July 1963, the Council included on its agenda the “Situation in Territories in
Africa Under Portuguese Administration.” The impetus for the inclusion of this item was
an 11 July 1963 letter forwarded the Council from 32 member states which maintained
that Portugal’s colonial domination of its African territories, namely Angola, undermined
international peace and security. 283

•

“The situation in Southern Rhodesia” came onto the agenda on 9 September 1963,
following the submission to the Council of a 2 August 1963 letter from Ghana, Guinea,
Morocco, and the United Arab Republic calling for the Council to meet on this matter. 284
In a memorandum affixed to the letter, these member states argued that “the continuance
of the situation was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and
security.”285
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•

On 1 December 1964, 22 members wrote a letter to the Council that “drew attention to
the various attempts made by the Organization of African Unity with a view to the
peaceful adjustment of the situation”—i.e. the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 286 This
was considered in the Council’s proceedings, beginning on December 9, 1964 when it
became the agenda item, “Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.” 287

•

“The Question of Southwest Africa” was placed on the agenda on 25 January 1968 after a
request for a meeting was made by 49 member states from the developing world, 288
“following the decision of the Government of South West Africa to resume the ‘illegal’
trial at Pretoria of thirty-five South West Africans in violation of their rights and of the
international status of the Territory of South West Africa, and in persistent defiance of
General Assembly resolutions on the question.” 289 A little more than a year later, on 20
March 1969, “the Situation in Namibia” was made an agenda item, 290 following the
submission of a 14 March 1969 letter to the Council from 40 developing world member
states that maintained that the “General Assembly…had terminated the mandate of the
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South African Government to administer Namibia” (Southwest Africa) and arguing that
the Namibian people had the right to self-determination.291
A number of other requests in the 1960s for Council consideration of issues that became agenda
items were made by developing states, often in the form of complaints by individual states. Such
complaints were frequently made by developing states concerned about their independence and
sovereignty.292
The assertiveness of the developing states in the Council’s work was further
demonstrated by their willingness to propose draft resolutions for consideration, even when the
outcome of votes was uncertain. In the early years of the United Nations, drafts that were vetoed
were often proposed by permanent members France, the United Kingdom and the United States
or their allies.293 Many of these were membership applications that were vetoed by the Soviet
Union. However, by the 1970s, the drafts that would be vetoed were increasingly proposed by
Council members from the developing world and their counterparts among the wider UN
membership, a trend that would last through the end of the Cold War. 294
Most of the vetoes from 1970 through the end of the Cold War were P3 vetoes, primarily
cast by the United States. These vetoes were the product of the influence of the new members
whose strength in numbers enabled them to push an agenda in the General Assembly that spilled
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over into the Council. Their influence was limited in the Council because of the veto of the
permanent members, but they were nonetheless able to shape the organ’s agenda, allowing them
to voice their views in debates and propose draft resolutions that forced the permanent members
to take a position on matters that they most likely would have preferred to handle on their own
terms, not necessarily through the Council. Since the developing world’s policies frequently
gained the sympathy of the Soviet Union (and after October 1971, the People’s Republic of
China), the P3 was largely on the defensive in the Council’s consideration of many issues,
compelling them to use their veto or to abstain on resolutions not entirely to their liking.
Several P3 vetoes and abstentions were cast on unresolved colonial issues in Africa that
had come onto the agenda in the 1960s—such as Angola, the Congo, Namibia, Southern
Rhodesia, and South Africa—or from issues in the Americas that aroused US sensitivities (for
example, Nicaragua, Panama, and Grenada). However, draft resolutions that were detrimental to
the interests of Israel were vetoed more than any other matter, under agenda items that included
“the situation in the Middle East,” “the question of the exercise by the Palestinian people of its
inalienable rights,” “The Middle East problem including the Palestinian question,” “the situation
in the occupied Arab territories,” and the “Request by Libya and Pakistan for consideration of
the serious situation arising from recent developments in the occupied Arab territories.” 295
Between 1970 (when the US cast its first Security Council veto) and 1990, the United States cast
vetoes (all sole vetoes) on 29 drafts related to these agenda items. 296
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Although the Council’s treatment of several country-specific cases demonstrates the
assertiveness of elected members from developing world, I have chosen to focus in greater depth
on three in particular (Southern Rhodesia, Israel/Palestine, and Nicaragua) for three reasons.
First, the Council’s treatment of these issues collectively demonstrates that voting divergences
among the P3 were focused on a regionally and substantively diverse set of issues. Second, taken
together, the focus on these issues spans a wide-time period of the organ’s history, demonstrating
the longevity of the developing world’s influence on the deliberations and practices of the
Council. The first veto on these issues was cast by the United Kingdom on 13 September 1963
on Southern Rhodesia297 in a period when the Non-Aligned Movement was gaining influence in
the United Nations. The last veto in the Cold War on one of these issues was cast by the United
States on “the situation in the Occupied Arab Territories” on 31 May 1990, 298 which was
followed by nearly three years without a Council veto. 299 Third, and finally, a large percentage of
P3 vetoes during the Cold War were on these matters; from 1963-1990, roughly 27 percent of the
vetoes (28 of 105) cast by the P3 were on these three issues.
Southern Rhodesia
The inclusion of Southern Rhodesia on the Security Council’s agenda in September 1963
followed the adoption of two key General Assembly resolutions on this issue, resolution 1747 of
28 June 1962 and resolution 1760 of 31 October 1962. Resolution 1747 requested the
“Administering

Authority”

(the

United

Kingdom)

to

convene

“a

constitutional

conference…which would ensure the rights of the majority of the people, on the basis of ‘one
man, one vote’ in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the
297
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Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples…”. 300 Resolution
1760 reaffirmed resolution 1747, requesting the United Kingdom to grant to “the whole
population [of Southern Rhodesia] the full and unconditional exercise of their basic political
rights.”301 Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the United Arab Republic requested the first Council
meeting on the situation in Southern Rhodesia in August 1963, referencing resolution 1760 and
article 73 of the UN Charter (which focused on the responsibilities of administering powers). 302
Several Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia were adopted in the ensuing
years. Some of these were groundbreaking in the sense that the Council for the first time ever
authorized sanctions.
•

In resolution 216 of 12 November 1965, the Council condemned Southern Rhodesia’s
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI).

•

On 20 November 1965, it authorized the use of sanctions for the first time in its history
through resolution 217, calling upon all states not to provide the regime “with arms,
equipment and military material, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic
relations with Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil and petroleum
products.”303

•

In resolution 221 of 9 April 1966, it called upon Portugal not to ship oil from Beira (in
Portuguese Mozambique) to Southern Rhodesia.
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•

On 16 December 1966, the Council expanded the embargo through resolution 232,
deciding that states should prevent the import of various commodities. 304

•

Resolution 253, adopted on 29 May 1968, expanded the sanctions to prevent the import
of all commodities from Southern Rhodesia and created a sanctions committee.

Security Council sanctions on Southern Rhodesia remained in place until the adoption of
resolution 460 on 21 December 1979, the same day as the signing of the Lancaster House
Agreement, which paved the way for the territory’s independence from the United Kingdom as
the sovereign state of Zimbabwe.
In spite of these and other decisions taken by the Council on Southern Rhodesia,
meetings on this agenda item were often contentious. The United Kingdom would not entertain
draft resolutions calling on it to intervene militarily in Southern Rhodesia305 or demanding a
political solution regarding the territory’s future while it was in the process of negotiating with
the white supremacist regime. 306 Writing in 1971, Boyd maintained:
Throughout the later stages of the Rhodesia imbroglio, there were repeatedly clear
indications that Britain would use its veto if a Council majority tried to carry a resolution
that went altogether too far for Britain’s liking. This was an important factor in the
production of a series of Council resolutions which, while usually representing a
compromise between British and African positions, tended to come out closer to the
British than to the African. 307
The United Kingdom would table key draft resolutions that imposed and expanded sanctions on
the territory; however, these at least in part responded to intense pressure from the developing

UN Security Council resolution 232, 16 December 1966. These commodities included “asbestos, iron ore,
chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat, and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in
Southern Rhodesia.”
305
See, for example, UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.1534), 17 March 1970, 2-3, para. 14.
306
See, for example, UN Security Council meeting record (S/PV.1556), 10 November 1970, 11-12, para. 132-136
and 12, para. 141-142.
307
Andrew Boyd, Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council (New York: Stein and Day,
1971), 228.
304

90

countries that believed that the United Kingdom was not doing enough to bring about majority
rule in the territory. 308 This included pressure from Commonwealth countries. At the 6-15
September 1965 Commonwealth Conference in London, 16 of the 21 attending members “called
in varying degrees for more positive action by the British to bring down the Smith regime.” 309
The conference communiqué stated that the UK government would pursue mandatory UN
sanctions against Southern Rhodesia if efforts failed to convince it “to return to constitutional
rule before the end of the year.” 310 Following the failure of these negotiations, sanctions were
expanded on Southern Rhodesia the following year at the behest of the United Kingdom. 311
Voting discrepancies among the P3 on Southern Rhodesia occurred over several years.
In the ten years from 1963 to 1973, the United Kingdom vetoed seven draft resolutions on
Southern Rhodesia, including five sole vetoes. All of these vetoes responded to drafts put forth
by developing states, mostly from Africa, which were trying to use the Council as an instrument
to exert economic and political pressure on the white supremacist regime in Southern Rhodesia
and compel the United Kingdom to establish democratic rule in the territory. 312 France abstained

308

See Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Situation in Southern Rhodesia, 121-122,
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/66-68/Chapter%208/66-68_08-4-Situation%20is%20Southern%20Rhodesia.pdf.
For example, UN Security Council resolution 253, 29 May 1968, which was proposed by the United Kingdom and
expanded the sanctions to include all commodities, followed shortly after a 12 March 1968 letter to the Council from
36 African states that stated that the selective sanctions imposed in resolution 232 had not succeeded, maintained
that the United Kingdom had not attempted to negotiate with African political parties in the Southern Rhodesia, and
argued that Chapter VII [i.e. coercive] measures were required to enable the population of the territory to achieve
self-determination. Furthermore, Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Pakistan and Senegal had sponsored a draft resolution on
18 April 1968, which was not voted upon, that would have called for the severance of all economic and other
relations with the territory.
309
Office of the Historian, “553. Paper Prepared in the State Department, Southern Rhodesia,” Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Washington, 23 January 1967,
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v24/d553. Tanzania was not at the meeting.
310
Ibid.
311
Ibid.
312
UN Security Council document S/5425/Rev. 1, 11 September 1963, was proposed by Ghana, Morocco and the
Philippines; S/9696 (11 March 1970) by Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia; S/9976 (6 November
1970) by Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia; S/10489 (30 December 1971) by Burundi, Sierra Leone,
Somalia, and Syria; S/10606 (2 February 1972) by Guinea, Somalia and Sudan; S/10805/Rev. 1 (29 September
1972) by Guinea, Somalia, and Sudan; and S/10928 (18 May 1973) by Guinea, Kenya and Sudan.

91

on all seven and the United States abstained on five of them. The United States joined the United
Kingdom in vetoing two of these draft resolutions (S/9696 of 11 March 1970 and S/10928 of 18
May 1973); the first of these joint vetoes would have condemned the United Kingdom for not
overthrowing the Southern Rhodesian government, while the second would have limited the
shipment of certain commodities to the territory. Interestingly, France not only abstained on
those drafts vetoed by the United Kingdom on Southern Rhodesia, but also on several other
resolutions on the issue.
The US position of Southern Rhodesia was largely aligned with that of the United
Kingdom, although there were some differences. Like the United Kingdom, Washington opposed
Southern Rhodesia’s universal declaration of independence and supported progress toward
majority rule in Salisbury in a phased manner. 313 However, it was concerned that the slow pace
of efforts toward a political settlement “could be exploited by extreme African elements, as well
as by the Communists…”. 314Similarly, Washington did not want to find itself supporting a deal
struck by London that was perceived by states as being too favorable to Smith.315
The consistent French abstentions on this issue were rather remarkable: as Joanna
Warson has written: “France was the…sole country not to oppose UDI in the Security Council in
the immediate aftermath of Smith’s declaration as well as the only power not to vote in favour of
a resolution declaring that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a threat to international peace
and security and calling upon states to break economic relations with Rhodesia.” 316 Warson
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persuasively argues that France firmly adhered to the principle of “non-intervention” at the time,
believing that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was not a threat to international peace and
security.317 To support her argument, she notes that “…in cases where Rhodesia was perceived to
threaten international peace, notably acts of aggression and provocation towards Zambia
(Resolution 326), Botswana (Resolution 403 and 406) and the People’s Republic of Mozambique
(Resolution 411), France voted in favour of the relevant Resolution.” 318
The UK vetoes demonstrate that it wanted to manage the decolonization process on its
own terms, rather than have it imposed by the UN. The United Kingdom had to react to the tide
of world opinion, 319 as reflected by the membership of the General Assembly and the Security
Council, but it did not want the United Nations to highjack what it maintained was its own
responsibility—i.e. stewarding Southern Rhodesia toward majority rule. 320 In Council debates in
the 1960s and 1970s, the United Kingdom was pilloried by African, Asian and Eastern bloc
states for not doing more to precipitate the demise of the white supremacist regime in Salisbury
and create the conditions for democratic rule based on universal suffrage.
With the best diplomatic skills they could muster, UK diplomats struggled to withstand
the barrage coming from the developing and eastern bloc states. The vetoed draft resolution on
13 September 1963321 invited the United Kingdom not to transfer military forces to Southern
Rhodesia resulting from the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. 322 In
meetings leading up to the vote, several African member states expressed concern that
317
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empowering Southern Rhodesia with additional military strength would pose a threat to
international peace and security, given the nature of the regime and its capacity to undermine the
security of its neighbors.323 The United Kingdom countered that Southern Rhodesia was not a
“non-self-governing territory,” and referred to article 2 (7) of the UN Charter (i.e., that this was a
matter of domestic jurisdiction). 324 In a 13 September 1963 meeting, UK Ambassador Patrick
Dean opined that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was “tranquil” 325 and that the use of force
outside of the territory required the approval of the UK government, 326 implying that UK
government would check external mischief by Salisbury.
Southern Rhodesia’s UDI in November 1965 was particularly disturbing to developing
countries. In a Council meeting shortly after the UDI, Ghanaian Ambassador Alex QuaisonSackey, speaking on behalf of African states, maintained that as a result “of this seizure of
power, the 4 million Africans in Southern Rhodesia have been rendered impotent and
powerless…,”327 while accusing the United Kingdom of emboldening the Salisbury regime by
not using military force against it. 328 Similarly outraged, Senegalese Ambassador Ousmane Diop
called the UDI a “veritable act of international piracy,” and succumbing to hyperbole, added: “If
this crime goes unpunished, it will be the end of the moral foundations of the British
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Commonwealth, it will be the end of the authority of the Charter of the United Nations and it
will be the end of international peace and security in Africa.” 329
On 17 March 1970, Burundi, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Syria and Zambia introduced a draft
resolution that would have condemned the United Kingdom for not using military force to
overthrow the regime and that would have decided that states should immediately “sever all
diplomatic, consular, economic, military and other relations with the illegal racist minority
regime.”330 A request for the United Kingdom to forcibly overthrow the minority regime had
already been made by the General Assembly in resolution 2022 of 5 November 1965. 331 The 17
March 1970 draft was vetoed by the United Kingdom and the United States. Abstentions were
cast by Finland, France, and in this instance, even by Global South states Colombia and
Nicaragua. Prior to the vote, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Lord
Caradon, strongly criticized the draft, citing the unpredictable consequences that could arise from
military actions against Southern Rhodesia and saying that it could not justify “an economic war
against all southern African,” 332 most likely a reference to the draft resolution’s call for sanctions
to be imposed on South Africa and Portugal, both violators of the sanctions on Southern
Rhodesia.333 Regarding UK economic interests, Caradon bluntly noted that his country relied “as
much as any country in the world…on its foreign trade” and that “to cut off trade with all those
countries whose policies we dislike or oppose would be economic suicide.”334 At the same
meeting, US Deputy Ambassador Charles Yost supported the UK position. He concurred that
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that there was no way to “fully foresee the repercussions and consequences” 335 of the use of
force to overthrow the regime, and that imposing full-fledged sanctions on South Africa and
Portugal would be very difficult to enforce, requiring a blockade. 336
In November 1971, “proposals for settlement” were agreed between British Foreign and
Commonwealth Secretary Alec Douglas-Home and Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian
Smith after negotiations in Salisbury. These were based on “an intricate franchise system which
was supposed to lead one day to African majority rule.” 337 Property ownership still dictated the
right to vote.338 According to the terms of these settlement proposals, the agreement had to be
accepted by the Southern Rhodesian population “as a whole” before being implemented. 339
A UK commission led by Lord Edward Pearce (The Pearce Commission) undertook a
visiting mission to Southern Rhodesia from 11 January to 11 March 1972 to determine the level
of support for the agreement.340 After the mission, the Pearce Commission issued a report saying
that the population as a whole did not support the “proposals for settlement,” in part because the
African population in the Southern Rhodesia was not allowed to participate in the
negotiations.341 The UK decision to put the settlement before the people of Southern Rhodesia
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may have indicated that it was succumbing to international and domestic pressure to forge a fair
political solution to the long-standing crisis in Southern Rhodesia. 342
On 30 December 1971, less than two weeks before the arrival of the Pearce Commission
in Southern Rhodesia, the Council met to vote on a draft resolution proposed by Burundi, Sierra
Leone, Somalia and the Syrian Arab Republic. The draft rejected the “proposals for settlement,”
emphasized the need for universal adult suffrage in the territory, and called for the United
Kingdom “to facilitate the participation of a United Nations team of observers during the
preparation for and actual conduct of” the UK “exercise” to ascertain the wishes of the
population regarding the proposals. 343 It was vetoed by the United Kingdom, while Belgium,
France, Italy, Japan, and United States abstained.
The mood of the African members was reflected by Nigerian Ambassador Edwin Ogbu,
who opined: “The agreement in all its aspects is tantamount to a British Government
endorsement of the perpetual subjugation of the black people of Southern Rhodesia by the white
minority.”344 This sentiment was largely echoed by Soviet Ambassador Malik who claimed that
the UK veto and the abstentions of its NATO allies represent “a major failure of imperialism in
the United Nations.”345 UK Ambassador Colin Crowe said that the United Kingdom was being
pragmatic. In trying to strike a deal with the Smith government, its influence was limited. He
maintained that now was the time to determine whether the settlement proposals were acceptable
to the population of Southern Rhodesia “as a whole,” rather than to judge the proposals in the
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UN.346 He questioned whether the failure of the settlement to gain traction could “lead to
intensification of discrimination and apartheid?”347 The representative of the United States,
William Bennett, similarly argued against prejudging the agreement, while French Ambassador
François de La Gorce said that for France “it is simply a matter of following the experiment and
awaiting its results in the hope that maybe this will mark the end of the status quo
and…reintroduce momentum into a stagnant situation.” 348
The final two UK vetoes on Southern Rhodesia were cast in February 1972 and in May
1973, the second of these jointly with the United States. The first of these (S/10606 of 2
February 1972), proposed by Guinea, Somalia, and Sudan, would have urged the United
Kingdom to immediately cease implementation of the settlement proposals and expressed the
belief that an inclusive constitutional conference should be held to determine the political future
of the country. In addition to the UK veto, abstentions were cast by Belgium, France, Italy, Japan
and the United States. UK Ambassador Crowe argued that while he understood the Council’s
concern with the situation in Southern Rhodesia, it could not alter the current political process,
given that the Pearce Commission had yet to report on its findings. 349 The Somali representative,
Mr. Ghalib, said the veto contributed to the “long list of betrayals” 350 committed by the United
Kingdom, while the Soviet ambassador called the abstentions made by NATO members “equal
in force to a veto and to solidarity with those who use the veto and prevent the adoption of just
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resolutions,”351 an accurate if somewhat hypocritical assessment given the Soviet Union’s history
of breaking unanimity in the Council.
On 18 May 1973, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly vetoed a draft
resolution on Southern Rhodesia, introduced by Guinea, Kenya and Sudan, that would have
significantly ratcheted up the economic pressure not just on southern Rhodesia, but on
Portuguese colonies in the region and South Africa. The draft resolution, if adopted, would have
decided that “all states should limit, with immediate effect, any purchase of chrome ores,
asbestos, tobacco, pig iron, copper, sugar, maize and any products from South Africa,
Mozambique and Angola to the quantitative levels prevailing in 1965” (i.e., the year of Southern
Rhodesia’s Universal Declaration of Independence).352 It further would have extended the
blockade on Beira to cover the port of Lourenço Marques, also in Portuguese Mozambique,
while urging the United Kingdom to take measures to implement the blockade. 353
Once again, the familiar divide was exhibited in the discussion on this draft resolution in
the Council. Developing countries from Africa and Asia, again supported in their views by the
Soviet Union, expressed their anger and frustration with the UK and US vetoes. Kenyan
Ambassador Joseph Odero Jowi charged racism, suggesting that if the rebellion had been carried
out by the indigenous population, it would have been crushed, while “Rebellion by a minority of
colonial residents of British or white origin is fine.”354 The draft had crossed a redline for the
United Kingdom by calling for the expansion of the sanctions to Portuguese colonies and South
Africa, something that Caradon had argued in the Council would be detrimental to UK economic
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interests years earlier, as noted above. 355 Meanwhile, US Ambassador John Scali maintained that
expanding the sanctions would be “unrealistic” and “unenforceable” and that, as a result,
adopting the draft would harm the credibility of the United Nations. 356 US economic interests
were clearly at stake as well. In a March 1972 policy planning paper on South Africa, the US
National Security Council noted that the country was “an important source of essential
minerals—especially chrome, copper, platinum, gold, manganese and vanadium,” while listing
“continued profitable trade with South Africa and maintenance of U.S investments and access to
key resources” as an objective in the ensuing five years.357
The Middle East: Israel/Palestine
While the United States opposed Israel during the 1956 Suez crisis, strong support of Israel by
the United States has been a consistent feature of Security Council practice during the past half a
century, a policy that has varied little in this time period in terms of the level of this support. . In
the Cold War, however, the veto was used more frequently by the United States than in the postCold War period on draft resolutions viewed as detrimental to Israeli interests. This had more to
do with how the Council functioned than with any major shifts in US policy. As with a number
of other agenda items, there was more willingness to table draft resolutions that might be vetoed
than there has been during the post-Cold War period. From 1970-1990, the US cast 29 vetoes on
matters related to Israel, whereas it cast 13 vetoes on such issues between 1991 and 2016.
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At the root of the developing world’s ire toward Israel has been its occupation of the
territories acquired in the 1967 War, including East Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip 358 and the West
Bank. In the Cold War, vetoed resolutions on Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories were
consistently proposed by developing countries, either Arab states or developing countries
representing the Non-Aligned Movement more broadly. 359
Indicative of the movement’s opposition to the US use of the veto was its declaration at
its Conference in Havana, Cuba in September 1979. In a Council debate on 30 April 1980, the
Soviet representative read from the conference’s declaration, observing that the Conference
“‘condemned the threat by the United States to use the veto…against any resolution concerning
the implementation of the Palestinian people’s inalienable national rights.’” 360 A rash of US
vetoes on Israel/Palestine draft resolutions followed in the subsequent years, notwithstanding the
NAM’s condemnation.
Drafts resolutions in the Cold War on Israel/Palestine vetoed solely by the United States
(and which states proposed them) include the following:
•

On 29 June 1976, the United States cast the sole veto, with abstentions by France, Italy,
Sweden, the United Kingdom, on a draft resolution sponsored by Guyana, Pakistan,
Panama, and Tanzania, that would have affirmed “the inalienable rights of the Palestinian
people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right of national
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independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations.”361
•

On 30 April 1980, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Tunisia that
would have affirmed the “right [of the Palestinian people] to establish an independent
state in Palestine,” “[t]he right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their
homes…to do so, and the right of those choosing not to return to receive equitable
compensation for their property…”. The draft further reaffirmed that “Israel should
withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including
Jerusalem…”.362

While the US cast the only veto, France, Norway, Portugal and the

United Kingdom abstained.
•

On 20 January 1982, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Jordan that
characterized Israeli measures to administer the Golan Heights as an “act of
aggression.”363 While the United States registered the only veto, abstentions were cast by
France, Ireland, Japan, Panama, and the United Kingdom.

•

On 20 April 1982, the United States cast the only veto on a draft resolution sponsored by
Iraq, Jordan, Morocco and Uganda condemning an attack on worshipers at Holy sites at
the al-Haram al-Shareef.364 All 14 other members voted in favor of the draft.

•

On 2 August 1983, the United States cast the only veto on a draft resolution deploring
Israeli settlements in the occupied territories that was sponsored by Algeria, Bahrain,
Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
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Emirates and Yemen. 365 In addition to the US veto, 13 Council members supported the
draft resolution, while Zaire abstained.
•

On 13 September 1985, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Burkina
Faso, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Peru and Trinidad and Tobago that would have called
upon Israel “to immediately stop all repressive measures including curfews,
administrative detentions and forceful deportation and to release forthwith all detainees
and refrain from further deportations…”. 366 Australia, Denmark, France, and United
Kingdom cast abstentions.

•

On 30 January 1986, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Congo,
Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad and Tobago and the United Arab Emirates that would have
deplored “provocative acts [by Israelis] which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary
of the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem…”. 367 Other than Thailand, which abstained, and the
United States, the 13 remaining Council member voted in favor of the draft.

•

On 1 February 1988, the United States vetoed a draft submitted by Algeria, Argentina,
Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia and Zambia that would have called on Israel “as the
occupying Power and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, to accept the de
jure applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied
since 1967…and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention…”. 368 The
14 remaining members of the Council voted in favor of the draft.
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•

On 15 April 1988, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Algeria,
Argentina, Nepal, Senegal, Yugoslavia and Zambia that would have urged Israel to
“abide immediately and scrupulously with the Geneva Convention relative to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War, of 12 August 1949…” and “to rescind the order
to deport Palestinian civilians and ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied
Palestinian territories of those already deported…”.369 The 14 other Council members
voted in favor of the draft.

•

On 17 February 1989, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Algeria,
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia that deplored “Israel’s
persistent policies and practices against the Palestinian people” in the occupied territories
that had led to the deaths of Palestinian civilians. 370 The 14 other members voted in favor
of the draft.

•

On 9 June 1989, the United States vetoed a draft resolution submitted by Algeria,
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal and Yugoslavia that demanded that Israel
“desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory…ensure
the safe and immediate return of those already deported…and expresse[d] great concern
about the prolonged closure of schools in part of the occupied territory…”.371 All 14
additional members voted in favor of the draft.

•

On 7 November 1989, the United States vetoed a draft resolution proposed by Algeria,
Colombia, Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia that “strongly deplore[d]
those policies and practices of Israel, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian
people in the occupied territory, and in particular the siege of towns, the ransacking of the
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homes of inhabitants…and the illegal and arbitrary confiscation of their property and
valuables…,” while requesting the Secretary-General “to conduct on-site monitoring” of
the Occupied Territories. 372 The other 14 members of the Council supported the draft.
•

On 31 May 1990, the United States vetoed a draft resolution that would have
“establishe[d] a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be
dispatched immediately to examine the situation relating to the policies and practices of
Israel, the occupying Power, in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, occupied by
Israel since 1967…”. All 14 other members supported the draft.

Certain clear patterns emerge during the meetings in which these drafts were vetoed. What is
most striking is the isolation of the US position, especially in the final years of the Cold War,
when it became even less frequent for Western allies such as France and the United Kingdom to
abstain on the drafts. Israeli repression during the first Intifada, which began in December 1987
and ended in the early 1990s, prompted significant discussion in the Council, contributing the six
US vetoes in which Washington was opposed by all other Council members.
The US rationales for casting these vetoes were consistent. It often maintained that the
proposed drafts were not balanced or properly contextualized, condemning Israel for violence
against Palestinians while not at the same time condemning Palestinians for violence against
Israelis.373 The United States would also at times argue that the drafts, if adopted, would not
advance the cause of peace. 374 In the last years of the Cold War, a further source of the US
vetoes very well may have been that it did not believe that the Security Council was the
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appropriate forum for resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict,375 largely reflecting the negative
view of the UN held by its Israeli ally. In April 1989, when UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez
de Cuéllar asked the five permanent members whether there should be informal discussions
among the five of them and with him on the issue, only the United States said no. France, the
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union supported the idea for such discussions, while China did
not answer Pérez de Cuéllar’s query. 376
Another consistent feature of the discussions on Israel-Palestine was incendiary criticism
directed toward Israel by Arab and other developing countries in Council meetings. Diplomats
from the developing world maintained that the policies carried out by Israel were a form of
racism377 or colonial oppression.378 The United States was at times criticized for its support of
Israel.379 Sometimes there was a connection made between Israeli actions in the occupied
territories and the policies of the repressive white minority apartheid regime in South Africa. 380
These views were consistent with the platform of the Non-Aligned Movement at the time.
Nicaragua
For most of the 1980s, Council engagement on Nicaragua was fueled by concerns of the leftwing Sandinista government about US interference in Nicaragua’s domestic affairs. With the
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Cold War still at its height, the administration of US President Ronald Reagan expressed grave
reservations about the rise of a left-leaning government in the Americas that was supported by
Soviet Union and Cuba, 381 and consequently, funneled military and financial support to the
Contras, a rebel group seeking to overthrow the Sandinista regime.
The United States cast the sole veto on four draft resolutions on the situation in
Nicaragua in the 1980s. All four were proposed by developing states in the Council. The first,
proposed by Guyana and Panama and vetoed by the US on 1 April 1982, would have emphasized
principles related to state sovereignty in the UN Charter—for example, the importance of nonintervention and territorial integrity—and called on “all Member States to refrain from the direct,
indirect, overt or covert use of force against any country of Central America or the
Caribbean…,”382 a thinly veiled reference to US covert operations against the Nicaraguan
government. The second, vetoed on 4 April 1984, “condemn[ed] and call[ed] for an immediate
end to the mining of the main ports of Nicaragua,” 383 a reference to US subversive operations in
Nicaraguan waters. This draft was proposed by Nicaragua, which was a Council member in
1983-1984. The non-aligned members of the Council—Congo, Ghana, Madagascar, Trinidad
and Tobago and the United Arab Emirates—proposed the last two vetoed drafts on 31 July384
and 28 October 1986.385 Both would have called on states to comply with the ruling of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) of 27 June 1986 on “Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua,” a ruling that was favorable to Nicaragua and detrimental to US interests.
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The states that proposed these four drafts must have anticipated a US veto on all of them,
given that they directly targeted for criticism US policies in its own backyard and called for the
United States to end military operations against a regime that it perceived as a threat to its
national interests. The ICJ ruling, which was the subject of the 1986 drafts, must have been an
especially bitter pill for the Reagan administration to swallow. In its advisory judgement, the
Court decided by a vote of 12 to 3 that the United States had “acted, against the Republic of
Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene in the
affairs of another State.” 386 It further decided, also by a vote of 12 to 3, that the United States
should “immediately…cease and…refrain from all…acts…as may constitute breaches
of…[its]…legal obligations.”387
The week prior to the vote on the April 1982 draft, Ambassador Raúl Roa Kourí of Cuba
addressed the Security Council in a public session on behalf of the NAM, focusing on its
apprehensions about external interference in the affairs of Central America and the Caribbean.
He referred in particular to concerns about the “threats and hostile acts directed against the
people and government of Nicaragua” and called on the Security Council to “unequivocally state
its opposition to the threat or use of force against Nicaragua…”.388 This sentiment was at the
heart of the draft resolution that the US vetoed the following week.
The April 1982 draft had the support of 12 Council members, with the United Kingdom
casting one of two abstentions along with Zaire in addition to the US veto. In the 2 April 1982
meeting in which it cast its veto, US representative Jeanne Kirkpatrick stated her opposition to
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the NAM position. She said that the United States did not intend to invade Nicaragua, and sought
to expose inconsistency and selectivity in the NAM’s views on non-intervention. She referred to
a number of developing states (as well as the Soviet Union) that backed the Nicaraguan position
but did not support the General Assembly’s call for the Soviet Union to withdraw from
Afghanistan.389
In his explanation of vote, UK Ambassador Anthony Parsons was also critical of the text,
complaining about its reference to General Assembly resolutions that the United Kingdom had
not supported in the past. 390 One of these, General Assembly resolution 2160 on “strict
observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations and of the
right of people to self-determination,”391 had been called “an exercise in political propaganda” 392
in November 1965 by Ambassador Caradon of the United Kingdom, which was still in the
process of unwinding its colonial engagement in Southern Rhodesia at the time.
France, parting ways with both the United States and the United Kingdom, supported the
draft. While it did not make an explanation of vote, Paris had previously espoused a more
balanced position than its P3 colleagues. During a 29 March 1982 Council meeting, Ambassador
Luc de La Barre de Nanteuil said that France understood the concerns of Nicaragua and other
states in the region about their “national independence and territorial integrity,” further noting
that France recognized “the anxiety felt by a number of American States, including the United
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States” regarding the need for “ensuring tranquility and the strengthening of democracy in that
part of the world.”393
The P3 were once against divided on the April 1984 draft condemning the mining of
Nicaragua’s ports. This draft was supported by 13 of the 15 members, with an abstention by the
United Kingdom and the veto by the United States. The US Representative, Deputy Ambassador
José Sorzano, argued that the draft lacked balance and did not reflect violations of El Salvador’s
sovereignty by Nicaragua. 394 While deploring mining activities described in the draft, 395 UK
Ambassador John Thompson nonetheless shared the US assessment that it lacked balance, 396
arguing that it should have reflected an emphasis on “free elections, pluralism, democratic
processes, human rights and economic and social development” in Central America. 397 While it
did not make an explanation of vote, just two days prior to the US veto, France was highly
critical of the mining of Nicaragua’s waters,398 thus directly objecting to US actions. Its Deputy
Ambassador, Philippe Louet, maintained that “this type of…action…by interfering with free
access to the port facilities of a sovereign country, is leading to a kind of blockade in
disguise…in fundamental violation to…international law.” 399 Louet also expressed concern that
the shipments, including from France, had to be rerouted “with considerable delay and at great
cost, and only if neighboring countries’ transport systems make it possible,” 400 noting that
humanitarian aid was among these shipments.401
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In 1986, the positions of the P3 were less divided on the drafts on the ICJ ruling, although
the US vetoed them while France and the United Kingdom abstained, reflecting some nuanced
differences of view. In his explanation of vote on the July 1986 draft, US Ambassador Vernon
Walters maintained that adopting the draft would not contribute to a peaceful and fair resolution
of the turmoil in Central America, which he said made “no mention of Nicaragua’s own
responsibility for the situation in Central America….”. 402 He questioned the competence of the
Court, 403 whose compulsory jurisdiction the United States refused to accept following the ICJ’s
ruling on the particular case under discussion. Walters reiterated these same points prior to
casting his vote on the October draft resolution. He also pointed to the fact that other states in the
Council “which do not accept themselves the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice denounce the United States” for not doing so, 404 while questioning the commitment of
the Sandinistas to the pursuit of peace and noting that they were being armed by the Soviet
Union.405 French Ambassador Claude de Kemoularia said that his country had wanted to support
a resolution that brought a settlement to the conflicts in Central America; 406 however, he noted
that France, which did not at the time and still does not support the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, questioned the ICJ’s ruling “both on matters of substance and on the Court’s role.” 407
The United Kingdom, the only permanent member that accepted the ICJ’s compulsory
jurisdiction, nonetheless argued against the draft resolutions on political grounds. 408 During the
UK’s statements on the July and the October drafts, its representative, Ambassador John
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Thomson, underscored his country’s support for the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction. 409 In the
July meeting, he reiterated London’s condemnation of the mining of Nicaraguan waters, a
chastisement of it US ally. 410 However, Thomson maintained that the drafts failed to account for
the broader political context in the region, questioning Nicaragua’s commitment to the wider
Central American peace process (i.e. the Contadora process). 411 With regard to the October draft
resolution, he pointedly stated that Nicaragua was selectively applying the UN Charter for
“narrow political ends”412 and that the draft “fails to acknowledge that Nicaragua has largely
brought its troubles upon itself.”413
The October 1986 veto on the ICJ ruling was the final one the US cast on Nicaragua. By
the time George H.W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan as US President in 1989, the Cold War
was reaching its denouement, creating conditions for a peaceful settlement to the various
conflicts in Central America. 414 Then UN secretary-general Pérez de Cuéllar has said that the US
support for resolution 637 in July 1989, which backed the “good offices” role of the SecretaryGeneral in Central America, represented “a major shift in U.S. policy.” 415 Prior to that resolution,
according to de Cuéllar, it had appeared that the “US Permanent Mission had standing
instructions to keep the United Nations out of Central America.”416
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A question of process
In reading the transcripts of Security Council debates from the Cold War, one is struck by the
vigorous discussion and spontaneous exchanges that often animated the Council’s proceedings.
They are now largely relics. Today’s Council debates are generally staid and scripted affairs with
little interactive discussion. On politically charged issues, such as Syria since 2011, there are
occasional moments of off-the-cuff interaction, usually unconstructive outbursts of recriminatory
anger between Russia and Western states, but such spontaneity is the exception that proves the
rule.
While Cold War antagonisms and propaganda litter many of the early debates, much of
the spontaneity and interactivity came from the fact that draft resolutions were often negotiated
during them. Whereas today draft resolutions are negotiated in private before reaching the open
chamber for a vote, for much of the Cold War it was common for draft resolutions to be
negotiated in open sessions, during which amendments were at times proposed and voted on by
the members.
Sievers and Daws have written that it was not until the mid-1960s that a working method
developed whereby drafts would more frequently be discussed in consultations before being
brought to a vote. 417 They note:
From 1966 onwards, another shift in Security Council decision-making was taking place.
Increasingly, Council members abandoned the practice of bringing resolutions directly to
a vote. Rather, they were first negotiating the drafts during consultations of the whole,
with the hope of reaching consensus. Each time such efforts have been successful,
potential vetoes have been avoided. In other cases, when it has become apparent in
informal consultations that a draft resolution will be unacceptable to one or more of the
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permanent members, the sponsors have often chosen not to bring it to a formal vote,
thereby also avoiding potential vetoes. 418
The upshot of this analysis is that there may have been fewer vetoes and more unanimous
resolutions had negotiating processes been more intensive prior to 1966. Along these lines,
George Ignatieff, Canada’s permanent representative to the UN during its 1967-68 Council
tenure, observed that informal discussions with other members were “essential if any business is
to be transacted by the Council” and that “if such consultations fail, the Council becomes merely
a sounding board for sharply divergent views and a focus for confrontation, rather than for
negotiation and compromise.” 419
The historical evidence supports this view. Bailey, for example, refers to an early vetoed
draft resolution that “would merely have called on Greece and her Communist neighbors to cease
from provocative acts and would have directed them to enter into direct negotiations” and that
might have been adopted “if more sustained negotiations” had occurred. 420 Even after 1966,
there are cases in which veto-wielding permanent members complained about insufficient
negotiations. For example, when the United Kingdom vetoed a draft resolution on 10 November
1970 that would have called for Southern Rhodesia not to be granted independence prior to
majority rule,421 it complained that “no effort was made beforehand by the sponsors to consult
with or even inform the United Kingdom delegation of their intention to ask for a debate and to
submit a draft resolution”, adding that this appeared “a curious procedure if the sponsors really
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wanted to achieve a constructive result.” 422 The UK position was echoed by the United States,
which abstained on the draft resolution, stating that “little or no effort was made to consult in
advance all the members of the Council in order to determine whether the draft was in fact noncontroversial.”423 NAM efforts to isolate the UK politically, rather than achieve an immediate
result, may have been behind the tabling of this draft.
One of the more divisive episodes in Council history occurred on 30 April 1981, when
four draft resolutions that collectively would have imposed comprehensive political and
economic sanctions on South Africa for its occupation of Namibia were jointly vetoed by France,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.424 The first of these was proposed by Mexico, Niger,
the Philippines, Tunisia, and Uganda; 425 the remaining three were proposed by Niger, Tunisia,
and Uganda.426 France in particular was disturbed by the way it was forced to repeatedly use its
veto. French Ambassador Jacques Leprette stated:
The way in which they [the texts] were prepared, submitted, and…imposed did not make
their adoption at all likely. In such complicated subjects having such important and
diverse consequences, rigidity and haste and the absence of negotiations on substance
could only doom to failure even attempts that seemed to have some aspects that merited
more detailed study.427
There have been other occasions in the Cold War when multiple drafts were vetoed on the same
day, but the four draft vetoes on 30 April 1981 were the highest single day total. As of the end of
2017, there had never been a case in the post-Cold War period in which more than one veto
occurred in the same day. Furthermore, although elected members today often complain about
422
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the short time allotted for negotiations—and while small groups of influential members
sometimes negotiate texts among themselves and circulate them to the rest of the Council as
virtual fait accompli—it is rare in the post-Cold War era for a draft resolution to be put to a vote
without any prior negotiations.
This is not to suggest that the preparation and negotiation of Cold War resolutions were
necessarily hasty affairs. The product of the Council’s efforts would at times be well-considered
resolutions resulting from protracted and intensive negotiations. 428 For example, Bosco writes
about the weeks in October and November 1967 following the Six Day War needed to prepare
and negotiate resolution 242, which created the idea of land-for-peace that has provided the basic
framework for negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian officials ever since. 429 However, it is
important to underscore that in the Cold War, drafts that had little or no chance of being adopted
were frequently put to a vote; while this still occurs on occasion, it happens less frequently in the
post-Cold War era. Likewise, the Cold War “practice of bringing resolutions directly to a
vote”430 described by Sievers and Daws is highly unusual in the post-Cold War era.

Conclusion
This chapter has provided a broad overview of P3 dynamics during the Cold War. It has
demonstrated that while there were strong policy differences on some issues—the Suez crisis of
1956 and Israel/Palestine, for example—many of the divergent votes among the P3 had as much
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to do with the way the Council functioned from the early 1960s onward as with the views of the
permanent members. The NAM had strong influence on the Council’s agenda, and non-aligned
states were not shy about tabling drafts that would be vetoed to make an ideological statement.
The frequent tabling of drafts by non-aligned states exposed differences among the P3, which
were not always significant but would at times be represented, for example, by one P3 member
vetoing a draft while the others abstained. The level of disagreement with a draft represented by
an abstention is difficult to gage, as each case is unique. Even in the Cold War, permanent
members preferred not to use the veto if they did not have to. However, the veto would be used
when political concerns were strong enough, and there are numerous examples in which all three
were strongly opposed to a proposed draft and would cast a veto simultaneously. 431 A final point
made in this chapter is that negotiating processes in the Cold War were in general not as
extensive as they have been in the post-Cold War era, most likely leading to less unanimous
votes.
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IV: The Council in the post-Cold War era: the ‘Brahmins’432
consolidate their control
Simply put, the Security Council is important to its members, permanent and elected
alike. As Edward Luck has written: “More than any other body in the United Nations system, the
Council matters. The Council’s mandate—the maintenance of international peace and security—
could not be more central, universal, or enduring.” 433 This helps to explain why so much time
and effort is spent negotiating resolutions and other outcomes on such a vast array of peace and
security issues. It also helps to explain why elected members often spend several years and
significant financial resources campaigning for a coveted two-year seat on this organ. While
elected members can and have exhibited leadership on some issues (e.g., leading the
humanitarian track in the Council’s engagement on Syria), the permanent members have largely
dominated the work of the UN’s peace and security organ. More than any other configuration of
members, the P3 have been the main drivers of the Council’s day-to-day work in the post-Cold
War era. Of the other permanent members, China generally takes an understated approach, while
Russia is very active in negotiations but, with the exception of issues on which it has major
strategic interests, its engagement is largely reactive. One prominent E10 diplomat from the early
1990s said that the P3 acted like “masters of the universe,” 434 while another said that the P3
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drafted resolutions “in industrial quantities.” 435 Today, the P3 draft the majority of resolutions
and presidential statements, and lead the negotiations on these outcomes.436 In fact, the P3’s
dominance of drafting has led in recent years to use of the term “penholdership.” This is a
practice by which members (usually France, the United Kingdom and the United States) draft all
the outcomes on specific agenda items or issues; it will be discussed in greater detail below.
The P3 have agreed over the years on the overwhelming majority of issues. However, this tells
only part of story of why their voting solidarity is so strong. An important part of why they vote
together so frequently and why the veto is used by them infrequently (in fact, France and the UK
have not used their veto since 1989) is because they manage so much of the Council’s work,
enabling them to have considerable control of its outcomes, and because they have by and large
underscored the value of unanimity.
In recent years, comity between the P3 and Russia and China has begun to break down on
a number of issues. China and especially Russia have become increasingly assertive, and at
times, the P3 have been willing to force through resolutions without unanimous agreement or to
table drafts that they know will be vetoed, as with the draft resolution that Russia vetoed in April
2017 condemning the chemical attack in Khan Shaykhun, Syria. 437 Nonetheless, the overall
trajectory of Council decision-making in the post-Cold War period reflects a trend toward
unanimous decision-making. Notwithstanding the divisions that have arisen in the Council in
recent years over issues such as Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen, unanimity is still valued by its
members and is achieved in the large majority of cases.
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This chapter has four major sections. The first section describes the P3’s role in
managing the Council’s workload from the late Cold War period onward, which has contributed
to consensual decision-making. The second section explores why efforts to the achieve
unanimity are important to members; it offers a typology of the different reasons why consensus
is valued. The third section describes key areas of disagreement among the P3, exploring why
efforts to overcome these differences were so difficult and how in some cases intensive
diplomacy averted vetoes. The fourth section analyzes the tensions between the P3 on the one
hand and China and Russia, on the other hand, which have become more pronounced in recent
years, especially as Russia seeks to assert its great power status; some of these sources of
disagreement are so fundamental, reflecting different worldviews, that they are difficult to
overcome by negotiation.

The P3 and the pen
One of the most striking trends in Security Council voting patterns has been the relative unity
among the permanent members in the post-Cold War era. This unity was largely borne out of the
thaw in East-West relations at the end of the Cold War. However, as demonstrated in Chapter II,
the P3 have also voted together more frequently since the early 1990s than beforehand. This P3
voting unity is in part a reflection of a broader effort among all the permanent members to work
together to manage the work of the Council and forge agreement when possible.
By the late Cold War period, with the Security Council unhampered by superpower
gridlock, the permanent members began to appreciate that this organ could fulfill its promise as
envisioned by the UN’s founders. They assiduously worked through the thorniest peace and
security issues with a renewed sense of purpose in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As former
Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar wrote: “There were remarkable achievements: the end
120

of the war between Iran and Iraq; independence for Namibia; the withdrawal of the Soviet army
from Afghanistan; the restoration of an independent Cambodia; the peace process in Central
America; and…the defeat of Iraqi aggression in Kuwait.” 438 At the same time, as discussed in
Chapter V below, the NAM became less assertive in pushing its agenda in the Council with the
end of the Cold War, and it lost much of its clout as a movement. 439 One deputy ambassador
representing an elected member in 1993-1994 noted that the “automaticity of NAM opposition to
the United States was no longer there.” 440
The monumental changes in global politics made the Council a more important foreign
policy instrument for the permanent members because they perceived its newfound potential.
Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar said that the permanent members in this period shared “an
enthusiasm born of the realization of the power they could exert when acting together.” 441
There was a renewed sense of purpose and an enhanced effort to reach agreements on
pressing issues of peace and security. Thomas Pickering, the US Ambassador to the UN from
1989-1992, said that the P5 tried “to find ways to reinvigorate the Council, and make it much
more a centerpiece of cooperation.” 442 In an effort to achieve this cooperation, the permanent
members—and the wider Council—began to meet more frequently to discuss their work in a
determined effort to reach agreements and to manage the organ’s increasing workload.
According to David Hannay, UK Ambassador to the UN from 1990-1995, the P5 ambassadors
convened more than 50 times in the second half of 1990, when the Iraq-Kuwait crisis was a
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major focus of the Council’s attention. 443 Hannay adds that the “emergence of the permanent
members as a group capable of acting together and of ironing out differences between
themselves privately and before wider discussion in the Council began was an extremely
significant development, with positive consequences for the Council’s decision-making
capacity.”444
Pickering describes the intense negotiating process on resolution 687 (adopted in April
1991), which established a weapons inspection regime in Iraq, as well as other resolutions from
the time period. His description is worth quoting at length because it demonstrates the
painstaking efforts undertaken to reach agreement, as well as the efforts by the permanent
members to manage the Council’s work:
…this resolution was long discussed among the Permanent Five before it was introduced
to other members of the Council. In that sense, the effort was to try to work out all
problems before introduction to other members of the Council, and then, as we did with
the Iraq resolution, receive their proposals and ideas for change; try to incorporate as
many as we could, and to build consensus. It was critical, in building a consensus for any
of these resolutions, that we have no opposition among the Permanent Five, either to the
principle or the text of the resolution. Four of us, at a minimum, always undertook to
present the resolution to the non-aligned members of the Security Council, so that we
would either have…the Russians or the Chinese in that group. It almost invariably was
the Russians, and it almost invariably helped enormously that the U.S., U.K., France and
Russia presented this text on behalf of the five. In addition to that, in various times, …we
would have informal meetings as well, with either the members of the non-aligned or
groups among the members of the non-aligned to give them a sense of this. There were
also, of course, the non-non-aligned members of the Council, who were included. The
principle formal way of proposing a resolution text to the other members of the Council
was to have, in the informal meeting room of the Council, a kind of caucus meeting at
which the four would present it to all the others. But in many cases, we had preliminary
consultations, sometimes at bilateral levels, sometimes with groups among them, so that
they had an idea of where we were going and what was included. The final…presentation
involved give and take in the informal Council meeting, and then we would produce the
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final draft that would be circulated to them. That normally opened up the way for formal
passage.445
This description demonstrates a thorough effort by the permanent members to shape the work of
the Council in an effort to reach agreements suitable to their interests in a new era in world
affairs. Public displays of power, while they still had their place in the open chamber, occurred
less frequently and gave way to more regular informal consultations, 446 which provided
opportunities to hash out disagreements and strike compromises. The consultations room,
adjacent to the Council chamber, became a frequently used venue for private and often
constructive dialogue.
By the early 1990s, the ability of the permanent members to manage the work of the
Council and to control the content of its resolutions became greater for two primary reasons.
First, the permanent members were less divided than they had ever been, approaching their work
with a renewed sense of purpose. Second, the elected membership had less influence than it had
before. In the Cold War, the NAM could exert leverage on the Council’s agenda, usually because
it had the support of the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. These efforts often resulted in one or
more P3 vetoes, because making an ideological statement outweighed getting a positive result
(i.e. an adopted text) more often than it did in the post-Cold War era. The NAM became more
fragmented in the Council in the post-Cold War era in large part because of the pressure that one
or more of the permanent members could exert on them when they want to get their way.
Indeed, the elected members as a whole were subjected to the political pressures of the P5. One
E10 diplomat, who served on the Council in the mid-1990s, noted that the only time during his
two year tenure on the Council that the United Kingdom complained to his capital was when his
445
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mission convened a meeting of all the elected members. 447 This was viewed as an “unfriendly”
gesture: if the ten elected members could unify around common positions, they could create a
majority that might necessitate the use of the veto. 448
The enthusiasm for the Council’s potential that marked Pickering’s period as US
ambassador would soon be tempered by the difficulties of managing the complexities of a new,
messier international landscape. The mid-1990s were littered with high-profile failures by the
UN in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, most notably the massacre of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim
boys and men at the hands of the Bosnia Serb army at the so-called “safe area” of Srebrenica in
July 1995. Already by 1993 tensions resurfaced among the permanent members, including within
the P3.449 However, by this point, a pattern had been established by which consistent efforts were
made by the permanent members (and the elected members as well) to use the Council as a tool
to resolve differences through often protracted deliberations on complicated issues.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, caucusing among the P5, or even the P3, was not done
regularly, 450 as had been the case in the late Cold War period and the immediate post-Cold War
era. Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock, the UK’s ambassador to the UN from 1998 to 2003,
maintains that there were concerns that such meetings would be viewed negatively by UN
member states, who resented the permanent members for their privilege. 451 However, it is clear
that much of the drafting of resolutions was still being performed by the P3, a consistent trend
throughout the post-Cold War period. Moreover, on divisive issues of strategic importance to
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permanent members such as Iraq, the P5 worked assiduously to maintain their control and, at
least on this issue, held informal meetings among themselves. 452
One key point to be made about at least the first decade of the post-Cold War period is
that, while the permanent members clearly held a privileged position and would exert their
authority when they believed it necessary to do so, there was some room for elected members “to
take the initiative on major substantive items and to strongly contest the policy options on other
items where a member of the P5 had the lead.” 453 In spite of the power asymmetries between the
P5 and the E10, elected members could and would frequently draft outcomes; furthermore,
discussions in the consultations room were more collaborative than they are in the current period,
with genuine dialogue among all members on difficult issues. 454 This did not mean that the
elected members suggestions were necessarily taken on board, 455 but they at least had flexibility
to engage in substantive problem-solving with the permanent members, something that rarely
happens today.456
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As Colin Keating has written, “…by the mid-2000s the dynamic had changed.” 457
Caucusing among the P3, and among the P5 more generally, began to occur more frequently by
the mid-2000s, in particular on matters related to non-proliferation,458 which are of fundamental
importance to the permanent members. All draft resolutions on these key strategic issues were
first negotiated among the P5 before being circulated to the elected members: it was typical for
France to organize the P5 meetings on Iran’s nuclear program; the United States on North
Korea’s nuclear program; and the United Kingdom on “Weapons of Mass Destruction”
(resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004 and subsequent resolutions related to this issue). 459 There
could be slight variations in the P5 stranglehold on these meetings; for example, Japan, a key
regional player, participated in the initial P5 discussions on North Korea when it served on the
Council in 2005-2006.460 While “experts,” middle-level diplomats, generally negotiate outcomes,
the negotiations on these matters were conducted at ambassadorial level, with deputy
ambassadors sometimes standing in. 461
Negotiations among the P3 and the P5 on nuclear issues were often intense and timeconsuming, requiring frequent meetings to reach agreement. For example, following North
Korea’s test of a nuclear device on 8 October 2006, the permanent members went into high-gear
to develop a rapid and adequate response. In the six days leading up to the unanimous adoption
of resolution 1718 on 14 October condemning the test and imposing sanctions on the regime, US
Ambassador John Bolton notes that his UK colleague, Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry, had
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“counted twenty-three Perm Three or Perm Five meetings (plus Japan in all cases).” 462 Bolton
claims that the most important meeting he had during this process was a bilateral discussion with
Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya, who indicated that China would not veto the draft
because, in Bolton’s words, “China did not want a public tiff over this resolution.” 463
While the P3 have frequently spearheaded the drafting of resolutions in the post-Cold
War era, there have been several permutations in how they have managed negotiations on texts
that one or more of them have prepared. Sometimes, for example, influential states whose
support is needed to implement the resolution are engaged in early rounds of negotiations, as in
the case of Japan’s inclusion in the P5 discussions on North Korea’s nuclear program in the mid2000s.
A notable example of regional actors being included early in negotiations occurred with
respect to the Council’s handling of Côte d’Ivoire in the mid-2000s. While leading the drafting
and negotiations on resolutions on UN peace operations in Côte d’Ivoire, France would initially
consult at ambassador-level with African members of the Council, other influential African
states, and at times, the African Union to ensure that the text was appropriately calibrated before
enlarging the negotiating group to include the permanent members. 464 Based on their interest in
the issue, some elected members were kept informed about the content of the text, before it was
ultimately presented to all Council members.465 Burkina Faso, which mediated the Ouagadougou
Peace Agreement of 2007, was at times consulted about the content of resolutions following the
signing of this peace agreement. 466 African engagement on Côte d’Ivoire resolutions at an early
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stage was important, especially given the delicate regional politics,467 reflected by divisions on
the issue between two heavyweights on the continent: Nigeria and South Africa, which had a
close relationship with Ivoirian President Laurent Gbagbo.468
In the mid-2000s, in an interesting case of excluding the United Kingdom from their
early negotiations, France and the United States worked closely on resolutions regarding Syria
and Lebanon, including in cases when they were not in agreement. 469 The difficult negotiations
on resolution 1701 of 11 August 2006 demonstrate these efforts to cooperate. (Resolution 1701
increased the troop strength of UN Interim Force in Lebanon [UNIFIL] to 15,000 and called for
the withdrawal of Israeli forces, which had been fighting Hezbollah in southern Lebanon, once
UNIFIL troops and Lebanese troops were deployed in the area.) 470 US Ambassador Bolton
maintained that at one point French Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière asked that
discussions on the text be between just France and the United States, to avoid being perceive as
an “‘Anglo”’ text that would not be as well received in the Middle East. 471 One UN diplomat
active at the time noted that it was important that the text at least be acceptable to US ally Israel
and French ally Lebanon, which would in turn help it gain support in the Council. 472
These bilateral negotiations between Bolton and de La Sablière and their staffs enabled
them to make compromises ultimately leading to the unanimous adoption of resolution 1701.
Less than two weeks earlier, on 31 July 2006, Bolton asserted that de la Sablière had confided to
him that “the conceptual gaps between our two positions on Lebanon might be unbridgeable.” 473
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In the final text, several concessions were made. For example, the resolution called for a “‘full
cessation of hostilities,’” a distant cry from “‘no cessation of hostilities without a political
solution,’” which had been advocated by the United States and would have been preferable to
Israel.474 Moreover, while the United States initially espoused the authorization of a robust
international force in southern Lebanon, it ultimately consented to the French position, which
entailed merely enhancing the force structure of UNIFIL to support efforts of the Lebanese force
to provide security. 475
Later that year, on 29-30 November 2006, during the annual workshop that the Finnish
Government hosts to prepare the incoming members of the Security Council for their terms,
there was discussion of the marginalization of the elected members in work of the Council. It
was observed that: “Three of the five permanent members…are the lead countries on the bulk of
active items on the Council’s agenda,” 476 most likely a reference to the P3, given the fact that
they, rather than China and Russia, have historically been more active drafters of Council
outcomes. Similarly, the viewpoint was expressed that “elected members are brought into the
resolution drafting process only at a later stage,” 477 a common refrain of elected members over
the past decade that highlights the tension between them and the permanent members. The
counterargument to this viewpoint, also made at the workshop, is that on particularly difficult
matters, “it is best to begin with a smaller group and then move towards a larger one,”478
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particularly relevant when each of the members of that “smaller group” (i.e. the P5) holds the
veto.
Concerns about over-concentrating the preparation of drafts in the hands of a small
minority has been reflected in presidential notes on working methods dating back to 1999. In
1999, 2006, 2010, 2014, and 2017, notes by the president emphasized the importance of allowing
all members of the Council to participate in preparing its outcomes, including resolutions or
presidential statements. 479 The most recent of these presidential notes (in 2017) stated that “Any
member of the Security Council may be a penholder” and that “Members of the Council are
encouraged to act as the penholder(s) in the drafting of documents.” 480 The 2017 presidential
note further “encourage[d] penholders or co-penholders, as early as possible in the drafting
exercise, to ensure the exchange of information among all Security Council members and to
engage in timely consultations with all Council members with openness and flexibility.”481
The consolidation of the pen in the hands of the P3 over the past decade has led to use of
the term “penholdership.”482 As noted above, according to this practice, a particular member (or
members) monopolizes the drafting of outcomes (i.e., resolutions, presidential statements, and
press statements) on a particular agenda item or issue. The common process by which
penholdership works among the P3 is that a draft is produced by one of them, which agrees on
the text with their P3 colleagues, before then circulating it to other permanent members China
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and Russia for their input and for further discussions. 483 Only then is the draft circulated to the
elected membership. 484 The process enables the permanent members to largely control the
content of resolutions (as well as presidential statement and press statements), and at times, make
compromises among themselves at an early stage of negotiations.
Penholdership is not dissimilar to what had happened in earlier periods. The P3 have
throughout the post-Cold War period been considered prolific drafters. A process akin to
penholdership has occurred, especially on issues of high strategic importance to the permanent
members, in other periods of the late Cold War and post-Cold War period. Pickering’s
description above of negotiations in the early 1990s attests to this. The P5 deliberations on
nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea in the mid-2000s—whereby all drafts were negotiated
on these issues by the permanent members at ambassador-level before being circulated to the
elected members—were also akin to penholdership.
However, unlike in prior years, when it had not been uncommon for the elected members
to initiate drafts on their own, some elected members in recent years have increasingly felt that
they are being discouraged from drafting, although they do hold the pen on some issues and there
have been some high-profile drafting initiatives led by elected members, such as the May 2016
resolution on the protection of health care in armed conflict, discussed in Chapter V.485
Penholdership is clearly exclusionary. At times, it can also delay the Council’s reaction time to a
crisis, when the penholder delays in taking action and others do not take the initiative. Another
frequent criticism worth reiterating is that drafts produced by the permanent members are often
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shared with elected members very late in negotiations when there is little, if any, time for them to
contribute constructive inputs.
However, it is possible to muster arguments in favor of penholdership. Given that the
permanent members have advantages of capacity and institutional knowledge (of the Council and
of particular issues) and political influence, they are often well-qualified to spearhead drafting
and negotiating. Furthermore, for the purposes of building consensus on a draft resolution, it is
helpful to ensure that all of the veto-wielding permanent members support a resolution at an
early stage before the draft is circulated to the elected members. In this way, differences of
perspective can frequently be worked out early on among these powerful states, possibly
avoiding unnecessary vetoes.
Table 4. Security Council Penholders - 2017486
Issue

Penholder

Afghanistan
Bosnia/Herzegovina

Japan
Monthly rotation among contact and drafting group
members (including France, Germany, Italy,
Russia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ukraine and
the United States)
France
United Kingdom

Burundi
Central African Region (UN Office for Central
Africa/Lord’s Resistance Army)
Central African Republic
Central Asia (UN Regional Centre for Preventive
Diplomacy for Central Asia)
Côte d’Ivoire
Cyprus
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea
Golan Heights (UN Disengagement Observer
Force)
Guinea-Bissau
Haiti

France
Russia
France
United Kingdom
France
United States
Russia and the United States
Senegal
United States after negotiation among the Group of
Friends of Haiti (Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
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Iran (Non-Proliferation)

Iraq
Iraq/Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Middle East (Israel/Palestine)
Somalia
Sudan and South Sudan

Syria

Ukraine
Yemen
West Africa, including the Sahel
Western Sahara

Children and Armed Conflict
Counter-terrorism (resolutions 1267/1989/2253)
Counter-Terrorism (resolution 1373)
International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia and International Residual Mechanism
for Criminal Tribunals
Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(resolution 1540)
Peacekeeping
Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict
Women, Peace and Security

Working Methods

Colombia, France, Guatemala, Peru, the United
States, Uruguay and Venezuela)
United States; Italy facilitates implementation of
resolution 2231 which authorized the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (i.e., the Iran
nuclear deal)
United States
United Kingdom
France
United States
United Kingdom
France
Various Council members
United Kingdom; United States on piracy issues
United States on South Sudan, as well as on
Sudan/South Sudan and UN Interim Security Force
for Abyei; United Kingdom on Darfur
Egypt, Japan and Sweden on the humanitarian
track; on other matters the United States and Russia
normally seek agreement on texts before circulating
to the broader Council; France and the United
Kingdom also propose texts and request meetings.
The United States and Russia have drafted texts.
Other members have requested meetings.
United Kingdom
Senegal
United States drafts; resolution is then negotiated
among the Group of Friends of Western Sahara
(France, Russia, Spain, the UK and the US) before
being circulated to the Council for negotiation.
Sweden
United States
United States
Uruguay

Bolivia
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
United Kingdom on women’s participation in
resolving conflict and in peace processes and
women’s protection issues (resolution 1325);
United States on sexual violence in armed conflict
(resolution 1820)
Japan
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Why is consensus important?
Council members frequently emphasize the importance of a unified Council, sometimes
underscoring the consensus achieved following difficult negotiations. When resolutions are
adopted without unanimous support, members express their concerns about the broken unity of
the Council, even though such resolutions have the same legal status as those resolutions that are
unanimously adopted.
It is useful to unpack the motivations underpinning efforts to achieve consensus to
improve our understanding of how the Council works and what role it plays in the foreign
policies of its members. Four primary reasons can be adduced for why unanimity is so desired by
members: the legitimacy it accords to decisions;487 the notion that a consensus document is the
product of the good stewardship of the negotiation process by those leading it; the perceived
impact of unanimous resolutions on the party or parties who are the object of the resolution; and
the fear of isolation of those considering breaking the consensus. Analyzing these four reasons
gives a clearer indication of why consensus is important to members.
Legitimacy of Unanimity
Using Hurd’s definition of legitimacy as “an actor’s normative belief that a rule or institution
ought to be obeyed,”488 it can be assumed that a resolution—if allowed to substitute for a
“rule”— has greater political clout when it is unanimously adopted. The unanimity of the
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Council in difficult cases is particularly important because it consists of only 15 members,
representing a small percentage of the wider membership in UN General Assembly; since the
Council is the main arbiter of international peace and security, representing all 193 member
states, a divided Council can be perceived as an indication that the broader international
community of states is divided and therefore not fully supportive of its action.489
The relationship between legitimacy and unanimity is especially relevant to why the P3
strived to secure a unanimous vote on resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002 on Iraq, a last ditch
effort to forestall a US-UK invasion of the country, one that ultimately failed. UK Ambassador
Greenstock notes that in the later stages of the negotiations on the resolution, US Ambassador
John Negroponte “confirmed…that the US was becoming increasingly interested in securing a
unanimous vote.”490 In the lead up to the vote, once it had settled its differences on the text with
the United States, France—along with Arab countries and Secretary-General Kofi Annan—
pressured Syria, the one hold-out expected to abstain, to support the resolution. 491
During the explanations of vote, several members alluded to the importance of the
unanimity that had been achieved. Representing a US administration known primarily for its
unilateralism, Negroponte commended the “international consensus on how to proceed towards
Iraq,” an implicit acknowledgement that the Council reflects the will of the global community of
states on peace and security matters. 492 French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte was explicit in
upholding the centrality of the Council’s responsibility as the main arbiter of international peace
and
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unanimously…strengthens the role and authority of the Security Council,” referring to France’s
desire to ensure that violation of the resolution would not automatically lead to the use of force
without explicit Council approval. 493 In spite of the failure of the resolution to prevent the
ensuing war in Iraq, the major powers valued the legitimacy of a unified Council at this moment.
Good Stewardship
There is a certain amount of pride that comes with leading a successful negotiation process.
When resolutions are adopted unanimously, it can be perceived as an indication that the drafters,
who lead the negotiations, have done a good job of managing the process, especially when
differences of perspective have been accommodated or compromises are made. 494 They are thus
viewed as effective stewards of the Council’s work, 495 who have demonstrated good judgement
and diplomatic skill. 496 How negotiation processes are led is especially relevant to the British
and the French, who have consistently been active drafters of resolutions in the post-Cold War
period and who have over the past decade taken hold of the pen on a high percentage of issues.
As waning powers whose permanent seats have been called into question, it is important for
them to demonstrate their competence and skill to the wider UN membership.

It is not

uncommon for UK diplomats to highlight their proficiency at drafting,497 especially since draft
resolutions are produced and negotiated in English before being translated into the other five
languages of the UN (Arabic, Chinese, French, Russia, and Spanish) once they are adopted.
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The adoption of resolution 2296 on 29 June 2016, which renewed the mandate of the
UN/AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for one year, provides an example of members
emphasizing the importance of achieving unanimity through compromise. The United Kingdom
drafted the text and led the complex negotiations, accommodating different views regarding how
to calibrate language on the security situation, on obstacles imposed on the mission by the
government, and on the efforts of a joint AU, UN and government of Sudan working group
designed to create an exit strategy for the mission. 498 When the text was unanimously adopted,
UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft “welcome[d] the constructive spirit in which all
members…engaged with us during the negotiations” and noted that the “balance” of the text. 499
Likewise, Deputy Ambassador Pyotr Ilyichev of Russia, which has clashed with the United
Kingdom and other Western countries on Darfur, maintained that “As a result of intensive
consultations, members of the Council managed to make the text sufficiently balanced.” 500
Obviously, there are times when unanimity cannot be achieved because the differences to
be bridged are too great; in such cases, no matter how long a negotiation process endures and no
matter how creatively and constructively the members engage, the text simply does not have the
requisite support to be adopted unanimously or to be adopted at all. This is especially the case
when the core national interests of the permanent members are at stake. From the beginning of
the Syria crisis in 2011, it has been clear that Russia has been inflexible in its unwillingness to
pressure the Assad regime; the veto has been the most common outcome of drafts attempting to
do so. Likewise, given the Trump administration’s early policy pronouncements on the Middle
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East, it is hard to imagine that any draft resolution critical of Israel would not be vetoed by the
United States.
However, when unanimity is not achieved and when the negotiation process is considered
to have been poorly managed, the member or members leading the process are subject to
criticism. Sometimes in their explanations of vote, members complain not only about the
substance of the text but also about the way the negotiating process has been conducted, arguing
that their concerns have not been taken into account or that too little time was allowed for
substantive discussions.
The negotiations on resolution 2333 of 23 December 2016, which was drafted by the
United States and which renewed the mandate of UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), illustrate this
point. The resolution significantly downsized the mission in anticipation that UNMIL will close
when its mandate expires in March 2018; however, the resolution kept in place some 700
peacekeepers. The vote represented a rare case of disunity among the P3, with France and the
United Kingdom joining Russia in abstaining, while all other members supported the draft.
Ambassador Isobel Coleman of the United States maintained that it was necessary to keep in
place the peacekeepers “to support the Liberian security services through [elections planned for
October 2017]…in order to consolidate the hard-earned security gains that Liberia has made.” 501
France, Russia, and the United Kingdom all believed that maintaining the peacekeepers was
unnecessary, as they could have been better used in other missions in need of personnel.
While there was considerable criticism of the substance of the text, Council members
expressed displeasure with the United States for the way in which the negotiations were led and
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for the failure to make a genuine effort to reach consensus. There was a political price to be paid,
with the US lambasted in the public chamber for it poor management of the process. French
Ambassador François Delattre said in his explanation of vote: “…we can only regret the absence
of genuine negotiations among Council members…our proposals were never taken into serious
account…We hope…that in the future we are able to strengthen the Council’s unity on this key
topic.”502 Deputy Ambassador Luis Bermudez of Uruguay, although supportive of the text,
argued that “The Security Council must show that it is able to adopt resolutions that achieve the
broadest possible support among its members. The role of the penholder is crucial in such
negotiating situations, and it is desirable that penholders demonstrate more flexibility and be
more receptive to proposals from other Council members.” 503 And New Zealand’s Deputy
Ambassador Phillip Taula similarly maintained that “more could have been done to bridge the
diverging views within the Council in order to achieve consensus and thereby send a united
message to Liberia.”504
The perceived impact of a unified Council
There is a generally held view that a unified Council has greater impact in exerting leverage on
the actors who are the object of its attention than one that is divided. Members frequently argue
that a unified Council sends an important message to the party or the parties on the ground either
about the strength of the UN’s support for their efforts or about the consequences of a failure to
comply with its demands. This perception has been evident at the annual Finnish Workshop for
incoming members of the Council; at the 15 and 16 November 2007 workshop, one of the
speakers contended that “When members were ‘determined to come together’…the prospects for
502
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implementation [of resolutions] rose,”505 while at the 18-19 November 2010 workshop, “several
participants spoke of the tendency of members of the Security Council to see consensus
decisions as the most effective ones.” 506 A frequent refrain as well is that Council unity is
essential with regard to effectiveness of UN peace operations in particular. During the 6 April
2017 debate on peacekeeping, Uruguayan Ambassador Elbio Rosselli captured this sentiment:
“Experience has shown and continues to show that when there is a lack of unity in the Council
and the lack of a clear role in support of the peace process, the success of a peacekeeping
operation can be seriously compromised.” 507
Whether or not these assertions are true merits further study. Nonetheless, the view that
consensus means that “the full weight of the Council is behind a decision” or that this organ is
“stronger when it is united” is frequently heard. This perception, true or not, is at least one
rationale for efforts to achieve unanimity. The caveat that should be observed is that a unanimous
adoption does not necessarily mean a united Council. The concessions that are made to achieve
unanimity in voting can lead to ambiguity in language that allows for significant latitude in how
a resolution is interpreted. Resolution 1441 is an example of this, as the United States and the
United Kingdom believed that this resolution and prior ones on Iraq provided a legal justification
for intervention in March 2003, 508 while France, Russia and other members did not accept this
view.
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Fear of Isolation
In addition to vetoes, there are numerous cases when one or more abstentions are cast on
resolutions that have the support of most members. However, as Bolton has written, the
compulsion to seek unanimity “could also increase the pressure on some members to go along
with the majority.”509 At times, hold-outs from smaller states find it difficult to resist the pressure
placed on them by more powerful states to vote a certain way, especially if those powerful states
have political or economic leverage over them. Even powerful states at times vote along with a
resolution not entirely to their liking, so as not to appear divisive. Bolton, for example, describes
the unanimous adoption of the resolution 1679 of 16 May 2006, which paved the way for the
transition from an African Union to a UN peacekeeping operation in Darfur, as an instance in
which China and Russia succumbed and supported the resolution “because they feared being
exposed and isolated on a subject as sensitive as Sudan.” 510

Differences among the P3
In spite of being united on most issues, there have nonetheless been several points of friction
among the P3 in the post-Cold War period on peace and security issues that have featured to a
greater or lesser extent in the Council’s deliberations. This section is not intended to be
exhaustive in describing the differences among the P3, but rather to highlight some of the key
ones. Significant areas of differences included the Bosnian conflict in the early to mid-1990s,
Iraq beginning in the 1990s and culminating with the US-led invasion in March 2003, and
Israel/Palestine over several decades. Disagreements on Israel/Palestine extended beyond the
509
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Cold War and have continued until the present day; all but one US veto in the post-Cold War era
has pertained to Israel/Palestine.
Descriptions of these issues demonstrate why agreement could not be reached on them.
In some cases, the divisions among the P3 (and the P5 more broadly) were simply too vast,
leading to diverging votes or even the bypassing of the Council altogether (e.g., the US decision
to invade Iraq in 2003 without Council approval). However, when there are opportunities to
bridge the divide on difficult issues, considerable efforts are frequently made to hammer out
differences and make agreements. While it is not always possible to achieve unanimity, in some
cases vetoes have been avoided as a result of these discussions. With regard to resolutions
critical of Israel, a major US client benefiting from a powerful US lobby, the domestic costs of
not vetoing resolutions can be significant, as reflected by the US abstention on resolution 2334 in
December 2016.
Bosnia-Herzegovina
Bosnia was a particular strong point of contention between the United States, on the one hand,
and France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand. John Weston, UK Ambassador to NATO
from 1992 to 1995 and to the UN from 1995 to 1998, has said that the NATO alliance was
almost broken over Bosnia. 511 The crux of the disagreement was that the United States endorsed
a muscular approach against the Bosnian Serbs—including by advocating robust NATO-led air
strikes—but the British and the French were more circumspect, particularly since both countries,
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unlike the United States, had peacekeepers on the ground and were worried about potential
retaliation against their personnel by the Bosnian Serbs.512
The so-called “dual key” approach—a cumbersome process by which all bombing
decisions had to be approved by both NATO and the UN—reflected the divergent views among
the allies.513 As Hannay notes: “There was a permanent tension between NATO, dominated by
the USA, where substantial strategic deployment of air power was favoured, and the UN
hierarchy, which listened more to the concerns of the main troop contributors (France and
Britain) and which favoured limited tactical use of air power in narrowly defined
circumstances.”514 The result of this tension was to promote further intransigence of the Bosnian
Serbs, with the support of Slobodan Milosevic. 515 The controversial dual key policy was
discarded by NATO in 1995, amidst ongoing Serb bombing of Sarajevo 516 and “the
unwillingness of the United States and NATO to accept the halfhearted Bosnian Serb efforts at
appeasement and to accept UN authority over NATO’s actions.” 517
A further frustration of the United States during the Bosnia War—and a source of tension
with all the other permanent members of the Council—was the inability to adopt a resolution
endorsing the lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia, with the goal of enabling the Bosnian
Muslims to defend themselves from the Bosnian Serbs who were supplied with weapons by
Belgrade. This issue came to a head on 29 June 1993 when the Council voted on a draft
resolution that would have lifted the arms embargo. Reminiscent of what happened frequently in
512
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the Cold War days but less frequently since then, the draft resolution was proposed by the nonaligned caucus in the Council, and was consistent with the 24 May 1993 declaration of the
Organisation of Islamic Conference calling for a lifting of the embargo. 518 The draft received
only six affirmative votes—including all the NAM members (Cape Verde, Djibouti, Morocco,
Pakistan, and Venezuela) and the United States. Abstentions were cast by Brazil, China, France,
Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
This was one issue that no amount of discussion or dialogue could overcome. The
Council was too divided. During the meeting in which the vote occurred, those states supporting
the lifting of the embargo maintained that the Bosnian Muslims needed to be able to defend
themselves.519 Those states against lifting the embargo argued that lifting the embargo would
lead to increased fighting, with the Bosnian Serbs and Croats redoubling their military actions,
while undermining the political process.520 For France and the United Kingdom, perhaps the
most important consideration for their decision to oppose the lifting of the embargo was that they
(unlike the United States) had troops on the ground, whose safety was a major concern. Along
these lines, French Ambassador Jean-Bernard Mérimée reacted against impassioned pleas for the
lifting of the embargo by saying that France “will not accept lessons in morality from anyone,” 521
noting that 11 French personnel had already died in the conflict. 522
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Iraq
While many people recall P3 divisions in the lead up to the March 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq,
less frequently discussed is that the divergence of views between France, on the one hand, and
the United States and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, on Iraq policy began years earlier.
Hannay writes that as early as 1993, elections in France had brought in a government that was
“instinctively more friendly towards Saddam Hussein’s Iraq than its predecessor.” 523
In the aftermath of the brief US-UK bombing campaign against Baghdad in December
1998—which was precipitated by Saddam Hussein’s lack of cooperation with weapons
inspectors and the withdrawal of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in August 2008 524—
the Council established a new weapons inspection regime through UN Monitoring, Verification
and Inspection Commission with the adoption of resolution 1284 in December 1999. France—
along with China, Malaysia, and Russia—was one of four countries that abstained on the draft.
In its explanation of vote, while noting the humanitarian impact of sanctions on Iraq, France said
that the draft left open for interpretation the “criteria for the suspension and then lifting of
sanctions,”525 an indication of its trepidation that the sanctions on Iraq might be unfairly
maintained even if it improved its compliance. 526
In spite of the four abstentions on this resolution, significant efforts were made to strike
agreement. Greenstock observed that the negotiations on resolution 1284 lasted eight months,
from April to December 1999, surmising that this was “one of the longest negotiations of any
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[Security Council] resolution.” 527 Some of the negotiations were held at ministerial level. 528 The
resolution was negotiated only after the Council considered the recommendations proposed by
three panels it established in January 1999 to “discuss options which would lead to the full
implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.” 529 These panels—
consisting of UN and International Atomic Energy Agency experts—focused on disarmament
and monitoring and verification issues; humanitarian matters; and Kuwaiti prisoners and
property seized by Iraq. 530 Greenstock concludes that while the negotiations on resolution 1284
“failed to unite the Security Council around a single position,” 531 they at least avoided vetoes
from the three permanent members that abstained. 532
The negotiations on resolution 1441 of 8 November 2002, which gave Iraq “a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations” or “face serious consequences” were
also highly divisive. 533 The language had to be calibrated to allay French and Russian concerns
that violation of the resolution’s terms would not lead automatically to the use of force without
further Council discussion—concerns which would have led to vetoes by both countries if left
unaddressed.534 Ultimately, after several weeks of negotiations that included engagement among
P5 foreign ministers, a compromise was struck, 535 not only avoiding French and Russian vetoes
but resulting in a unanimous adoption. The unanimity achieved was not strong enough to survive
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the profound divisions among the major powers, with Washington and London determined to
pursue a military option.
However, this only happened after the United States and the United Kingdom attempted
to secure a second resolution in late February/March 2003 to authorize the decision to use force.
The effort met stiff resistance from several Council members, including permanent members
China, France, and Russia, which believed that the weapons inspectors needed more time to
complete their work.536 On 11 March, French President Jacques Chirac publicly stated that his
country would veto a resolution resulting in military intervention.537 In spite of US/UK lobbying
of permanent and elected members alike, 538 it became clear that not only would the draft be
vetoed but that it would not even receive nine votes, the required number to adopt a resolution
absent a veto. The draft was never put to a vote.
Israel/Palestine
The Israel/Palestine conflict has been a persistent problem on the Council’s agenda. Since
August 2002, the Council has met every month on this issue 539—and sometimes more than once
per month—and yet, no progress has been made in addressing the conflict’s underlying issues; in
fact, relations between Israel and Palestine are far worse now than they were in the early postCold War era when the Oslo process provided at least a modicum of hope for a better future for
Israelis and Palestinians. Blame heaped on the Security Council for its failings on this issue can
be widely dispersed onto other actors; its gridlock is a reflection of the great power divides that
536

UN Security Council meeting record S/PV.4714, 7 March 2003.
Elaine Sciolino, “Threats and Responses: Discord; France to Veto Resolution on Iraq War, Chirac Says,” The
New York Times, 11 March 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/11/world/threats-and-responses-discord-franceto-veto-resolution-on-iraq-war-chirac-says.html.
538
On these lobbying efforts, see Heraldo Muñoz, A Solitary War: A Diplomat’s Chronicle of the Iraq War and Its
Lessons, (Golden, Colorado: Fulcrum Publishing, 2008), 62-67.
539
Security Council Report, “Middle East Open Debate,” What’s In Blue, 19 April 2017,
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2017/04/middle-east-open-debate-2.php.
537

147

exist outside the organ as well. The parties themselves have missed several opportunities to make
peace, bilateral efforts to exert leverage on them have not been particularly effective, and the
issues involved have always been complex and intractable. While the UN has often been accused
of an anti-Israel bias (both during and after the Cold War) and it could be argued that this bias
applies to the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, and the UN Educational, Scientific,
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), it is much harder to make this case with regard to the
outcomes of the Security Council, where Israel is often protected by the US veto and threat of
veto and where resolutions on Israel/Palestine are moderate and balanced. Thirteen of the 14 US
vetoes in the post-Cold War era through the end of 2016 have been on this Israel/Palestine, and
they have all been sole vetoes.
In recent years, draft resolutions on Israel/Palestine are usually initially drafted by the
Palestinians and presented by the Arab group member of the Council. Thus, the P3 does not
exercise control of the pen, as they do on so many other issues. For obvious reasons, the United
States prefers to keep the focus off of Israel in the Council. France and the United Kingdom as
close allies of the US are inclined to exercise caution in proposing drafts on Israel/Palestine; one
notable exception to this, discussed below, was the draft resolution vetoed by the United States
in March 1997, which would have condemned settlements, that was proposed by Council
members belonging to the European Union.
On Israel/Palestine in the post-Cold War era, three vetoes were cast during President Bill
Clinton’s administration; nine during President George W. Bush’s administration; and one
during President Barack Obama’s administration. The United States was particularly isolated
with regard to the three vetoes cast under President Clinton in the 1990s. The first of these texts,
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voted on 17 May 1995,540 would have condemned Israel’s annexation of 53 hectares of land in
East Jerusalem, while the second (7 March 1997) 541 and third (21 March 1997) 542 would have
condemned Israeli settlement building in East Jerusalem. The first two received fourteen
affirmative votes, meaning that no other member even abstained, while the third one received
thirteen affirmative votes with only one abstention, cast by Costa Rica. The 7 March 1997 draft
was sponsored by the European members of the Council—including France, Portugal, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom—demonstrating the depth of division between the United States and its
Western allies. What is particularly striking about the US explanations of vote in all of their
vetoes in the Clinton years is that it did not directly criticize the substance of the draft
resolutions; rather, it argued that the Council was not the appropriate venue to address the issue,
maintaining that the parties themselves should resolve their differences through negotiations. 543
This is a case of the United States marginalizing the Council to protect one of its closest allies,
instead of using it as a pressure point to exert leverage on it.
The nine vetoes cast on Israel/Palestine under the Bush administration came during years
of heightened tension and violence between Israel and Palestinians, marked by the Second
Intifada (2000-2005) and the fighting between Israel and Hamas in 2006, following Hamas’
seizure of the Gaza strip. A common thread running through these drafts was their call for an end
to the violence between the parties. The 26 March 2001 draft called for the establishment of a
UN observer force to protect Palestinian civilians, 544 while the 10 November 2006 draft called
for the “possible establishment of international mechanism for protection of the civilian
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populations.”545 A frequent US refrain in explaining their vetoes in the 2000s was that the texts
lacked balance, maintaining that they failed to distinguish between Israel’s right to self-defense
and Palestinian terrorism or that their condemnation of Palestinian terrorist acts was
insufficient.546
There has been an interesting dynamic among the P3 on Israel/Palestine in the post-Cold
War era in the Council. While France and the United Kingdom have disagreed with US policy on
Israel/Palestine and have voted in favour of resolutions condemning settlement-building, there
has been some difference between them on this issue, with the United Kingdom less inclined
than France to criticize Israel. It is particularly telling, for example, that the UK abstained, rather
than voting affirmatively, on eight of the nine draft resolutions on this issue vetoed by the United
States during the Bush administration; France abstained on only one of these drafts, voting with
the majority on the eight other texts and thus willing to exert more pressure on Israel than its P3
colleagues. UK Ambassador Greenstock captures the dilemma facing the United Kingdom in
voting on Israel/Palestine resolutions in the Security Council or the General Assembly: “…these
were always agonizing occasions, torn as we were between firm support for Israel’s security and
insistence on justice for the Palestinians…we drove our EU colleagues to distraction as we
looked for one or more element of balance to set beside the mild but noticeable European bias in
favour of the Palestinians.”547
The explanations of vote on the vetoed draft resolution on 24 March 2004 demonstrate
the differences in the P3 perspectives. This draft condemned extrajudicial killings by Israel,
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particularly of Hamas leader Sheik Ahmed Yassin, a targeted assassination that led to six
additional Palestinian deaths. 548 In explaining its veto, US Ambassador John Negroponte gave a
common US refrain by saying that the draft would “not further the goals of peace and security in
the region.”549 He further argued that the draft was “silent about the terrorist atrocities committed
by Hamas,” maintaining that while it condemned the assassination of Yassin, it did not mention a
recent suicide bombing that killed 10 Israelis in Ashdod, Israel. 550 Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry
of the United Kingdom, which abstained, argued that his country would have voted for the text,
if there had been stronger language on terrorism. 551 The text did indeed say that the Council
“condemns…all terrorist acts against civilians;” 552 however, whereas this reference was
sufficient to satisfy France, which supported the text, it was not detailed enough for the United
Kingdom, and certainly not for the United States.
The Council was very active on Israel/Palestine in the Bush years. Between 2002 and
2004, for example, it convened 68 meetings regarding the “Middle East situation, including the
Palestine question.”553 In spite of the high number of vetoes under Bush, the United States also
allowed a number of resolutions to be adopted on Israel/Palestine. 554 It sponsored resolution
1397, adopted in March 2002, calling for the two parties to “live side by side within secure and
recognized borders”555 and “to cooperate… with the aim of resuming negotiations on a political
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settlement.”556 UK Ambassador Greenstock maintains that headway on the Middle East (i.e.,
Israel/Palestine) peace process was one of the conditions attached to the United Kingdom’s
support for the military option in Iraq—which provides a possible explanation for the increased
US engagement on Israel/Palestine at the time. 557 The level of activity in the Council is also
understandable considering that it occurred amidst the violence of the Second Intifada.
However, as Marcus Bouillon has argued, the increased engagement was indicative of
“deterioration, rather than progress” as the “Council became essentially a venting
mechanism.”558 The Middle East Quartet—formed in 2002 and comprising the European Union,
the United Nations, the United States, and Russia—guided international decision-making on
Israel-Palestine, and the Council was largely left to rubberstamp its decisions. 559
During the Obama administration, the United States cast one veto on Israel/Palestine
issues, on yet another draft resolution condemning the building of settlements in February
2011.560 Given the resonance of this issue among UN member states, the draft—which received
the votes of all other 14 members—garnered co-sponsorship from 79 UN member states. All
indications are that the United States was reluctant to cast this veto and worked hard to find a
way out of its diplomatic isolation. Rather than a resolution, it proposed that the Council pursue a
presidential statement, an outcome with less political clout, but one that needs unanimous
support to be adopted. 561 The United States further demonstrated willingness to consider a
Council visiting mission to Israel/Palestine and other parts of the Middle East, based on a
side within secure and recognized borders” represents in his words “The Council’s most significant pronouncement
on the Arab-Israeli conflict since resolution 242.”
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Russian proposal, 562 and to “publicly declare its support for a peace deal based upon the 1967
lines with mutually agreed land swaps.”563 However, these concessions were not enough to
prevent the draft from being put to a vote, in spite of a call from President Obama to Mahmoud
Abbas, the head of the Palestinian Authority, the day before the vote, in an unsuccessful effort to
have the draft resolution pulled. 564 US Ambassador Susan Rice, who reportedly would have
preferred the US not to veto the draft,565 gave the US response, condemning settlements but
maintaining, if adopted, the draft would not further the peace process. 566
Another resolution condemning settlements came before the Council in December
2016.567 Egypt—which initially co-sponsored the draft along with elected members Malaysia,
New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela—was expected to present it for a vote on 22 December. 568
However, after a phone call from US President-elect Donald Trump to Egyptian President Abdel
Fatah al-Sisi, Egypt succumbed to the diplomatic pressure and delayed tabling the draft. 569 The
other four cosponsors, however, decided to table the text for a vote anyway, which occurred on
23 December. A lame duck with less than a month left in office, President Obama let the
resolution go through, with the United States abstaining.
The Obama administration’s abstention generated considerable domestic repercussions
that put the administration on the defensive in its waning days. Following the vote, President-
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elect Trump tweeted that things would “be different at the UN”

570

when he assumed office. 571

On 5 January 2017, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution that had bipartisan
support condemning the decision by a vote of 342-80.572 In January 2017, US Senators Ted Cruz
(Republican) of Texas and Lyndsey Graham (South Carolina) proposed a bill (known as the
Safeguard Israel Act of 2017) calling for an end to all US financial support for the UN pending
the rescinding of the resolution; while it is unlikely that such a bill could pass, its introduction is
an indication of the ire aroused by resolution 2334.573 And during her confirmation hearing
before the US Senate, UN Ambassador Nikki Haley called the adoption of resolution 2334 “a
terrible mistake, making a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians harder to
achieve.”574
Israel/Palestine is one issue on which the United States will consistently defend Israeli
interests in the Security Council, at least for the foreseeable future, and notwithstanding the US
abstention on resolution 2334. The Trump administration has demonstrated that its policies will
be largely in line with the positions of the current right-wing Israeli government, as has been
abundantly clear from statements and actions by President Trump and his UN Ambassador Nikki
Haley.
There are long-standing historical roots to the relationship between Israel and the United
States, where there is a strong pro-Israel lobby and where any US administration that attempts to
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criticize or exert strong diplomatic pressure on Israel through the UN Security Council does so at
its own peril. The domestic reaction to the Obama administration’s abstention on resolution 2334
is an indication of the immense pressures imposed on any US administration considering a
position more in keeping with the international mainstream.
The below charts demonstrate differences in voting among the P3 in the post-Cold War
era.
Table 5. P3 Voting Divergences on Adopted Resolutions
Resolution
and Date

Number Agenda Item

Vote Tally

S/RES/946 of 30 The situation in Somalia
14-0-1 (US abstention)
September 1994
S/RES/1073 of 28 The situation in the occupied 14-0-1 (US abstention)
September 1996
Arab territories
S/RES/1280 of 3 The situation between Iraq and 11-0-3 (China, Malaysia and
December 1999
Kuwait
Russia abstained, while France did
not participate in the vote)
S/RES/1284 of 17 The situation between Iraq and 11-0-4 (China, France, Malaysia
December 1999
Kuwait
and Russia abstained)
S/RES/1322 of 7 The situation in the Middle East, 14-0-1 (US abstention)
October 2000
including the Palestine question
S/RES/1372 of 28 Security Council Resolution 1054 14-0-1 (US abstention)
September 2001
of 26 April 1996 [Sudan]
S/RES/1435 of 24 The situation in the Middle East, 14-0-1 (US abstention)
September 2002
including the Palestine question
S/RES/1487 of 12 United Nations peacekeeping
12-0-3 (France, Germany and
June 2003
Syria abstained)
S/RES/1497 of 1 The situation in Liberia
12-0-3 (France, Germany, and
August 2003
Mexico abstained)
S/RES/1506 of 12 Libya
13-0-2 (France and the United
September 2003
States abstained)
S/RES/1544 of 19 The situation in the Middle East, 14-0-1 (US abstention)
May 2004
including that Palestinian question
S/RES/1593 of 31 Reports of the Secretary-General 11-0-4 (Algeria, Brazil, China, and
March 2005
on the Sudan
the United States abstained)
S/RES/1828 of 31 July Reports of the Secretary-General 14-0-1 (US abstention)
2008
on the Sudan
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S/RES/1860 of 8 The situation in the Middle East,
January 2009
including that Palestinian question
S/RES/1958 of 15 The situation concerning Iraq
December 2010
S/RES/2334 of 23 The situation in the Middle East,
December 2016
including the Palestinian question
S/RES/2333 of 23 The situation in Liberia
December 2016

14-0-1 (US abstention)
14-0-1 (French abstention)
14-0-1 (US abstention)
12-0-3 (France, Russia and the
United Kingdom abstained)

Table 6. P3 Voting Divergences on Drafts that did not Receive the Required Number of
Votes for Adoption
Document Symbol and Date
S/25997 of 29 June 1993

Agenda Item
Vote Tally
The situation in Bosnia and 6-0-9 (Cape Verde, Djibouti,
Herzegovina
Morocco, Pakistan, United
States, and Venezuela in
favour; abstentions by Brazil,
China,
France,
Hungary,
Japan, New Zealand, Russia,
Spain, and the United
Kingdom)
S/2014/916 of 30 December The situation in the Middle 8-2-5 (Argentina, Chad, Chile,
2014
East, including the Palestinian China,
France,
Jordan,
question
Luxembourg and Russia in
favor; Australia and the
United
States
opposed;
abstentions by Lithuania,
Nigeria, the Republic of
Korea, Rwanda, and the
United Kingdom
Table 7. US Vetoes (1992-2016) 575
Document Symbol and Date Agenda Item
Vote Tally
of Vote
S/1995/394 of 17 May 1995
The situation in the Occupied 14-1-0 (14 in favor; the US
Arab Territories
veto)
S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997
The situation in the Occupied 14-1-0 (14 in favor; US veto)
Arab Territories
S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997 The situation in the Occupied 13-1-1(14 in favor; US veto;
Arab Territories
abstention by Costa Rica)
Dag Hammarskjöld Library, Security Council – Veto List, http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick. These were all
US vetoes since France and the United Kingdom have not used the veto since the Cold War. Also, all US vetoes
since the end of the Cold War have been sole vetoes.
575
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S/2001/270 of 27 March 2001

S/2001/1199 of 15 December
2001
S/2002/712 of 30 June 2002
S/2002/1385 of 20 December
2002
S/2003/891 of 16 September
2003

S/2003/980 of 14 October
2003

S/2004/240 of 25 March 2004

S/2004/783 of 5 October 2004

S/2006/508 of 13 July 2006

S/2006/878 of 11 November
2006
S/2011/24 of 18 February
2011

The situation in the Middle 10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions by France, Ireland,
question
Norway, and the United
Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 12-1-2 (12 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions by Norway and the
question
United Kingdom)
The situation in Bosnia and 13-1-1 (14 in favor; US veto;
Herzegovina
abstention by Bulgaria)
The situation in the Middle 12-1-2 (12 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions by Bulgaria and
question
Cameroon)
The situation in the Middle 11-1-3 (11 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions
by
Bulgaria,
question
Germany and the United
Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions
by
Bulgaria,
question
Cameroon, Germany and the
United Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 11-1-3 (11 in favor, US veto,
East, including the Palestinian abstentions by Germany,
question
Romania and the United
Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 11-1-3 (11 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions by Germany,
question
Romania and the United
Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian abstentions by Denmark, Peru,
question
Slovakia and the United
Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 10-1-4 (10 in favor; US veto;
East, including the Palestinian Denmark, Japan, Slovakia,
question
and the United Kingdom)
The situation in the Middle 14-1-0 (14 in favor; US veto)
East, including the Palestinian
question

The permanent members and the breakdown of consensus: toward a new
Cold War?
The Council has gone through a particularly contentious period in recent years, marked by
sometimes bitter divisions among the permanent members (and at times, even among the elected
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members) on Syria, Ukraine, South Sudan, and Yemen, among other issues. While unanimous
adoptions are still the norm, a higher number of non-unanimous adoptions (nine) occurred in
2016 than in any other year in the post-Cold War period 576 to go along with two vetoed draft
resolutions, both on Syria-related matters: the first577 vetoed solely by Russia, the second 578 by
both China and Russia. What is happening and does this reflect changes in the geo-political
landscape?
One point to be noted is that the high number of non-unanimous votes is in part a
reflection of the Council’s hyper-activity, including on a number of complicated issues. The nine
non-unanimous adoptions in 2016 occurred on a total of 77 resolutions, the most adopted by the
Council in any calendar year since 1993. 579 This means that in 2016 members still managed to
achieve unanimity roughly 86 percent of the time (i.e. on 68 of 79 drafts put to a vote, including
the 77 adopted and the two vetoed drafts). Despite clear divisions among the members, this is
still a high-level of unanimity, especially if compared to the Cold War years.
However, there has been a definite cooling in relations between Russia and the Western
powers during the Putin years, so much so that people question whether a new Cold War is upon
us. Following years of humiliation in the 1990s—and an inability to act more assertively to
prevent the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 580—Russia has demonstrated an incessant desire to be
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respected as a great power in more recent years,581 and it has been willing to use hard power to
achieve that end. In the past decade, it has used military force to assert its authority in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia, in 2008, and to annex Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, both
formerly part of the Soviet empire. Furthermore, from the outset of the Syrian civil war in 2011,
Russia has staunchly defended the legitimacy of the Assad government, and it continues to use
its air force to attack the anti-government opposition in a conflict that has now claimed some
400,000 lives and displaced over half the country’s population. 582
All of these issues—Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria—have been a focus of Council
deliberations, and all of them have resulted in Russian vetoes. In June 2009, Russia vetoed a
draft that would have extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. 583 It has
vetoed two drafts resolutions on Ukraine: one on 15 March 2014 that would have delegitimized
the referendum that Russia was organizing on the status of Crimea, which it had recently seized,
for the following day; 584 and a second on 29 July 2015 that would have established an
international tribunal to try those responsible for the downing of a civilian aircraft over Ukraine
(flight MH17).585 There have furthermore been eleven Russian vetoes between February 2011
and the end of 2017 on drafts designed to put pressure on or hold accountable the Assad
government for its actions in Syria.
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Russia’s opportunistic aggression in former Soviet Republics is understandable.
Notwithstanding Putin’s desire to project an image of power, the country harbors a strong sense
of insecurity, given its extensive borders and its history of suffering invasions from European
neighbors.586 Kimberly Marten, for example, has noted that: “The Russian military genuinely
fears a surprise Western attack along the country’s long borders, including possible U.S. or
NATO intervention in one of Russia’s ongoing military conflicts.” 587
While Russia does not share a border with Syria, there are several reasons for its support
of the Assad government. Salman Shaikh and Amanda Roberts maintain that these include such
factors as “preserving its security and arms-trading agreements and keeping its largely symbolic
naval base in Tartous on the eastern Mediterranean coast…,”588 as well as “maintaining its last
significant sphere of influence in the region, containing Islamic extremism…, and ensuring the
safety of Syria’s Christian community.” 589
If, as Stephen Kotkin argues, “Russian governments have generally oscillated between
seeking closer ties with the West and recoiling in fury at perceived slights,” 590 then the current
period falls into the latter category. This insecurity is at times reflected in Council deliberations.
For example, following the Khan Shaykhun chemical weapons attack in Syria on 4 April 2017,
when Russia was pilloried by Western countries in the Council chamber on 7 April for defending
the Assad regime, including through the use of the veto, Russian Deputy Ambassador Vladimir
Safronkov took the floor a second time at the end of the proceedings, requesting “the
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representatives of the United States and other countries not to insult my country” and adding that
“they have no moral right to do so.” 591 A week later, in response to criticism of Russia’s action
on Syria from UK Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, Safronkov made the point again in the open
chamber, retorting that Rycroft “should not dare to insult Russia again.” 592
However, Russia’s behavior in the Security Council can be explained by much more than
merely defending strategic interests or demanding respect as a great power. Russia, like China,
has a fundamentally different worldview from the P3, one that strongly underscores the
importance of state sovereignty and respect for non-intervention, a perspective shared with many
developing countries that maintain that sovereignty is their main source of protection from
Western interventionism. In addition, China and Russia have a more narrow perspective than the
other permanent members of the mandate of the Council (i.e. what constitutes a threat to
international peace and security.) Both are less amenable to discussing matters related to human
rights, among other issues, in the Council than their P3 colleagues. Russia, for example,
maintains that discussion of such matters encroaches on the work of other UN organs and
questions the connection between human rights violations and violent conflict. 593
Over the past decade, as Russia has reasserted itself as a major power, and as China has
grown in strength and confidence, both countries have not been shy about throwing their weight
around in the Council. Russia has done so through its statements and its vetoes. Although
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China’s approach is generally more muted—with its consistent calls for negotiation and
cooperation—it at times forcefully expresses its views in public, especially on issues of key
strategic importance such as North Korea or Myanmar 594 and when it upholds the notion that a
country’s domestic affairs are its own business.595 Moreover, it has in the past ten years
demonstrated less reluctance to use its veto, a course of action that was extraordinarily rare for
China prior to 2007.
In several cases in which these countries have either abstained or used their vetoes,
sovereignty concerns have been a major consideration. This is often reflected through a
reluctance to support sanctions, international legal prosecution, or military action as means to
address threats to international peace and security, frequently maintaining that such tools are
counterproductive. Public statements, including explanations of vote on several draft resolutions
resulting in Chinese and Russian vetoes or even abstentions, highlight their view that sovereignty
is sacrosanct and that coercive measures should be pursued cautiously, if at all.
•

When vetoing a 12 January 2007 draft calling on Myanmar to stop its violence against
ethnic minorities and to initiate “substantive political dialogue, which would lead to a
genuine democratic transition,”596 Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya said “the
Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State. The current domestic
situation does not constitute a threat to international peace and security.” 597 Russian
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ambassador Vitaly Churkin likewise stated that the issue “does not pose any threat to
international or regional peace.”598
•

When vetoing a July 2008 draft resolution that the P3 and other states sponsored that
sought to impose an arms embargo on Zimbabwe and targeted sanctions (i.e. travel bans
and assets freezes) on key government and military officials in the midst of government
repression during a fraudulent electoral process, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya
said that “lightly using or threatening to use sanctions is not conducive to solving
problems,”599 while Russian Ambassador Churkin asserted that “the draft resolution
represents nothing but an attempt by the Council to interfere in the internal affairs of
States, contrary to the [UN] Charter.” 600

•

Following the 11 March 2011 adoption of resolution 1973—which authorized a no fly
zone in Libya to protect civilians and which resulted in 10 affirmative votes and
abstentions by five members (including China, Russia, and elected members Brazil,
Germany, and India)—Chinese Ambassador Li Baodong underscored that “the Security
Council should follow the United Nations Charter and the norms governing international
law, respect for sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Libya and
resolve the current crisis…through peaceful means,” 601 while Russian Ambassador
Churkin expressed concerns that the resolution “could potentially open the door to largescale military intervention,”602 which approximates what occurred when NATO
undertook an air campaign that contributed to the downfall of President Muamar Gaddafi.
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•

In the early phases of the Syria conflict, China and Russia both maintained that the
fighting was an internal matter and upheld the principles of sovereignty and nonintervention.603 As the conflict took on clear cross-border implications—with large-scale
refugee flows out of Syria and several foreign states and terrorist groups playing a role in
the fighting—arguments that the Syria crisis did not impact on international peace and
security no longer had weight. 604 While China has continued to emphasize the importance
of negotiations to find a solution to the conflict, 605 Russia has, according to Shaikh and
Roberts, “shifted to a threefold argument in the Security Council: rejecting regime
change by external force, denying any legitimacy to the opposition, and amplifying the
threat of terrorism.”606

In recent years, while China and especially Russia have become more assertive, the United States
has demonstrated an increased propensity to force controversial drafts to a vote. Depending on
one’s view, this could be interpreted as the United States demonstrating less patience with
careful diplomacy or, more charitably, as a greater unwillingness to compromise on principles
and values. Why this change in approach has occurred is not clear, but there are some plausible
explanations. First, geopolitical tensions have polluted the Council’s engagement on a widerange of agenda items, even when core national interests are not at stake. Second, the issues
addressed have been intractable and reaching agreement on them is difficult, given the
philosophical differences among members on how to approach peace and security matters. Most
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likely, a combination of both of these factors is at play. 607 Whatever the case may be, there have
been since 2015 a number of non-consensual resolutions on issues on which the United States is
penholder; in fact, the United States was the penholder on 5 of the 9 non-consensual resolutions
adopted in 2016. These five were on a wide-range of issues, including S/RES/2272 (11 March
2016) on UN peacekeeping; S/RES/2285 (29 April 2016) on the UN Mission for the Referendum
in Western Sahara (MINURSO);608 S/RES/2304 (12 August 2016) on South Sudan; S/RES/2310
(23 September 2016) on nuclear non-proliferation; and S/RES/2333 (23 December 2016) on the
UN Mission in Liberia.
The limited US willingness to compromise has been particularly noticeable on South
Sudan, an issue on which it holds the pen. Since October 2015, three resolutions on the mandate
of UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) have been adopted without unanimous support, 609 and
one draft resolution in December 2016 seeking to impose an arms embargo and further targeted
sanctions on South Sudanese spoilers did not receive the requisite number of votes to be
adopted.610 In general, these resolutions have faced criticism because they call for measures that
some members—including China and Russia, among others—view as intruding too heavily on
South Sudan’s sovereignty.
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One consistent element of recent UNMISS resolutions has been the threat of targeted
sanctions against spoilers to the faltering efforts to promote peace in the country. While several
Council members supported these threats, some maintained that they risked undermining chances
for peace by hardening the positions of the parties; the inclusion of these threats contributed to
the decision by Russia and Venezuela to abstain on the 9 October and 15 December 2015
UNMISS resolutions. 611 Resolution 2304 of 12 August 2016, which authorized a Regional
Protection Force (RPF) to serve under the umbrella of the UNMISS, indicated that the Council
would consider an arms embargo if the deployment of the RPF were obstructed or the operations
of UNMISS in general continued to be impeded. Several members were concerned that the
government was not properly consulted about the establishment of the force and were opposed to
possible implementation of an arms embargo on South Sudan. 612 In large part for these reasons,
China, Egypt, Russia, and Venezuela abstained on the resolution.
Perhaps the most controversial effort in 2016 on South Sudan in the Council was the US
decision in December to force to a vote a draft resolution imposing an arms embargo on South
Sudan and targeted sanctions on high-level figures in the country. The vote was doomed to
failure, as it was clear that the United States did not have the nine votes needed for adoption. It
pushed the resolution to a vote anyhow, perhaps from a sense of moral obligation, the need to
show that at least it tried to do “something” in the face of the ongoing commission of atrocities,
even if the proposed “something” was rejected by the Council. As US Ambassador Samantha
Power said in her explanation of vote: “At a certain point, drifting along and internalizing the
constraints imposed by those Council members who do not want to take action in the face of the
611
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violence, that is not option. We learned that from Rwanda, Srebrenica and chapters past.” 613 The
supreme irony was that the United States—unlike France, the United Kingdom, and others—had
been opposed to an arms embargo until the latter half of 2016, and that in Rwanda especially, the
United States in 1994 had joined all the other permanent members, who did “not want to take
action in the face of the violence.” 614
There were a number of other elements of South Sudan resolutions in late 2015 and in
2016 that were controversial and that were incorporated into drafts produced by United States in
spite of the opposition of some Council members. Russia and Venezuela, in particular, objected
to references in the resolutions to unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs). 615 The Department of
Peacekeeping Operations advocated for this technology to be used by the mission to enhance its
situational awareness and early warning capabilities—a view supported by the P3 and some
other members—but Russia and Venezuela maintained that their deployment would violate the
sovereignty of South Sudan, considering that the government disapproved on their potential
use.616 Furthermore, although language on accountability was diluted in the October 2015
resolution to accommodate Angola, Russia, and Venezuela, references to the Council’s role in
assessing efforts to set up the Hybrid Court for South Sudan, envisioned in the August 2015
South Sudan peace agreement, remained problematic to them. 617 In its explanations of vote on
both resolutions 2241(October 2015) and 2252 (December 2015) Russia argued that under the
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peace agreement, the court was under the auspices of the African Union, implying that the UN
should not encroach on its efforts.618
Thus, on South Sudan—as on other issues in recent years—the United States has decided
to forfeit the unity of the Council in exchange for pursuing what it believes are stronger
resolutions or resolutions more in keeping with its interests. Such principled efforts are
understandable, and sometimes it is impossible to achieve unity when there are strongly
contrasting views on complex issues. However, an argument could be made that political
leverage is limited without a unified Council. For a penholder, trying to ensure that a resolution
is meaningful (and not weakened by unwise concessions) while also securing the unity of the
Council can be a difficult balancing act.

Conclusion
This chapter has explored Council decision-making and dynamics in the post-Cold War era. It
maintained that the drafting and negotiating of resolutions (as well as other outcomes) has been
dominated by the permanent members, particularly the P3, given the importance of the Council
to their foreign policies. It argued that they have often made considerable efforts to promote
consensus, a goal that is shared by all members. It posited that there are four primary reasons
why a high percentage of unanimous resolutions are adopted: the legitimacy of unanimity; the
importance of good stewardship for penholders; the perceived impact of a unified Council; and
the fear of isolation. The chapter further described key instances in which the P3 have disagreed
and the efforts that were made to avoid vetoes. Finally, it described the current deterioration of
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relations among the permanent members (particularly between the P3 and China and Russia),
what underlies these differences, and how they have impacted voting patterns.
Although normative factors play a significant part in the Council’s work, it is important
to note that rational calculations and power politics ultimately determine how this body
functions. While penholders seek the enhanced legitimacy of a unanimously adopted resolution,
the legitimacy afforded to such resolutions is often undergirded by instrumental concerns, most
notably the view that a unanimous resolution is more likely to have the support of the wider
membership and to be adhered to by the subject party or parties. Even the notion that penholders
like to be viewed as good stewards of the Council’s work has an instrumental value for members
such as France and the United Kingdom, if not for the United States, because they need to
demonstrate that they warrant a permanent seat at the horseshoe table; since their political and
military heft is not the same as the other P5, they try to compensate with their competence and
effectiveness. Although the unity of the Council is perceived as important, that unity will fracture
once big power tensions become too strong, no matter how much effort is made to compromise.
While not using the veto is preferable, it will inevitably be used, especially by China, Russia and
the United States, when core strategic interests are at stake. Furthermore, the penholder system,
which is the product of P3 efforts, is symptomatic of the permanent members’ efforts to
consolidate their control of the Council. As the next chapter attempts to demonstrate, the elected
members are not always passive in accepting the domination of the permanent members, and
they often play an important role in the Council’s work. Nonetheless, the permanent members
run the show.
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V: The elected members and efforts to build consensus
At the conclusion of the workshop that the government of Finland hosts every November for
incoming elected members of the Security Council, there is a session in which the outgoing
elected members share reflections of their time on the Council and impart their knowledge to the
incoming members about to embark on two years of intense diplomatic engagement on the world
body’s peace and security organ. One theme emphasized over the years has been the role that
elected members can play in building bridges among their fellow members, especially the
permanent ones, whose support, or at the very least acquiescence, is needed to for them to
contribute effectively to the Council’s work. Such thinking is captured by observations made by
departing members such as: “When the permanent members are divided, there may be
opportunities to claim some middle ground. Look for them.” 619 Or “Do not undermine any of the
15 members. At one point or another, you will need each of them. The Council works best when
everyone tries to work together. Consensus is the preferred option.” 620
The point of highlighting these observations is to demonstrate that one of the key reasons
why the Council has been able to achieve greater voting unity in the post-Cold War period, in
spite of persistent differences among its members on specific issues, is because the mindset of
the elected members about the function of this organ has changed in addition to that of the
permanent members. The role of the elected members has frequently been downplayed because
of the institutional obstacles that they encounter and the power disparities between them and the
permanent members, but many elected members strive to compensate for their status as “less
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than equal citizens” by making the most of their two year terms. In many instances, genuine
efforts have been made by elected members, either acting alone or in unison with others, to unify
the organ’s membership around initiatives they believe will promote international peace and
security. The E10 often divided the Council in the Cold War era, as reflected by the agenda
forcefully pushed by Non-aligned Movement (NAM); in more recent years, although there are
cases in which elected members have challenged the unity of the Council out of principle or to
pursue national interests, the elected members have frequently tried to use their limited influence
to unify the Council, notwithstanding their varied policy perspectives.
This chapter has two key sections, before some brief concluding observations. The first
section is on the waning influence of the NAM in the post-Cold War era, which has led to a less
divided Council. It maintains that in recent decades there has been no cohesive, ideologicallydriven bloc of elected members in the Council that will push the agenda in ways that consistently
lead to vetoes and more generally fracture the voting unity of the organ, as had been the case
with the NAM in the Cold War era. In fact, as the second, longer section argues, despite the
significant variation in priorities and world views among the elected members, they frequently
strive to strike agreements with all members, but most notably with the veto-wielding permanent
ones, in order to help produce constructive outcomes in accordance with Council’s mandate to
promote international peace and security. Three small cases studies are presented in an effort to
demonstrate this point with respect to how particular elected members have addressed issues
including: 1.) humanitarian access in Syria; 2.) the protection of health care workers and
facilities in armed conflict; and 3.) the UN’s sanctions work.
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Divided we stand: the elected membership in the post-Cold War era
In the Cold War, the Non-aligned Movement represented a cohesive and influential political
force in the Council, its members confidently asserting their positions and tabling controversial
draft resolutions, often out of a sense of principle, even if the result was a veto. As demonstrated
in Chapter III, a large number of the vetoes cast in the Cold War period were on draft resolutions
proposed by NAM members.
This dynamic had changed by the early post-Cold War period. The ideological zeal that
fueled the non-aligned movement had weakened. Many of the issues that drove its anti-colonial,
anti-apartheid agenda—and which had occupied the Security Council’s attention—had largely
been sorted out. Southern Rhodesia became the independent state of Zimbabwe in 1980;
Namibia gained its independence in 1990; and the death of apartheid in South Africa led to the
election in 1994 of Nelson Mandela, who had once been the country’s most famous political
prisoner. Furthermore, while the movement had leaned considerably more closely to the Soviet
Union than the United States, the question of “non-alignment” lost its meaning with the fall of
one of the two superpowers. In the bi-polar international system of the Cold War, “Third World
nations generally benefited by playing…[the United States and the Soviets] off against the
other.”621 This was no longer the case.
In the early 1990s, the permanent members sometimes referred to the elected members as
the non-aligned and the non-non-aligned members.622 This categorization, in and of itself,
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suggests that the NAM were still considered an important grouping in the Council, and at times,
they would (and still do) ban together to advocate common positions. Their effort, albeit a failed
one, to push through a resolution removing the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina in June
1993 was an example of this. 623 Among the elected members in the Council at the time, the
NAM members included Cade Verde, Djibouti, Morocco, Pakistan, and Venezuela, while the
“non-non-aligned” members consisted of Brazil, Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain. A
more recent example is the broader NAM caucuses’ response to the public briefing in the
Council specifically on human rights on 18 April 2017; on the same day as the briefing, the
Coordinating Bureau of the NAM released a communiqué that “reject[ed] the on-going practice
of the Security Council of dealing with human rights issues in pursuit of certain states’ political
objectives,”624 a pronouncement perhaps most directly aimed at the United States, which initiated
the briefing as a highlight of its April 2017 presidency of the Council.
However, notwithstanding such examples, the NAM does not have the same political
influence or cohesion in the Council as it had in the Cold War. While the NAM tries to
coordinate its positions, its 120 members are essentially an aggregation of developing countries
whose members have different views on a number of issues.625 For example, Council members
such as Guatemala (2013-2014) and Chile (2014-2015) were less inclined to support the
traditional, ultra-sovereignty views of their NAM counterparts Angola (2015-2016), Venezuela
(2015-2016), and Bolivia (2017-present), on peace and security issues during their Council
tenures. In recent years, one issue of considerable division among NAM Council members has
been Western Sahara; in 2016, for example, there were two NAM elected members that were
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generally supportive of Morocco’s position (Egypt and Senegal) and three that were more
sympathetic of the Polisario Front (Angola, Malaysia, and Venezuela).
The propensity of the NAM caucus in the Council—or for that matter, any elected
member or bloc of elected members—to propose draft resolutions out of principle that have a
high-risk of failure is by and large a distant memory. The pattern since the mid-2000s of the
Palestinian Authority producing drafts regarding the Israeli occupation, getting buy in from the
Arab Group for the draft, and then having the Arab member of the Council table the draft even
though failure is a distinct possibility (either through a veto or insufficient votes) is arguably the
closest example. However, even this pattern is a departure from what the NAM often did during
the Cold War. Such drafts are voted upon infrequently in comparison with the Cold War,
extended periods of intense negotiations are the norm, and there is at times the hope, if not
always the expectation, of an adoption. The veto forced on the United States in December 2017
for its decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel was quite rare by current standards,
but something that would have been more common in the Cold War.
The fragmentation of the NAM is representative of the broader fragmentation among the
elected membership as a whole. In a multi-polar world, the variation of views of the E10 is only
natural since the elected membership is drawn from an even large grouping of states than the
NAM. Although some UN member states have not served on the Council and some have served
multiple times, the E10 is drawn from the entire membership of the world body with the
exception of the five permanent members—that is, 188 member states. Therefore, these member
states come from all the regional groupings—Africa, Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, Latin
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American and Caribbean, and Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG)626—and include
countries that vary greatly in terms of military power, economic strength, political influence and
population size.
One must be careful about making broad generalizations about the behavior of the elected
membership as a whole, or even about the policy positions of members within distinct regional
groupings. The WEOG members are perhaps the most consistent in their policy views of all the
regional groups, its members often promoting the integration of human rights issues into the
Council’s work and frequently willing to espouse measures such as sanctions or international
legal prosecution. However, even among WEOG members, there are some variations in policy.
For example, during its 2009-2010 Council tenure, WEOG member Turkey627 parted ways with
its WEOG colleagues on several votes. In June 2009, when the Council voted to strengthen
sanctions on Iran because of its continuing pursuit of nuclear weapons, Turkey voted against the
resolution along with fellow Council member Brazil. 628 Both of these members believed that a
fuel exchange agreement they were negotiating with Iran needed more time to produce results
before the Council pursued additional sanctions. 629 While a sui generis issue, Turkey also
differed from the rest of the Council by voting against four resolutions 630 renewing the UN
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Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) because of its view that the Council failed to account
for the lack of Turkish Cypriot participation in the government of Cyprus. 631
Indeed, in recent years, on political charged issues such as Burundi, South Sudan and
Western Sahara, the divisions among the elected members have been as stark as they have been
among the permanent members. Alignments with and political pressure from different members
of the P5 tend to further fragment the elected members.632 With the exception of Israel/Palestine,
even when one or more of the elected members are able to unite most of the Council in support
of a controversial draft resolution, they are generally unwilling to put such a draft to a vote if it
were to force a veto, just to make a political point.
Indeed, it is striking that elected members vote together so frequently—and even at times,
attempt to unify the Council—when they themselves are divided on so many issues. The reasons
why all members strive for a united Council was highlighted in Chapter IV, but as the next
section attempts to demonstrate, there are times when the elected members in particular are
uniquely positioned to unite the Council around mutually acceptable outcomes. On occasion,
they have demonstrated the ability in recent years to be the responsible adults in the room when
the permanent members are compromised by their strategic interests and resort to political
grandstanding rather than engaging in constructive problem-solving.
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The elected members: making their mark?
The opportunity to spend two years on the Council as an elected member is desired for several
reasons. Often cited is the prestige value of serving with major powers on the organ responsible
for the maintenance of international peace and security. 633 Just being in the arena of big power
politics is a perceived benefit to some members. Furthermore, states that have a particular
national interest in one or more country issues on the agenda are motivated to serve in order to
have a role in decisions affecting such issues.634 Finally, a number of elected members believe
that multilateralism is the cornerstone of a peaceful international order and that all member states
have a responsibility to strive for a principled, “rules-based” international system. 635 This is a
point that is often downplayed because of the circumscribed power they have to influence the
organ’s deliberations, as they do not have the veto privilege and as they generally have difficulty
matching the institutional memory and staffing capacity of the permanent members. But elected
members coming onto the Council frequently express a desire to make a positive impact on the
international peace and security environment. Of course, any combination of these different
factors may motivate countries to pursue Council membership.
Unfortunately, several member states have strategic or political interests on certain issues
that prevent them from playing a constructive role, or that make them less than objective arbiters,
when they get on the Council. Big power interests are frequently accused of polluting the organ’s
work, but elected members also have strong political interests that can undermine the Council’s
work. Rwanda’s participation as an elected member in 1994 while it was committing genocide
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against its own people, erecting “significant obstacles to Council action during the time of
crisis,”636 is perhaps the most egregious example of the deleterious impact that a member can
have, especially when it is a party to a dispute.
However, elected members by and large do not have the same large variety and depth of
strategic and political interests as the permanent members. One E10 diplomat has said that
positions of the elected members are usually “milder;” 637 while this observation may not be true
of elected members with specific “intimacy issues” 638—e.g. Turkey on Cyprus in 2009-2010 or
Morocco on Western Sahara in 2013-2014—it is a fair generalization of the elected membership
as a whole with regard to the broad panoply of issues with which the Council deals. In many
instances, this can give the E10 the flexibility needed to compromise in a negotiation.
Furthermore, in spite of the policy differences among the elected members, they are generally
unified on the need to improve the working methods of the Council, as they frequently chafe at
the permanent members’ domination of the Council’s work. Especially on issues in which the
permanent members are at loggerheads or are politically compromised, the elected members can
be viewed as more neutral parties and play a bridging role among the permanent members.
Indeed, “modest sized delegation can serve as inconspicuous brokers on issues in which they do
not have a strong national interest and can often facilitate progress by providing important
ideas.”639 Since the permanent members so jealously guard their privileges as penholders on so
many issues, when the elected members do take the initiative, they often work hard to make their
mark by building widespread support for resolutions they pursue. The permanent members work
Colin Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” in The Security Council: From Cold War to the 21st Century ed.
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at times to circumscribe the initiative of the elected members. Nonetheless, in spite of the fact
that the P3 dominate the drafting on most issues, there are several examples of elected members
taking the pen and working hard over long periods of time, sometimes lasting several months, in
an effort to garner the support of their fellow members, especially the veto-wielding permanent
members, and to achieve unanimous adoptions on the resolutions they steward.
Below are three notable examples from recent years: the Syrian humanitarian initiative
led by Australia, Luxembourg and Jordan in 2013-2014; the protection of health care in armed
conflict resolution640 led by Egypt, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Uruguay in 2016; and the
Australian effort in 2014, albeit an ultimately an unsuccessful one, to adopt a resolution focused
broadly on sanctions. I have chosen to focus on these more recent examples because it has
enabled me to garner granular detail on negotiations from diplomats and other sources with close
proximity to the recent events. With the passage of time, memories fade and it is difficult to
capture in intimate detail the various aspects of negotiations. Additionally, I have relied heavily
in this chapter on the analysis of the not-for-profit organization Security Council Report, which
is the one organization that consistently provides in-depth coverage of negotiations on Council
outcomes through its What’s in Blue site. This service was not available prior to 2011, making it
harder to access the specific details of behind the scenes deliberations on draft resolutions and
presidential statements before that year.
Syria Humanitarian Initiative (2013-2014)
One of the more notable initiatives spearheaded by the elected members has been the Security
Council’s engagement on the humanitarian crisis in Syria. Over the years, the Council’s

640

UN Security Council resolution 2286, 3 May 2016.

179

treatment of Syria has been divided into three separate areas: political matters, chemical
weapons, and humanitarian issues. Permanent members have taken the lead on the political and
chemical weapons tracks. In 2013-2014, three elected members (Australia and Luxembourg,
joined by Jordan in 2014) made a determined effort to rally the Council around several outcomes
addressing the humanitarian crisis in Syria, in the face of significant resistance from China and
Russia. Referring to Australia and Luxembourg in particular, one UN official has noted that they
were “not naïve about the difficulties” they would face, which buoyed them and gave them the
“staying power” they would need to achieve constructive outcomes.641
The origin of the elected members’ leadership of the humanitarian track can be traced to
18 April 2013.642 On that day, several high-level UN officials briefed the Council on the
humanitarian and human rights situation in the country: Under Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos, High Commissioner for Refugees António Guterres,
Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict Zainab Hawa
Bangura, and Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
Leila Zerrougui.643 The Council retreated to closed consultations after the briefings, which one
E10 diplomat described as particularly disturbing and graphic in terms of the abuses detailed. 644
Following the meeting, Ambassador Eugène-Richard Gasana of Rwanda, Council president that
month, came out to the stakeout outside the consultations room and read press elements (or
“elements to the press,” as they are often called). Australia was a key force behind the decision
to produce the elements to the press.645
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Press elements are the weakest pronouncement Council members can make; unlike
resolutions and presidential statements, they are not even considered formal documents of the
Security Council. However, since they have limited clout and no legal standing, members
generally do not have to consult with their capitals on the substance of these documents, so it is
frequently possible to agree on them quickly, and since all members must agree them, they are at
least in theory a reflection of the will of all members. Nonetheless, even negotiations on these
elements were not easy, demonstrating the depth of the division.646 One former E10 diplomat has
noted that while this was a very small step, at least the members were not mute, as the Council
had not produced an outcome on Syria in several months. 647
Some of the language in the press elements foreshadowed language that would ultimately
find its way into Council outcomes on Syria humanitarian issues. Members “urged all parties to
ensure safe and unimpeded access for aid organisations to those in need in all areas of Syria.”648
They “deplored the obstacles to the provision of humanitarian assistance and underlined the
urgent need to remove such obstacles…” 649 And they “underlined the need to facilitate the
provision of humanitarian assistance through the most effective ways, including where
appropriate across borders in accordance with guiding principles

of humanitarian

assistance…”.650
By June 2013, Australia and Luxembourg had started working on a draft resolution
focused on ways to improve humanitarian access in Syria. 651 They were hopeful that as elected
members taking the lead on this initiative, they could reduce some of the tensions on Syria
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generated by divisions among the permanent members.652 Over the ensuing weeks, they held in
depth negotiations on the substance of the text with the permanent members, and they were
making progress in these negotiations. 653 However, this momentum was delayed following the
21 August 2013 chemical weapons attacks in Ghouta, Syria, which “killed hundreds of civilians,
including large numbers of children.” 654 On 20 August 2012, US President Barack Obama had
issued his famous warning that the use of chemical weapons in Syria would be “a red-line,”
which “would change my calculations significantly.”655 The magnitude of the these attacks and
the fact that Obama had a year earlier issued this ultimatum heightened international tensions
over Syria, including between the United States and Russia, and generated expectations that
United States, as well as France, might respond with military force against the Assad regime. 656
The Council’s bandwidth on Syria was taken up by the immediate crisis at hand—namely
addressing the Ghouta attack and calming political tensions—and the space to continue
discussions on Syria humanitarian matters was not readily available. The humanitarian initiative
spearheaded by Australia and Luxembourg would temporarily be put on hold, and the focus
shifted to the use of chemical weapons in Syria. A UK effort in late August 2013 to introduce a
draft resolution that would have “condemn[ed] the alleged chemical weapons attack on rebelheld areas in Syria…and [sought] Council authorisation for ‘all necessary means’ under Chapter
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VII…to protect Syrian civilians from chemical weapons”657 stalled and failed to gain momentum
amidst Chinese and Russian objections. 658
In the following weeks, the Council became largely a spectator to the real action on the
chemical weapons issue, with Russia-US bilateral diplomacy taking center stage. On 9
September 2013, Russia proposed that Syria do away with its chemical weapons under
international supervision, a clever diplomatic maneuver that contributed to an easing of tensions
with the United States. This proposal became the basis of resolution 2118 of 27 September 2013,
through which the Council decided that Syria would terminate its chemical weapons program
with the UN with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons playing a key role
in the process and endorsed the (ultimately unsuccessful) 30 June 2012 Geneva Communiqué,
which “called for the establishment of a transitional governing body” 659 in Syria. The resolution
was negotiated in Geneva and New York by the United States and Russia, including involvement
from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry. 660 The other
members were left to endorse the agreement that had been struck by these two big powers.661
After the adoption of resolution 2118, the focus shifted back to the humanitarian situation
in Syria. However, Australia and Luxembourg decided to pursue a presidential statement rather
than a resolution. While still a formal outcome of the Council, a presidential statement has less
political weight than a resolution, although it needs the support of all 15 members to be adopted.
Some of the permanent members encouraged Australia and Luxembourg to pursue “a more
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gradual approach.”662 The strategy to forgo the pursuit of a resolution was based on apparent P3
concerns, already expressed to Australia and Luxembourg in August 2013, that a draft resolution
risked being vetoed, 663 and could have polluted the political process being pursued in Geneva. 664
The negotiations on the draft presidential statement were not difficult. This text was
perceived by members as being measured. 665 Australia and Luxembourg had already conducted
negotiations in July and August with the permanent members, 666 hammering out some of the
more difficult elements of the text, which was at the time envisioned as a possible resolution but
which ultimately came to birth as a presidential statement. Adopted on 2 October 2013, the
presidential statement was the first formal Council outcome on the humanitarian track. 667 In the
statement, the Council urged that the government of Syria to remove bureaucratic obstacles and
other impediments to humanitarian operations and urged all parties to “take all appropriate steps
to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel…and all other personnel engaged
in humanitarian relief activities.” 668
By January 2014, Australia and Luxembourg—joined by new Council member Jordan—
had reengaged with the P3 in a renewed effort to negotiate a resolution addressing the
humanitarian crisis in Syria. Jordan’s inclusion as a third penholder made sense as a neighboring
country directly impacted by the fighting in Syria.669 Apparently eager to play more of a
leadership role, the United Kingdom suggested that it assume the role of co-penholder with
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Jordan, which would have meant wresting the pen away from Australia and Luxembourg. 670
Australia and Luxembourg tactfully rebuffed the effort. 671 How serious the United Kingdom was
about seizing the pen is not entirely clear. Although the United Kingdom has traditionally taken
pride in drafting outcomes, it was not a penholder on Syrian issues.672 One diplomat close to the
negotiations has suggested that United Kingdom may have restrained its more assertive instincts
because it had confidence that the penholders would manage the process effectively. 673 The fact
that the penholders worked closely with the United Kingdom—as well as the other permanent
members—throughout the negotiations likely encouraged this perspective.674
A key challenge was producing a text that could secure the support of all the permanent
members, particularly China and Russia, but that still maintained strong language critical of the
government and contained meaningful references to measures of accountability for the
violence.675 Finding the right balance proved to be a difficult endeavor. After the three
penholders negotiated the text with the P3, they circulated it on 6 February 2014 to China and
Russia,676 whose initial reactions were not favorable.677 China expressed concern that pursuing
the initiative could disrupt the Geneva negotiations, while Russia maintained that the members
should instead be pursuing a counter-terrorism resolution with regard to Syria. 678 The draft had
gone some way in trying to anticipate and address such potential concerns: for example,
terrorism was referenced in operational paragraphs; violence by all parties, not just by the
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government, was denounced; and there was language backing the political process in Geneva. 679
However, the draft did not go far enough to get Chinese and especially Russian support, and
further concessions would need to be made.
Two weeks of vigorous negotiations of the full Council ensued before the unanimous
adoption of resolution 2139 on 22 February 2014.680 It is not by coincidence that the adoption
was scheduled during the Sochi Olympics, 681 which closed on 23 February. This was a way of
raising the stakes on Russia, which was less likely to risk international opprobrium by casting a
veto on a Syria humanitarian resolution while it was basking in the glow of hosting the Winter
Olympics.682
The final text resulting from the negotiations demanded that “all parties immediately
cease all attack attacks against civilians” 683 and that “all parties, in particular the Syrian
authorities, fully implement the provisions of the 2 October Statement by the President of the
Security Council…”. 684 It further demanded that “all parties, in particular the Syrian authorities,
promptly allow rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian
agencies and their implementing partners, including across conflict lines and across borders, in
order to ensure that humanitarian assistance reaches people in need through the most direct
routes.”685 One of the more notable features of the resolution was that it established a monthly
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reporting requirement regarding the resolution’s implementation, 686 which was still in effect as
of December 2017.
This final product was significantly different from the initial draft proposed by the
penholders.687 A number of revisions had to be made to get all the permanent members,
especially Russia, on board. Resolution 2139 “stresse[d] the need to end impunity for violations
of international humanitarian law and violations of abuses of human rights” and “reaffirme[d]
that those who have committed or are otherwise responsible for such violations and abuses in
Syria must be brought to justice.” 688 However, a clear reference to the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which had been included in an earlier draft of the resolution, was omitted as it had
discomforted Russia, Rwanda, and the United States in particular 689—none of which are state
parties to the ICC’s Rome Statute.
Furthermore, the Council merely “expresse[d] its intent to take further steps in the case of
non-compliance with the resolution,” 690 rather than threatening to impose article 41 measures
(usually a reference to sanctions) in case of non-compliance, language that had been in the draft
initially forwarded to China and Russia. 691 The weakened accountability language was a
concession to Russia, which had “said publicly and during negotiations that the threat of
sanctions was a non-starter.”692
Another difficult matter was how to refer to cross-border humanitarian access. Resolution
2139 demands cross-border access, but only does so in cursory fashion. An early draft had
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specifically called for all restrictions on such access, particularly from neighboring countries Iraq
and Turkey, to be lifted. 693 However, this more specific language proved to be controversial and
was removed from the text ultimately adopted. 694 Syria continued to restrict humanitarian access,
including cross-border access, in the months following the adoption of resolution 2139. This
would set the stage for the intense negotiations on resolution 2165, which focused on means of
achieving cross-border access.
With the humanitarian situation in Syria continuing to deteriorate, Australia, Jordan, and
Luxembourg had produced a draft resolution in late May 2014 that, according to Shaikh and
Roberts, “under Chapter VII, permitted the UN to carry out cross-border and cross-line
humanitarian aid operations in the absence of state consent, and included the threat to impose
sanctions.”695 The negotiation process followed the same pattern as had been the case on
resolution 2139. Australia, Jordan, and Luxembourg first discussed the draft among the P3, then
among the P5 as a group, and finally with the whole membership of the Council. The
negotiations lasted for six weeks, five of which were with the permanent members. 696
There was some guilt among the penholders that they were excluding the other elected
members from the initial negotiations. 697 By excluding their fellow elected members, they could
be perceived of the same exclusionary tactics for which the permanent members were often
criticized. However, the penholders realized that this approach was the most effective way to
ensure a successful outcome, as the permanent members, notably China and Russia, had to be on
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board for the draft to be adopted. 698 Moreover, a concerted effort was made by the penholders to
consult with their fellow elected members on their negotiations with the permanent members so
they would be able to engage fully once the draft was circulated to the whole Council. 699 This
effort at transparency appeared to be appreciated by the other members. 700
A number of significant concessions were made to get China and Russia on board.
Calibrating the language was a tug of war. China and Russia wanted to soften the language so
that the resolution could not be perceived as containing legally binding obligations on Syria
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The penholders wanted stronger language that would
impose such obligations. Reference to Chapter VII was struck at an early stage. 701 The threat of
article 41,702 usually a reference to sanctions, in case of failure to comply with the resolution,
was replaced with a much weaker formulation affirming that the Council “will take further
measures in the event of non-compliance with this resolution or resolution 2139 (2014) by any
Syrian party.”703 However, in spite of these concessions, the penholders did get some language
in the final draft that could be interpreted as binding, informally consulting legal experts for their
input.704 The final draft, for example, underscores the obligation of member states to comply
with Article 25 of the UN Charter, which says that “Members of the United Nations agree to
accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council...”. 705 In addition, there are several
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operative paragraphs that begin with the verb “decides” with regard to the Council’s decisions,
one of the stronger formulations used by the Council. 706
One of the key impasses in the negotiations related to the modalities for cross-border aid
deliveries.707 While Syria agreed to permit aid to be delivered at four UN-specified border
crossings not under its control, it wanted to exercise oversight of the distribution of the aid once
inside Syria.708 This constituted a red-line for the penholders and the P3,709 given evidence that
the Syrian government “had used the distribution of humanitarian aid as a tactic of war.”710 The
impasse was ultimately resolved during negotiations on 2 July 2014 between the penholders and
the permanent members, when Australia, Luxembourg, and Jordan proposed that the “UN would
notify the Syrian authorities of the contents of the humanitarian convoys, creating a notification
system that would offer transparency with no corresponding requirement for the regime’s
approval.”711 Russia appeared to accept this proposal, 712 which in retrospect represented a tipping
point in the negotiations.
Nonetheless, in spite of the many concessions made and the fact that Russia seemed to
consent to proposal offered by the penholders, a positive outcome was not taken for granted. On
the day of the vote, it was not entirely clear if China and Russia would support the draft,
although members were “cautiously optimistic.”713 One advantage that the penholders had was
that China and Russia were “clearly uncomfortable with the prospect of casting a fifth veto on
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Syria,”714 having already jointly vetoed four draft resolutions on the issue in less than three
years, including one as recently as 22 May 2014 that was drafted by France and that would have
referred the situation in Syria to the ICC. It was most likely the case that the penholders
coordinated with France, the penholder on the ICC draft, regarding the timing of the vote on the
humanitarian draft resolution. 715 Tabling this draft shortly after the vetoes in May increased the
political pressure on China and Russia not to veto another Syria resolution less than two months
later.716
Resolution 2165 was adopted on 14 July 2014 with the support of all Council members.
One diplomat involved in the negotiations maintained that it was important to get a unanimous
vote, because it “sends a message to the Syrian government.”717 The resolution authorized aid
delivery “across conflict lines and the border crossings of Bab al-Salam, Bab al-Hawa, Al
Yarubiyah and Al-Ramtha, in addition to those already in use, in order to ensure that
humanitarian assistance…reaches people in need throughout Syria through the most direct
routes, with notification to the Syrian authorities…”. 718 It further established a monitoring
mechanism, under the UN Secretary-General’s authority, to “monitor, with the consent of the
relevant

neighboring

countries

of

Syria…the

loading

of

all

humanitarian

relief

consignments…and any subsequent opening of the consignments by the customs authorities of
the relevant neighboring countries…in order to confirm the humanitarian nature” of the relief
items shipped.719 Other key elements of the resolution decided that all parties to the conflict
“enable the immediate and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance directly to people
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throughout Syria” and that they “take all appropriate steps to ensure the safety and security of
United Nations and associated personnel…”.720
In their explanations of vote on the resolution, several members emphasized the
unanimity achieved. Jordanian Ambassador Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein said that Australia, Jordan,
and Luxembourg tried their “best to come up with the highest degree of consensus,” while
adding their appreciation for “the unified position taken by the Council.” 721 Australian
Ambassador Gary Quinlan thanked his co-penholders for their efforts to bring about a
unanimous adoption, positing that: “Decisively, the Council has been united today in recognizing
that the humanitarian situation…has become even more desperate, and that immediate action is
necessary…”.722 And US Ambassador Samantha Power closed her remarks with the following:
“The Council must now take the cooperation and unity we have shown today and bring it to bear
in ensuring the end of the horrors being perpetrated against the Syrian people.” 723
Unfortunately, as of late 2017, the horrors have not ended, and these resolutions, and
subsequent ones reauthorizing cross-line and cross-border humanitarian access (resolution 2165
was authorized for 180 days), have not been as impactful as had been hoped. It would be
foolhardy, even blindly insensitive and divorced from reality, to talk about success on the
humanitarian front in Syria, given large-scale displacements, the restrictions of humanitarian
access, and the siege and starvation tactics of the regime which have continued unabated. The
lack of meaningful consequences for non-compliance with the resolutions, necessary concessions
to avoid vetoes by China and Russia, provided a greenlight for continued obstructionism by
Syrian authorities. However, resolution 2165 has had a positive impact, allowing humanitarian
720
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assistance to reach people in need who otherwise would not have received it. 724 For example, in
November 2017 alone, the United Nations noted that “902,000 people were reached through
cross-border convoys” in Syria. 725 Furthermore, the monthly reporting requirement to the
Council on the humanitarian situation in Syria, initiated through resolution 2139, has in the very
least helped to maintain a constant high-level focus on the crisis. In a Council that has been
largely feckless in recent years, the passage of these resolutions may be the closest to a bright
spot that the Council has been able to achieve on Syria, as the conflict continues to rage and a
political solution remains elusive.
Negotiations on resolution 2286: protection of health care in armed conflict (2016)
On 3 May 2016, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2286 on the protection of
healthcare workers and facilities in armed conflict. This was the first time it had adopted a
resolution specifically on this issue, although it had adopted one condemning “violence and
intimidation” against humanitarian workers.726 Resolution 2286 condemned attacks against
healthcare workers, facilities, and “their means of transport and equipment,” while “deplor[ing]
the long-term consequences of such attacks for the civilian population and the health-care
systems of the countries concerned.” 727 It demanded that parties to conflict respect and protect
humanitarian and medical workers engaged exclusively in medical activities, in accordance with
their obligations under international law. 728 It further strongly urged states to develop “domestic
legal frameworks,” to collect data, and to share “challenges and good practice” with regard to
attacks on medical and humanitarian workers engaged solely in medical activities and “their
724
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means of transport and medical facilities.” 729 The resolution requested the Secretary-General to
provide recommendations to prevent such attacks, to strengthen the protections afforded to the
wounded and sick and those exclusively involved in medical duties, and to enhance
accountability for those responsible for attacks on health care. 730 Finally, to ensure continuity of
focus on this issue, it requested that the Secretary-General brief the Council annually on the
resolution’s implementation. 731
The drafting and negotiations were spearheaded by five elected members. Coordination
among them to produce the desired outcome was a difficult task. 732 The resolution was the result
of painstaking negotiations that took place over several months, with numerous concessions
made, including to all of the permanent members, in order to secure a unanimously adopted text.
This intensive legwork was necessary, given the political sensitivities involved with such a
resolution. These sensitivities were highlighted by Joanne Liu, the International President of
Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), when she briefed the Council moments after the resolution’s
adoption. Ms. Liu stated, “The Council is charged with protecting peace and security. Yet four of
the five permanent members…have, in varying degrees, been associated with coalitions
responsible for attacks on health care structures during the past year. Those include the NATOled coalition in Afghanistan, the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen and the Russian-backed, Syrianled coalition.”733
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Indeed, the resolution had its genesis in these attacks and the toll they had taken on health
care workers and facilities. 734 In MSF’s 2015 US Annual Report—referring to attacks on MSF
facilities in towns in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Syria, and
Yemen—the President of the organization’s US Board of Directors (Deane Marchbein) and its
US Executive Director (Jason Cone) warned of “an existential threat to the practice of
humanitarian action.”735 In his 18 June 2015 report to the Security Council on the protection of
civilians in armed conflict, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern about
“continuing attacks against humanitarian and health-care workers and facilities,” 736 referring to
such attacks on such workers or facilities in several country cases, including South Sudan, Syria
and Yemen.737 Similarly, when addressing the Council during its 19 January 2016 debate on the
protection of civilians, Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson stated: “Hospitals must be treated
as sanctuaries in wartime. But recently we have seen a surge in attacks on hospitals and health
centres.”738
Those initiating the drafting and negotiations on resolution 2286 represented a regionally
diverse group of elected members with varying political interests (Egypt, Japan, New Zealand,
Spain and Uruguay), who shared a clear strategy to garner maximum support for the initiative.
(Malaysia, which had initially shown interest in a leadership role in the initiative, remained
supportive of the effort throughout but withdrew as one of the penholders; it was replaced by
Japan, which became the fifth and final penholder.) The diverse composition of the group was by
design. The logic was that the wide-range of political views and the regional diversity of the five
734
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members were a microcosm of the broader Council, thus making it less difficult to get other
members on board with the initiative. 739 The five were also careful to depoliticize the initiative as
much as possible from the outset. 740 The permanent members were excluded from the drafting. 741
Furthermore, the penholders pursued a thematic resolution, rather than a country-specific one, 742
apparently to make it clear that attacks on health care had become a serious problem in several
different contexts and to avoid charges of bias. If, for example, the resolution had focused on
attacks on health care in Syria alone, Russia would most likely have been less inclined to support
the text, and probably would have pointed to cases in which health care workers and facilities
had been bombed by the P3 or its allies in Afghanistan or Yemen. Likewise, if the resolution had
focused on attacks on health care specifically in Yemen, for example, the P3 might have argued
that it was more appropriate to have a resolution on attacks on health facilities and workers in
Syria.
By January 2016, the groundwork for the resolution was already being prepared. At the
Council’s open debate on the protection of civilians on 19 January 2016, the New Zealand and
Spanish representatives noted that they were working on an initiative to protect health care in
armed conflict, along with colleagues from Egypt and Uruguay. 743 A roundtable discussion was
convened at the New Zealand mission during January with a variety of stakeholders to
brainstorm about a possible resolution, including which elements would be most useful to
practitioners in the field, which would be most workable for the UN system, and which were not
plausible to include. 744 In addition to the penholders, the discussion included humanitarian actors
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both inside the UN system (such as the UN Children’s Fund, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health
Organization) and outside of the system (including the International Committee of the Red Cross
[ICRC] and non-governmental organizations such as MSF and the Physicians for Human
Rights).745 Advice from ICRC and MSF in particular played a key role in shaping the text. 746
While it was not until late March that the group had a draft ready to distribute to the
wider Council, the penholders made extensive efforts to be transparent about their own internal
deliberations. On 3 March, they held an informal discussion on their initiative during the
“another other business” part of consultations and “shared the objectives of the draft…”. 747 In
addition, each of the five was assigned to reach out to one to three other members in order “to
answer their questions and ascertain what their red-lines might be.”748
The negotiations among all 15 members began in earnest in early April, with a total of
three rounds with the full Council held prior to the resolution’s adoption. 749 Two of the five
penholders had the responsibility of co-chairing each of these three rounds.750 Several
compromises were struck and adjustments made to the text before it was satisfactory to all
members—both during the preliminary negotiations among the five penholders and during the
later negotiations among all members.
One key issue that was divisive was the language on accountability for attacks on health
care. When the draft was initially being discussed by the five penholders, Egypt objected to the
745
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potential inclusion of a reference to the International Criminal Court (ICC). This was to be
expected, as it was the only one of the five penholders not a state party to the Rome Statute. As a
compromise, the penholders decided not to specifically reference the ICC, but incorporated in
the text language from article 8 of the Rome Statute on war crimes.751 During the negotiations
among the 15 members, the language on accountability had to be further calibrated to satisfy the
preferences of France and the United Kingdom, who wanted stronger language on this matter,
and Angola, China, and Russia, who preferred less robust accountability language. 752 Consistent
with article 8 of the Rome Statute, resolution 2286 recalled that “under international law, attacks
intentionally directed against hospitals and places where sick and wounded are collected,
provided that they are not military objectives, as well as attacks intentionally directed against
buildings, material, medical units and transport and personnel using the distinctive emblems of
the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law are war crimes…”.753
Another sensitive issue that had to be addressed was how to address the issue of “nonpunishment” of those engaged in medical duties. Both Article 16 (2) of the First Additional
Protocol and Article 10 (2) of the Second Additional Protocol of the Geneva Conventions make
an identical point: “Under no circumstances shall any person be punished for carrying out
medical activities compatible with medical ethics, regardless of the person benefiting
therefrom.”754 However, the United States is not a state party to either of the first two additional
protocols, and it had difficulty with the language on non-punishment in the draft resolution. 755 To
address this concern, the penholders substituted “applicable rules” for “rules” when referring to
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international law regarding “non-punishment.”756 Apparently the penholders were willing to
make this compromise because they believed that “non-punishment” of medical personnel was
already recognized in customary law; its mere mention in the resolution was perceived as a step
forward, which could be used to promote ethical medical practice.757
A further contentious matter was the inclusion in an early version of the draft resolution
of language calling on medical personnel to adhere to the domestic laws of the country in which
they were working. Some members maintained that this would necessitate foreign militaries,
including their medical staffs, to abide by the national legislation of the states where they served.
This language was removed, with the resolution ultimately underscoring the need for
humanitarian and medical personnel to demonstrate medical ethics in their activities. 758
During the briefing at which resolution 2286 was adopted, amidst concerns expressed
about the high incidence of attacks on health care workers and facilities, was an
acknowledgement of the intensive labor that went into preparing the resolution, which was
adopted with sponsorship from 85 UN member states. Peter Maurer, the President of the ICRC
and the former ambassador of Switzerland to the UN, stated: “I know from my own experience
at the Organization that every comma actually has carefully been considered and negotiated, and
the result is strong.”759 Ambassador Gerard van Bohemen of New Zealand, one of the five
penholders, said that “Close consultation with all Council members and openness to negotiation
enabled its unanimous adoption,” 760 while Spanish Ambassador Román Oyarzun Marchesi
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expressed thanks to “the five permanent members of the Council, which participated actively in
the negotiations and will play an essential role in implementing the resolution.” 761
As of mid-2017, a year after its adoption, resolution 2286 had not had a noticeable
impact, with health care facilities and personnel continuing to be under assault at a high rate.
This was the assessment of several of the briefers and member states participating in the
Council’s open debate on the protection of civilians on 25 May 2017, which was chaired by the
Foreign Minister Affairs Rodolfo Nin Novoa of Uruguay, one of the co-penholders on resolution
2286, and which included a discussion of the protection of health care in armed conflict.762 As
Secretary-General António Guterres noted during the meeting, “…on the ground, little has
changed. Attacks against medical workers and facilities continue and no is spared.”763 However,
at the very least, the resolution reinforced a normative and legal standard regarding the
unacceptability of attacking medical and humanitarian workers and facilities that can be used as
a springboard for advocacy to promote the protection of health care. Furthermore, by requiring
the Secretary-General to brief the Council annually on the resolution’s implementation, the
penholders ensured an ongoing focus on this issue.
Australia’s pursuit of a sanctions resolution (2014)
Australia took a keen interest in how to improve the implementation UN sanctions during its
2013-2014 tenure on the Council. Starting in November 2012, before it even began its term, it
engaged in a systematic way with a variety of UN entities—the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Office of Disarmament Affairs, and the Subsidiary Organs Branch in the
Department of Political Affairs, among others—to enhance its own understanding of UN
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sanctions and to advocate improved implementation measures.764 While on the Council, it was
one of five member state sponsors—along with Finland, Germany, Greece and Sweden—of the
High-Level Review of UN Sanctions, an initiative of the Watson Institute and Compliance and
Capacity International conducted in 2014, intended to improve UN sanctions implementation. 765
A compendium of the results of the review was produced in 2015. 766 Australia spearheaded one
of the review’s three working groups (Working Group I), the one that focused on bringing the
different parts of the UN system together to better implement sanctions. 767
In preparing for its November 2014 presidency of the Council, Australia planned to hold
a briefing on sanctions late in the month at which in hoped to table a resolution on sanctions
implementation. A key objective of the draft resolution was to bring various parts of the UN
system together more effectively in implementing sanctions in order to make this area of the
world body’s work more professional and, as much as possible, less politicized. 768 Australia
sought to cast sanctions as a collaborative tool, “whereby the Council, sanctions committees,
regional organizations and the UN system would work with the subject state.” 769 One of the more
innovative proposals in the draft was its request to establish a “Policy and Coordination Unit”
within the UN Secretariat’s Security Council Affairs Division (SCAD) that would discern best
practices, marshal expertise within the UN system on how to make sanctions more effective, and
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support the Council in helping to guide member states in implementing sanctions. 770 The draft
charged SCAD with helping member states to obtain capacity building and technical assistance
regarding sanctions implementation.771 It further encouraged Special Representatives of the
Secretary-General, the senior UN representative in countries with UN peace operations, to make
sure that all UN entities understand their part in carrying out sanctions imposed by the
Council.772 And it called for enhanced cooperation on sanctions-related issues between the UN
and intergovernmental, sub-regional, regional and international organizations, such as the
International Civil Aviation Organization, INTERPOL, and World Customs Organization,
among others.773
Before it began its November 2014 presidency, Australia had already consulted with the
all Council members about its intention to propose a draft resolution on sanctions and had even
circulated a first version of the text. 774 China and Russia were uncomfortable with the draft from
the start; there were two major sticking points for them. The first one was the draft resolution’s
call for the special unit in the Secretariat to discern best practices, among other tasks. Russia
perceived such a unit as infringing on the decision-making authority of the Security Council. 775 It
further thought that such a unit could be manipulated by influential member states to serve their
political purposes.776 The second major concern for both China and Russia was that the
penholder would not include language in the draft indicating that the only legitimate sanctions
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are those imposed by the UN Security Council. 777 This was most likely an especially sensitive
matter for Russia, which was the target of bilateral sanctions because of its military involvement
in Ukraine and had seized the Crimea only some months earlier in March 2014. As John
Langmore and Jeremy Farrall have noted, a sanctions resolution “was a risky initiative to pursue
particularly in light of the non-UN sanctions that were in place against…Russia at that time by
the United States, the European Union, and even Australia itself following the Crimea and
eastern Ukrainian crises.” 778 Beyond the particular elements of the draft resolution, a more
fundamental challenge in getting support for the initiative was the caution with which China and
Russia approach sanctions in general. One E10 diplomat serving on the Council at the time
noted: “Russia and China…persisted in the belief that sanctions were a punitive, coercive
measure to be applied against the most egregious states as a last resort.”779 This view was in
sharp contrast with that of Australia, which tended to see sanctions in most cases as an
instrument to help countries get out of crisis, rather than as a form of punishment. 780
The Russian and Chinese views were clearly on display during the 25 November 2014
briefing on sanctions that Australia chaired. 781 Russian Ambassador Churkin appeared to roundly
criticize the potential establishment of a new Secretariat sanctions mechanism. He stated: “…we
believe that it would be unwise and harmful to periodically toss around ideas…regarding the
creation of additional bureaucratic barriers, whether inter-state or at the level of the Secretariat.
Moreover, what we detect in such initiatives is not simply the danger of creating excessive redtape but an attempt to consolidate the approaches of a narrow group of States with regard to the
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issue of sanctions, as well as to infringe on the exclusive prerogatives of the Security Council
itself with regard to sanctions.”782 Churkin added that: “The Secretariat has nothing to do with
issues relating to the implementation and development of relevant recommendations.” 783 With
equal clarity and verve, he took aim at unilateral or non-UN sanctions. He stated that “we should
not overlook…the illegitimacy of unilateral sanctions,”784 while lamenting that “there has been a
number of attempts via unilateral restrictions to circumvent the Security Council.” 785 Churkin
further posited “that such actions only undermine the system of international relations and
torpedo political and diplomatic efforts in the quest to resolve situations.” 786 This position was
consistent with Russia’s call during the negotiations for the addition of language in the draft
resolution stating that sanctions by national and regional actors (i.e. outside of the UN context)
violate international law, a proposal that Australia turned down. 787 During the briefing, Chinese
Deputy Ambassador Wang Min, like his Russian counterpart, maintained that “…a small number
of countries act at will according to their domestic laws and impose or threaten to impose
unilateral sanctions against other States, which is not only in violation of the principle of
sovereign equality among Member States but also undermines the authority of Council
sanctions.”788 Wang further maintained that: “Sanctions should not be a tool for one country to
use in pursuit of power politics.” 789
Australia was unable to table the draft resolution at the briefing, as it had hoped. It had
held several negotiating rounds at expert level and produced numerous revised drafts. 790 Bilateral
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negotiations between Australian Ambassador Gary Quinlan and Ambassador Churkin were held
both the weekend before the (Tuesday) debate and ensued in the days after the debate.791
According to one E10 diplomat at the time, “China recognized that Russia had the greater
political concerns and would have only supported the resolution if Russia had acquiesced on the
text.”792 However, the impasse with Russia could not be broken. As reflected by Churkin’s
intervention in the briefing, Russia would not relent on its unwillingness to cede greater
administrative power to the Secretariat. 793 The sanctions imposed on Russia by Australia as a
result of its actions in Ukraine may have been an additional factor fueling Russia’s
intransigence.794
Australia ultimately decided not to bring the draft to a vote, avoiding what would have
been a Russian veto and possibly a Chinese one. Some modest advances had recently been made
in the Council’s sanctions work, mostly related to transparency. 795 Australia, which chaired three
sanctions committees,796 and other elected members had begun to brief on the work of their
committees in open sessions, whereas the norm had previously been closed briefings. 797
Furthermore, the UN Secretariat at the time had recently begun to publish on the Security
Council’s website a monthly program listing the meetings of the various sanctions
committees,798 while these committees were interacting with increased frequency with states that
were targeted by sanctions and other regional states. 799 As one Security Council diplomat at the
time has maintained, a vetoed draft “would have a chilling effect on the changing practice that
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was …occurring without the resolution.” 800 Australia did not want to risk undermining the
progress that had been made.

Conclusion
This chapter has maintained that a major reason for fewer vetoes (and greater voting unanimity)
in the Council in the post-Cold War era as compared to the Cold War era is because of the
evolving role of the elected members. Although the elected members from the NAM would
frequently propose drafts in the Cold War with a high probability of being vetoed, the elected
members in more recent years have been more circumspect about tabling resolutions that might
fail to be adopted. They have often worked hard to build bridges among the permanent members,
making painstaking efforts to achieve successful outcomes and leading negotiations that have at
times lasted several months as part of these efforts. Recent examples of such initiatives by the
elected members have been highlighted in this chapter.
A few general conclusions can be drawn from the analysis. First, by and large, the elected
members take their role on the Council seriously. Elected members often serve for reasons other
than mere prestige, trying to make a positive contribution during their two year tenures. Second,
as the Syria and the protection of health care case studies demonstrate, they at times ban together
to pursue initiatives, ostensibly because proposals will have greater appeal if they are pursued by
a range of elected members. Third, and perhaps most depressingly for the E10, their room for
maneuver is highly limited. Because of the veto (and the threat of the veto), any proposal for a
draft resolution on all but procedural matters requires the acquiescence, if not the support, of all
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the permanent members, as evidenced by the negotiations on the Australian sanctions draft
resolution proposed but not put to a vote in November 2014.
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VI: Whither the Council?
This project started with the puzzle of why the P3 voted together in the Security Council a higher
percentage of the time in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War, when one might have
expected greater voting unity among them as a result of the common threat from the Soviet
Union. Given the high level of voting unity in general in the Council in the post-Cold War era, it
also led to broader consideration of why Council members place so much emphasis on the
importance of unanimity. In other words, if the rapprochement between the United States and the
Soviet Union was not the only reason for greater unity in the Council, what were the other
reasons?
A number of conclusions emerge from the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras in
searching for answers to these questions. First, a strong Non-aligned Movement (NAM) exerted
considerable influence on the Council’s agenda from the early 1960s onward, often proposing
draft resolutions with little chance of being adopted. Drafts that NAM members proposed on
Israel/Palestine, Namibia, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and other issues frequently resulted
in vetoes or abstentions by one or more of the P3. Second, France and the United Kingdom
viewed the Council as a danger to their colonial interests in the early part of the Cold War, rather
than an instrument crucial to promoting their foreign policies, as they have in recent decades.801
Charles de Gaulle, French President from 1959-1969, was particularly critical of the United
Nations, even encouraging the French mission in New York to abstain on draft resolutions rather
than seek agreement. 802 Third, negotiation processes were not as developed as they have been
since the late Cold War period, when the East-West thaw led to a greater appreciation of the
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potential for a more effective Council and greater attention was focused on hashing out
differences and making compromises so as to promote more unanimous decision-making.
The post-Cold War era has been marked by greater voting unity as reflected by the high
percentage of resolutions adopted with the support of all members and the decrease in the
number of vetoes. With the end of the gridlock that plagued the Council until the late Cold War
period, this organ become a more central tool of the foreign policies of its members, both the
permanent and elected members alike. The Council was, is and likely always will be a forum for
political grandstanding, but this has been more muted in recent decades than during the Cold
War, notwithstanding the deterioration of Russia-US relations in recent years. The pursuit of
unanimity has been a reflection of how important the Council is to its members and can be
attributed to several factors:
•

the perceived legitimacy that a unanimous decision accords a resolution, with the
expectation that the wider membership will be more likely to respect and abide by the
resolution;803

•

the notion that a unanimous decision exerts more leverage on the subject parties, who at
least in theory will not be able to exploit divisions among Council members;

•

the view among those drafting resolutions and leading negotiations (nowadays
disproportionately the P3) that a unanimously adopted resolution is a sign of good
stewardship of the Council’s work; and

•

the stigma of being isolated attached to those members who might abstain or vote against
a resolution that has broad support.

On the Council’s legitimating role, see, for example, Mats Berdal, “The UN Security Council: Ineffective but
Indispensable,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003): 9; Inis L. Claude, Jr., “Collective Legitimation as a Political Function of
the United Nations,” International Organization 20, no. 3 (1996): 367-379; and Ian Hurd, After Anarchy:
Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2007).
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Trying to answer the questions posed in this dissertation has generated a number of
additional questions and observations that provide fertile ground for additional research. First,
while members frequently emphasize the importance of unanimity, there are legitimate questions
about how much of an impact a unanimously adopted resolution has in comparison to one that
does not have unanimous support. Second, while the P3 does most of the drafting of resolutions
and managing of negotiations, one can question whether and for how long this will continue,
given questions about the Council’s ineffectiveness in recent years and about the right of France
and the United Kingdom to serve as permanent members given their waning geo-politics
influence. Third, since China is the least engaged in drafting and leading negotiations of all the
permanent members, it would be interesting to investigate whether it will play a more assertive
role in the Council’s work in the years to come, especially considering its growing role on global
security matters, or whether it will maintain its more measured approach. Fourth, while the
Trump administration has been highly critical of the United Nations and has cut funding for UN
entities, there is evidence that in some respects it has found the Council useful in achieving its
foreign policy goals and that, at least to this point, its engagement with the Council has not
represented as significant a departure from prior US administrations as might have been
anticipated. These issues are briefly discussed before the chapter concludes with some final
observations on the current state of the Council and its role in world affairs moving forward.
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What is the value of unanimity?
It is often presumed that a unanimously adopted text has more impact than one not garnering 15
votes, with members regularly equating more unified decision-making with enhanced
effectiveness. But is this assumption correct? The answer is not clear.
There are numerous cases in which the implementation of non-unanimous resolutions has
been problematic, particularly when there are abstentions from permanent members or
abstentions and negative votes from other influential members. Resolution 1593, which referred
the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court (ICC) in March 2005, was adopted
with abstentions from Algeria, Brazil, China and the United States. In the years since, the ICC’s
investigations in Darfur have been controversial, and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, who
has been indicted by the court for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, has
travelled abroad with impunity. Even state parties to the Rome Statute of the ICC have not
apprehended him, as is their obligation under the Statute, when he has been on their respective
territories. Resolution 2303, adopted in July 2016 with abstentions from Angola, China, Egypt,
and Venezuela, authorized the deployment of up to 228 UN police in Burundi for one year “to
monitor the security situation and to support OHCHR [Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights] in monitoring human rights violations and abuses.” As a result of the resistance
of the government of Burundi, no doubt observing and exploiting the divisions in the Council,
the police were never deployed. Resolution 2304, adopted in August 2016, with abstentions from
China, Egypt, Russia, and Venezuela, authorized the deployment of a Regional Protection Force
(RPF) in South Sudan to enhance the mission’s ability to protect civilians and the airport in the
capital city of Juba. As of October 2017, South Sudan has persisted in its refusal to allow the
force to protect the airport and repeatedly delayed in providing visas to some of the peacekeepers
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in the force. These examples demonstrate that divisions in the UN’s peace and security organ can
complicate the implementation of the resolutions it adopts. They give credence to the view that a
divided Council is a less effective one, especially when powerful members are not clearly
supportive of the resolutions adopted.
However, the notion that unanimity is the gold standard should be accompanied by three
key caveats. First, sometimes the sought-after unanimity is not possible, and a resolution that is
not unanimously adopted is better than no resolution at all, or a resolution that is significantly
diluted to achieve the support of all members. Second, non-unanimous resolutions can be
faithfully implemented if the permanent member(s) abstaining, or the elected member(s)
abstaining or voting against the resolution, have little inclination or ability to block its
implementation. For example, resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, which authorized “all
necessary means” to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, was adopted with 12 affirmative
votes, two negative votes (Cuba and Yemen) and one abstention (China). The lack of unanimity
on the vote was of little importance; the resolution provided political and legal backing for the
US-led campaign to oust Saddam Hussein’s forces from Kuwait, and the Council’s response to
Iraq’s aggression strengthened its credibility. 804 Third, it is frequently the case that a unanimous
resolution is not faithfully implemented—both by those Council members whose affirmative
votes are merely a sign of acquiescence rather than full-throated support or by other influential
states that have the capacity and influence to affect the behavior of the subject parties.
Regardless of whether a resolution is adopted unanimously or not, the will to implement it must
be forthcoming—especially from the permanent members of the Council and other influential
Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1997), 252. Pérez de Cuellar has written that “it was an extraordinary feat of American diplomacy to keep the
Permanent Members together (or, in the case of China, to keep it from blocking the desired action) and to gain
sustained majority support in the Security Council for action against Iraq that was in important respects without
precedent.”
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states (whether on the Council or not). For example, it makes little difference that all the
permanent members agree to support a resolution on the protection of health care in armed
conflict (i.e., resolution 2286 of 3 May 2016) if they are unwilling to adhere to the resolution or
to exert sufficient leverage on the parties that are violating it to change their behavior.
Indeed, the view that unanimous resolutions will be more readily adhered to or
implemented by those members adopting them (or by the wider UN membership) and that such
resolutions will increase the likelihood of compliance by the subject parties needs to be carefully
scrutinized and raises several interesting questions for further research. Are Council members
(and other UN member states) more likely to implement unanimously adopted resolutions than
ones adopted without the support of all 15 members because they perceive them as having more
legitimacy? Are the subjects of unanimously adopted resolutions more likely to comply with
them than with resolutions that do not receive the support of all members? In other words, do
subject parties perceive that “the full weight of the Council” is being brought to bear on them, as
members sometimes profess with regard to unanimously adopted resolutions? Even if all 15
members vote in support of a resolution, how well do the subject parties recognize the difference
between acquiescence and committed support for the resolution by permanent and other key
members? If they do pick up on these differences of perspective, how effectively do the exploit
them? These questions merit further study, as the answers to them are not entirely clear.

Breaking the P3 penholder stranglehold?
It is frequently observed that the composition and the privileges of the permanent members of
the Security Council no longer reflect the realities of geo-politics. In large part, this is a criticism
of the fact that France and the United Kingdom are still part of this elite club, even though their
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great power status is questionable. However, structural reform of the Security Council, which
could weaken their influence at the horseshoe table—and that of the other P5—is not on the
horizon for a variety of reasons, including the unwillingness of the permanent members to forfeit
their privileged positions and the inability of the rest of the world to decide on a mutually
acceptable reform proposal that they can rally around to exert pressure on the permanent
members. It is further unlikely that a larger Council would be more effective or responsive in
preventing, managing, or resolving conflicts. The 15 members already have enough difficulties
managing their differences, and adding more members would only complicate the political
tensions among them. Nor is it apparent that the potential candidates for permanent membership
would necessarily have a significant impact on the work of the world body’s peace and security
organ if they were to be given permanent seats, especially if those seats were not to come with
the institutional benefit of the right of veto. As Colin Keating has written: “From 2010 to 2013,
the elected members….included Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Turkey,
and Mexico. But it is fair to say that this…concentration of ‘heavyweights’ had only minimal if
any impact on the power relationships between the P5 and the elected members, and on the
overall quality of the Council’s output relative to other recent periods.” 805
Reform efforts will remain mired in the General Assembly, precluding the possibility
that powerful elected members such as those that Keating refers to will become permanent
members any time soon. At the same time, France and the United Kingdom will continue to cling
to their outsized role in drafting outcomes, and consequently, managing negotiations, amidst
persisting questions about whether they deserve that right.806 Influence in the multilateral system,

Colin Keating, “Power Dynamics Between Permanent and Elected Members,” in The UN Security Council in the
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Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016), 149.
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as embodied by the UN, remains critical to them. As French Ambassador François Delattre
observed in a statement soon after France assumed the monthly presidency of the Council in
October 2017: “Our presidency doesn’t come out of the blue. It is very much anchored…in favor
of a [sic] efficient multilateralism and a strong UN. This is at the core of French diplomacy.”807
The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union will likely increase the role it places on its
engagement with the UN.
Both France and the United Kingdom have highly competent diplomatic corps, and can
legitimately claim they have strong historical and cultural ties to many of the countries on the
Council’s agenda by virtue of their colonial past, including several cases on which they hold the
pen. But is this enough to justify the extent of their influence in stewarding the Council’s work?
And do they play a constructive or negative role in stewarding the Council’s engagement on
those issues on which they have strategic interests or cultural and historical attachments? With
respect to the United Kingdom, how much will its exit from the European Union (i.e., Brexit)
magnify the importance that London places on its role in the Security Council and in other
international fora? Answers to these questions are worthy of further exploration.
One plausible scenario is that the role of France and the United Kingdom as penholders
will be increasingly challenged by elected members, who question the legitimacy of their
influence and who want to make their own mark on the Council’s work. Complaints against the
United States as a penholder will probably be more muted, because it remains the most powerful
country in the world and therefore can justify its influence. These complaints will focus more on
a perceived lack of consultations with the E10 when preparing resolutions and presidential
statements, rather than on whether the United States merits the right to draft a high percentage of

François Delattre, Briefing on France’s Presidency of the UN Security Council, organized by the World
Federation of United Nations Association of the United Nations, 2 October 2017.
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outcomes. In general, the elected members will continue to chafe at all of the P3’s domination of
the pen if they believe that they are not adequately consulted; if they believe that they have good
ideas that the Council can pursue, but are discouraged from taking initiative; or more broadly, if
they do not believe that the penholder is doing a good job of managing the issue under
consideration.
It is extremely difficult for the elected members to break the penholder stranglehold of
the permanent members on country cases of considerable strategic importance to the P5. With
some exceptions, the elected members have traditionally been afforded more latitude by the
permanent members in taking the initiative on thematic resolutions, such as those on health care
in armed conflict, mine action, and small arms and light weapons, among other issues (i.e., not
on country cases).808 However, there are indications that that the exasperation of the elected
members, both with the outsized role of France and the United Kingdom and with the inability of
the P5 collectively to resolve some of the more difficult issues of our time—such as South
Sudan, Syria and Yemen, among others—may be reaching a breaking point. One important issue
to consider is how assertive the elected members will become as their ire with their
marginalization by the permanent members rises and as their concern with Council’s
shortcomings in addressing the difficult international peace and security environment compels
them to fill the perceived void in responsible action left by the permanent members.
There is evidence that they are trying to push back and are not passively accepting their
second class status. During its February 2016 presidency of the Council, Venezuela proposed a
presidential note on improving the transparency and practices of subsidiary bodies of the organ.

Notable exceptions include the Syria humanitarian initiative and Afghanistan; the Council’s work on Afghanistan
is focused on overseeing the UN’s political mission in the country: UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
(UNAMA). It should be noted, however, that the elected member that holds the pen on Afghanistan is invariably a
close US ally over whom the United States exerts strong influence. In 2017, for example, the penholder was Japan.
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In a reversal of normal procedure, it negotiated the text first among the elected members before
sharing it with the permanent members, the apparent rational being that elected members are the
ones who generally chair subsidiary bodies.809 The note was adopted on 22 February 2016. 810 In
April 2017, when the permanent members were gridlocked over how to respond to the Khan
Shaykhun chemical weapons attack in Syria, with the P3 proposing a draft resolution that Russia
found unacceptable and countered with its own draft to which the P3 objected, the ten elected
members tried to break the impasse by crafting their own draft resolution. This was ultimately
rejected by the P3, with US Ambassador Nikki Haley complaining that “compromising with
Russia for a watered-down draft resolution would have only strengthened [Bashar] Al-Assad.”811
Elected members disagreed with Haley’s view.

When a revised P3 draft was vetoed by

Russia,812 Ethiopian Ambassador Tekeda Alemu posited that:
what the resolution was supposed do was to call for a thorough investigation [of the
chemical weapons attack] to ensure accountability based on the results of an independent,
professional and impartial process…What could have easily resolved the issue was to
turn to already agreed language from previous resolutions. That language is strong
enough to convey the message and ensure that the objective is achieved, namely, to hold
those responsible to account. We tried, as the 10 elected members of the Council, to work
towards that end.813
Of course, while elected members at times demonstrate resistance to the permanent members’
dominance of the Council, this example demonstrates how futile their efforts often are. The
institutional and political realities are simply too significant for the elected members to play a
sustained leadership role. As Ambassador Elbio Rosselli of Uruguay said at the same meeting in
which Alemu lamented the unwillingness of the P3 to consider an E10 compromise draft on the
Security Council Report, “Working Methods Debate,” What’s In Blue, 9 February 2016,
http://www.whatsinblue.org/2016/02/working-methods-debate-2.php.
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Khan Shaykhun attack: “The privileges that distinguish the various Council members calls to
mind an expression from the novel of George Orwell, ‘Animal Farm’, namely, that some animals
are more equal than others. That legal, but dishonest, imbalance means that many members are in
a situation where they have to choose the lesser of two evils in terms of the options before
them.”814
The E10 have several options available to them to challenge the P5. Any elected member
can break the coveted unanimity by abstaining or voting against a resolution if it believes the
negotiations are poorly handled by the permanent members or if its views are not adequately
taken into account. 815 Furthermore, since much of the Council’s work is done by consensus
(sanctions committees operate by consensus and presidential and press statements require the
support of all 15 members), any elected member can kill a presidential statement or press
statement or block the work of sanctions committees by mere non-acquiescence. However, the
key question for an elected member is whether and when taking such measures is worth it, both
for the sake of the Council’s work and for one’s own well-being. Standing up to the permanent
members is a risky proposition, particularly when political or economic retribution from a
permanent member may ensue and the desired outcome of greater input in decision-making and
respectful treatment may not follow.
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What about China?
It is unclear why China is the least directly engaged of the permanent members in the
management of the Council’s work in terms of drafting and negotiating, especially considering
its significant geo-political influence. As Zhu Wenqi and Leng Xinyu have argued, “Since the
mid-1990s…the United Nations has played a growing role in Chinese foreign policy
thinking.”816 It has demonstrated increased willingness to use its veto over the past decade for
several reasons, including those related to state sovereignty and non-interference, as
demonstrated with respect to Myanmar, Zimbabwe, and Syria. 817 As of 30 June 2017, it was by
far the leading contributor among the permanent members of UN peacekeeping personnel and
the 12th overall contributor among UN members states more broadly, with 2,515 personnel
deployed.818 China contributes 10.25 percent to the UN peacekeeping budget;

819

this is well

behind the United States, which provides 28.47 percent of the budget, but still second among all
UN member states.820
And yet, as Wenqi and Xinyu note, it is “disinclined to take the lead on either
contemporary security crises or the thematic discussions among member states…” 821 and its
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“overall profile in the Council remains deliberately understated relative to its global heft.” 822
Why is this so? Is it because China prefers conducting its diplomacy bilaterally? 823 Are there
cultural reasons for China’s preference for low-key diplomatic engagement in the Council?
Given that there has been an evolution in China’s engagement with the UN, marked by greater
involvement in peacekeeping operations and an increased willingness to use the veto, and given
China’s important role in world affairs, might its approach to the Council become less low-key
over time? In other words, will it become more involved in proposing initiatives and drafting
outcomes? Such questions merit investigation.

The Trump administration’s engagement with the Security Council
While only one year has transpired since US President Trump assumed office, it is already
abundantly clear that his administration views the UN as bloated and inefficient and that it chafes
at what it perceives as the world body’s unfair treatment of close US ally Israel. Along these
lines, US Ambassador Nikki Haley has said: “You can be sure we’ll continue to look at ways to
increase the U.N.’s efficiency while protecting our interests.” 824
The Trump administration’s reservations about the Security Council are consistent with
this view. It is frustrated by the monthly public meetings in the Council on the Middle East,
because they generally focus on Israel/Palestine, rather than the misdeeds of the Iranian or Syrian
governments. Trump and Haley were infuriated when the United States was forced to cast a veto
in December 2017 on a draft resolution isolating it for recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of
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Israel. It has also consistently looked for ways to cut the peacekeeping budget; while the Council
does not manage this budget, it does mandate and oversee peacekeeping operations.
However, it would be wrong to assume that the United States under Trump does not see
value in the work of the Security Council. It found the Council useful in unanimously adopting a
series of resolutions that significantly strengthened sanctions on the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 2017. As Mark Leon Goldberg has written, “when it comes
to confronting some of the toughest global challenges, like non-proliferation and terrorism, the
United States still believes it is in its best interests to work with the Security Council, and not
around it.”825 Furthermore, while legitimate concerns have been raised about the cuts to UN
peacekeeping operations that the administration has demanded and continues to demand,826 these
seem to reflect a desire for more efficient and cost-effective operations as much as the
administration’s “America-first” mentality. The verdict is still out regarding how detrimental
current and future cuts will be to the effectiveness of the peacekeeping missions the Council
mandates. However, it should be noted that the United States showed willingness in 2017 to
compromise with other members in reductions in the numbers of peacekeepers in operations in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Abyei. 827 In the Central African Republic, where the
security situation is highly unstable, it agreed to an increase in the number of peacekeepers.828
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As of early 2018, Trump himself has already hosted Security Council members twice in
the White House, after little more than a year in office. 829 While one admittedly must be careful
not to read too much into Trump’s words, as he is not known for his honesty and has shifting
opinions, it is striking that during the Council’s second visit to the White House on 29 January
2018, he told members: “We’ve already done…tremendous…coalition building, and the United
Nations Security Council, in particular, is very important to us. The power and respect it has all
over the world is…excellent.” 830 These words are not what one would expect from a president
dismissive of multilateralism.
There was considerable division in the Council in 2017. There were six vetoes, which
was the most since 1988. While this level of discord is troubling, it should nonetheless not be
exaggerated. The Council was already divided before Trump came into office. Furthermore, five
of these vetoes were on a single issue, chemical weapons in Syria, 831 and the Council managed to
achieve a considerable degree of unity on several other issues. Only two of the 61 resolutions in
2017 were not adopted unanimously. This compares favorably to 2016 in which 10 of the 77
resolutions were not adopted unanimously and one draft failed to garner the requisite 9 votes to
be adopted, although admittedly there were only two vetoes during 2016.
The bottom line is that while changes in US policy have been reflected in the Council—
for example, support for Israel is more pronounced, there is stronger emphasis on cost-saving in
peacekeeping operations, and efforts to address climate change as a security issue are not being
supported—there is yet to be an indication that the overall US view of the Security Council has
represented as significant a departure from the past as would seem at first site. By and large, the
Goldberg, “One Year In, The Trump Administration Seems to Have Learned to Like the UN.”
Quote taken from Goldberg, “One Year In, The Trump Administration Seems to Have Learned to Like the UN.”
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administration has not subjected the UN Security Council to the same level of scorn as, for
example, the UN Human Rights Council; the UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) (from which the United States withdrew in 2017);832 the UN
Population Fund (UNFPA) (which the United States announced it would stop funding in April
2017);833 and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (which
is expected to suffer from the Trump administration’s decision to slash US financial support).
From a cynical perspective, it does seems that Ambassador Haley enjoys the spotlight offered by
the Council, which is enabling her to burnish her domestic reputation among certain conservative
elements of the electorate and serves as a springboard for possible future political ambitions. 834
Nonetheless, while it is unclear how US engagement with the Security Council will unfold
during the remainder of the Trump administration, it values the UN’s peace and security organ as
a useful instrument of US foreign policy, despite its criticism of the United Nations and its cuts
in funding for UN peacekeeping and other UN entities.

Conclusion
The Security Council is going through a difficult period. The Council remains engaged in
longstanding crises in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Israel/Palestine, and
Western Sahara, with little to show for its efforts, and it has had limited success at best in
supporting political solutions to the more recent conflicts that have come onto its agenda since
2011 in the Central African Republic, Libya, Mali, South Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
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Tensions between Russia and the United States have affected dynamics in the Council for the
worse.
While this negative depiction of the Council does not leave much room for optimism, one
could argue that expectations of what this organ can do need to be tempered. The permanent
members were accorded the veto to ensure their participation in the new world body at the end of
World War II and to ensure that the Council would not be used as an instrument against their
core interests; the UN would likely not exist if the P5 were not given the right of veto in the
peace and security organ. 835 The gridlock in the Council with regard to conflicts in Syria,
Ukraine, and Yemen is to be expected because the strategic interests of the great powers clash in
these cases; a continuation of this gridlock in the Council will continue until and unless the
permanent members come up with a political arrangement among themselves that is also
acceptable to the respective host countries and key regional states.
Another major challenge in the Council’s work, also described in Chapter IV of this
dissertation, is the fundamental disagreements over the nature of state sovereignty, especially
among the permanent members, but also among the elected members. How and when this organ
uses instruments at its disposal under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, such as sanctions,
international legal prosecution, or the use of force—and more broadly, how it chooses to engage
with states that are the subject to its resolutions—is very often a decision about how much the
sovereignty of the target state should be temporarily forfeited. As noted earlier, China and Russia
generally have more traditional views of state sovereignty than the P3, who tend to be more
amenable to pursuing Chapter VII measures. Even in cases in which members agree with the
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basic diagnosis of the problem, they have sometimes had difficulty developing a common
approach because of their different views on state sovereignty (for example, South Sudan). As
the Council continues to manage a heavy agenda of crises, its members will frequently be
divided on appropriate responses, if and until there is a shared understanding of when and how it
is permissible to pursue Chapter VII measures, or threaten their imposition as a way to exert
political leverage.
However, for all of its shortcomings, the Council plays a critical role in the foreign
policies of its members. The quest for reaching consensual arrangements is very often a
reflection of this fact. While I have attempted to demonstrate that unanimity in and of itself is not
necessarily a good thing, there is much to be said for the Council’s impact on issues on which its
members, especially the permanent ones, agree. The Council may never do enough to satisfy its
detractors, but when its most powerful members are united—and are willing to back their
decisions with political will and resources—it can make a positive difference on international
peace and security.
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Appendix: List of Interviews
Arria, Diego, former Venezuelan ambassador to the UN, New York, NY, 19 September 2016.
van Bohemen, Gerard, former New Zealand ambassador to the UN, New York, NY, 1 November
2016.
Greenstock, Jeremy, former UK ambassador to the UN, interviewed by phone by the author,
New York, NY, 3 March 2017.
Mendez, Wilmer, current political coordinator of the Venezuelan mission to the UN, 1 January
2017.
Yañez-Barnuevo, Juan A., former Spanish ambassador to the UN, New York, NY, 12 December
2016.
Various former and current diplomats and UN Secretariat officials with knowledge of the UN
Security Council in New York, NY and East Hampton, NY, between June 2016 and August
2017.
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